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Executive Summary
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
In the second half of the eighties, the Spanish economy
achieved among the fastest rates of GDP and investment
growth within the Community. During this period, the
country has made major progress in indusaial reorganisa-
tion, inreforming and starting to open up the financial sector,
and in liberalizing capital flows. It has also entered the ERM,
albeit with wide margins
Foreiga capital inflows have been heavily encouraged by the
twin factors of strong perceived opportunities forreal invest-
ment urd high rates of interesL That has been both necessary
and appropriate in a period of demand dynamism charac-
teristic of an economy €ngaged, after a painful readjusbnent
between the mid-70s and the mid-8Os, in a process of real
convergence. Nevertheless, the spurt in growth in recent
years has not yet restored the relative income level (vis-l-vis
EC parhers) of the early 1970s. But this strong real catching-
up process caused inflationary pressures from the demand
side which, taking account of the remaining rigidities in the
economy, in due course have also become evident on the
costs side.
Despite genuine supply-side improvements a number of
sbuctural deficiencies persisl particularly in the labour mar-
ket in the public finances and in an inadequately competitive
structure of many sectors, most notably services, irrcluding
financial services.
Fast growth of output in Spain has engendered impressive
gains in employment (very largely ternporary-conhact em-
ployment) and an increase in participation rates. Nonethe-
less, the uremploSrment rate, while well below the peak of
229orcachd in 1985, is still at a level (around 16% ) much
higher than in most other Community counhies. Moreover,
rapid employment expansion has been associated with me-
diocre growth in productivity. Inflation, which was below
5% n L987, peaked at mqe thanT% last year and currently
at around 5.5% rernains clearly out of line with inflation rates
in the original narrow-band ERM countriesr. A notable fea-
ture of inflation performarrce in Spain has been the wide dis-
parity between inflation in industrial goods (where inflation
convergense with narrow-band countries has already been
achieved) and services, where particularly high rates of in-
crease in prices have been reconded recently.
At least part of the observed behaviow of relative inflation in
se,rvices sectors in the recent past can probably be asoibed to
macroeconomic factors - a demand boom outstripping cur-
rent domestic supply potential. Nonetheless, there is clearly
an underlying sbmctural problem in sen ices in Spain : inzuf-
ficient competition combined with - or even created by - the
regulatory public policies pursued in areas zuch as health,
truxport and comrnunications has led to an inefficient allo-
cation of rpsources in the economy as a whole and has there-
by reduced ttrb volume of output and employment consistent
with any given rate of overall inllation. Thus structural fac-
tors almost c€rtainly con&ibuted to the acceleration in over-
all inflation in Spain in 1988p0 as output and employment
increased faster than the short-term capacity ofthe economy
to grow without shains.
Domestic demand was growing fast and progressively in ex-
cess of output leading to a trade and current account balance
deterioration. Public savings did not increase enough to com-
pensate for the reduced saving rate of the households, result-
ing in insufficient domestic savings to finance the strong
investrnent process.
The restrictive measures adopted in 1989 together with a fur-
ttrer worsening in expectations in reaction to the Gulf crisis
allowed a slowdown in domestic demand which halted the
growth in the trade deficit and stabilized the inflation rate,
despite the temporary effect of oil price increases.
Nevertheless, some confidence about moderation of dise-
quilib,ria, combined with the optimism associated with the
special events of 1992, could restore the economy to a tem-
porary new expansionary path.
The main goal for the economic authorities has been and
should be to maintain investors confidence in prospects for
the economy. That means that improved economic efficiency
should be fanslated into productivity, and external competi-
tivity gains, to allow a non-inflationary and sustained path of
economic growtlr"
A policy of wage moderation would conkibute to avoiding
the risk of a re-emergence of overheating in the economy.
But, an incomes policy will not be effective in restraining in-
flation if the growth of aggregate demand is excessive. In
this raspecl a slowdown inreal wage costs wouldreduce the
pressure on demand tlrough a reduction in the real dispos-
able incomes of households and would positively affect the
cost formation process. In a dral labour market such as exists
in Spain, where wages are set in the perrnanent segnrent of
the market, an incomes policy p'resumably has a more in-
stitutional aim : to ensure, whether by persuasion or by legal
compulsion, a &gree of wage moderation that the non-com-
petitive structure of the labour market is unable to produce.
But it carmot replace the required reform of the labou mar-
ket
On ttre otlrer hand, a policy of global wage moderation might
prove to be ineffective in damping inflation since employers
would be more ready to widen profits by simply increasing
prices in a context of booming demand. In this respect, the
slowdown of demard in 1991 has forced some moderation
Monetary policy has faced significant constraints. Condi-
tions of shong extemal confidence and high interrest rates
have encouraged substantial capital inflows and have created
the well-known dilemma between allowing the peseta to ap-
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preciate at lhe expense ofpreserving exchange rate stability
(near the top of the ERM wide band) or continuing redrcing
interest rates, with the risk of an undesired domestic demard
expansion As Stage 2 of EMU approaches, the possibility of
an independent Spanish monetary policy response would be
further limited" But, as long as full nominal convergence has
not been achieved, monetary policy, although subject to con-
straints, should remain restrictive.
Therefore, a major contribution from budgetary policy might
be required However, there would clearly be both practical
Iimitations and drawbacks to an active countercyclical use of
fiscd policy. What is more, the key iszue for fiscal policy
will not only be its role as a demand stabilizer but rather its
impact on the supply side through the implementation of tax
reform (lowering corporation tax relief, reducing the direct
tax burden on households, limiting tax fraud and indirect tax
harmonization) and the reshaping of public expenditure
(lower current expenditwe and sustained public investment).
The Economic and Financial Situation in Spain
PART I
THE ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL SITUATION IN SPAIN
0. Introduction
The Spanish economy, after a long*awn-out and difficult
period of adjustment in the 1970s and erly 1980s, showed
considerable dynamism in the second half of 1980s, with
shong growth in employment output url - in particular - in-
vestment, much of it financed by capital inflows. This dy-
namism has partly reversed the previous steep fall in income
levels in Spain relative to those in the Community as a
wholg but the counEy's income levels are still around Z)%
lower than the EC average.
The recent period of dpamism has since 1988 been associ-
ated with a rising real exchange rate and the emergence of a
large current account deficit more than matched by capital
inflows - but also with an overheating economy and an in-
crease in the inllation rate that only began to turn dowrr
somewhat after spring 1990.
This study seeks to analyse and explain these developments
in terrns both of pnvate sector behaviour and of economic
policies, and to assess the challenges faced by the Spanish
economy as it moves towards 194 and the second stage of
EMU.
The first part reviews the supply-side factors underlying
Spain's riecovery, from the mid-1980s, after a very difficult
decade. It concludes that genuine zupply-side improvernents
have taken place, wen though they have not as yet been re-
flected in a sharp acceleration in productivity. It also points,
however, to a number of persisting structural deficiencies.
The second part analyses tbe problem of macroeconomic sta-
bilization - in terms of demand, activity and inflation - un&r
the impact of supply-side developmenls and in the presenoe
of conshaints on policy. A following section assesses the
prospects for the current cycle to enter a new phase in which
nominal disequilib,rium can be reduced while avoiding too
strarp a slowdown in activity so that earlier investrnent bears
fruit in higher productivity and an adequate return to foreigrt
and domestic investors. An improvement in competitiveness
via greater mastery of domastic cost increases, coupled with
an adequate budgetary policy, is identified as the key to
achieving the degree of nominal convelg€,lrce necessary for
Spain to enter Stage 2 with confidence. However, as thepen-
ultirnate section of the report recalls, the process - inevitably
a long one - of Spanish real convergerrce is likely to generate
new cycles in demand. The study reflects on the policies
available to react to such cycles, and points to the choices
that will have to be made in facing the challenge of carrying
the catching-up process forward while achieving the degree
of nominal convergenoe necessary for future stages of EMU.
1. Supply-side performance and challenges
The Spanlsh economy underwent a palnful adJustment
after 1!174....
From 1985 to 1990 the growth of the Spanish economy
(4.5% per year on average) was among the highest in the
Community. Theboom in investrnent arrd employment char-
acterised ttris period, &ring which GDP per head caught-up
five percentage points compared to the EC average.
Nevertheless the present situation only represents a retum to
the relative levels of the first half of the 1970s. Between
1975 and 1984, Spain lived tlrrough an exceptionally long
and deep economic crisis. A new political and economic
model was taking shape at a time when the economy was zuf-
fering 0re impact of the two oil shocks. Over ten years, fixed
investment fellzz%,ernployment declined 15 96, consump-
tion zuffered a long stagnation and GDP per head lost ten
p€rcentage points relative to the EC average.
During this period the Spanish economy was still charac-
terised by widespread non-marlcet behaviour of economic
agents, trying to avoid competition and asking for public
zubsidies, a high degree of protectionism and large institu-
tional rigidities in different markets.
As theunemploymentrate grew from 3 % nl974to229on
1985, ttre public sector tried to maintain social cotresion and
support the costs ofreorganisation ofthe industrial and fin-
Greph l: Spdn: GDP per Crpltr PPS,
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ancial sectors. The general goverffnent deficit, close to zero
in the first half of the 1970s, reached some 7 % of GDP in
1985. Gross public debt rose from 12 7o of GDP in 1974 to
45 Vo in 1985.
.... but the ground was belng prepared ......
At the end of 1982 the new govemment, enjoying a large ma-jority and initia[y backed by the trade unions, implemented
a stability-oriented economic strategy in order to regain do-
mestit: and extemal confidence.
After the &valuation of ttre peseta @ecember 1982), a more
stringent monetary policy was implemented and an accelera-
tion of the restucturing of the industial and financial rys-
tems took place. The latter, together with the policy of wage
moderation, led to both an improvernent in productivity ard
a sharp deceleration in unit labour costs. This, in turn, re-
sulted in a strong rccovery of the gross operating surplus per-
mitting an improvement in the financial situation of
companies, and paved the way for a boost to inveshenL
Moreover the apparent rate of retum in the Spanish economy
has risen much faster than the EC average sirpe 1984.
The business climate benefited from worldwide economic
expansiorl the prospect of EC entry, lower real inte,rest rates
and the 1986 fall in oil prices. Moreover the hend toward
economic liberalisation gained momentum with the supply-
side economic reforms enacted in 1984-1986, notably in the
field of frnancial and exchuge controls and labour ma*et
legislationl.
EC entry led to the phased dismantling of extemal tariffs ant
to the introduction of the VAT, with an implicit widening of
the tax base. As a result of some expenditure moderation and
increasing receipts, the general government deficit fell about
4 perrcentage points, in terms of GDB to 3.2 % in I 987.
These changes under way consi&rably incr€ased the attsrc-
tiveness of the Spanish economy for foreign investors not
only as a platform to reach the wider EC martet (tlpical of
US andlapanese investrrents), hrt also as adomestic mutet
in itself with an enonnous potential growth rrd high proc-
pect of profitability. Foreign direct investment hcreesed its
role in sustaining rapid economic growth and in mo&mizing
indusEial structures, business management rnd know-how.
.- for a mqfor supply-sldc lmprovement...
During the six years to 1990, Spain achieved an impressive
investrnent performance (+ N% in rcal terms partially sup-
pofied by a four-fold increase in rmports of capital goods),
which laid the foundatiors for a stnengthening of the produc-
tive base and for an acceleration of potentid growth. In this
period the manufacturing sector mo&rnised its productive
structure, even reorienting to sorne degree towards activities
with higher capital content new areas of specialization and
diversification of products, ant becoming more involved in
inha-industry EC trade.
The good results in recent years have permitted a shengthen-
ing of the financial structure of the enterprise sector. The
self-financing rate rose by 20 percentage points between
1983 ant 1988 and the dependence on bank crrdit has been
substantially rcduced" Thus, in spite of a re&rctim in p,rofits
in 1990 aod 1991 Spanish enterprises remain in a financial
position which is much more solid than sonre years ago and
comparable to European competitors
Grrph 2: Cost Greph 3: Net Retura ol Nct Cepltrl Stocf
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The improved btrsfupss climate resulted in a large irrrease in
emplo5rment (+LSVo in the six years to 1990), but it was ac-
companied by a sharp increase in laborn market participation
and an increase in the potential Iabour force. In consequence,
the unemplolm.ent rate fell slowly and has now stabilised
around l6%o,ltut without any apparent moderating influence
on the wage formation process.
The main feature of the rise in employment has been a re-
mutable increase in temporary-conhact workers, especially
in the service sector. Between 1987 and L99O,UEo of total
new employment was located in the sen ice sector; 85% of it
comprised ternporary worters. That fact has had a double ef-
fect Fint, the presenoe of a high strare of temporary workers
means that firms have been able to moderate average som-
pensation per wor&er during a period wben economic activ-
ity has accelerated rapidly. Second, t€mporary workers have
expanded employrent mainly in low-wage jobs in the ser-
vice sectm, pulling down the averaga
At the same time, abigger increase of emplo5nnent inthe ser-
vice sector, which is traditionally labour-intensive, than in
the industrial sector explains why aggregate productivity
growth in fie uptum has beenmodesl
Unit lsbour cosB have been growing faster than in those
countries in the narow band of the ERM since 1979. In
temrs of external competitiveness, higher growth of unit la-
bour costs together with tlre nominal appreciation of the
peseta meant a s$stantial appreciation of the real exchange
nte and, therefore, a loss of competitiveness of Spanish
goods aDd services in the extemal ma*et, especially against
ell industial countries (namely due to the US dollar fall).
In spite of the current productivity differentials, Spain's
lower level of labour costs, comparcd with those of EUR 7,
still make it attractive for foreign inveshenL Moreover, an
appreciation of the rcal exchange rate (or, in other words, a
rpduction in competitiveness) is a feature of a "catching-up"
procesll.
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..... that stlll needs to be carrled further.
Although great efforts have been made to eliminile rir-
idities, some important structural constraints still exist
. The need for investment in infrastructure and social ser-
vices is still very high. Combined with this is a need for te-
chnological innovation, mqnagement modernization and
rationalization of thc size of firus to be maintained.
. The opening-up of the economy as a reult of Spain joinfuU
the EC has seen import penetration rise. The s lare of output
going for export hos remained at a low levelinspite of gains
inEC markets.
. The greater opening-up has not affected all prodrctive sec-
tqrs to the same extenl The semice sector, except for tou-
rism, remains quite closed. The lack of external
competition in the service sector allows the existence of a
wide divergence of product prices and inflation as betr*reen
tradeables and non-tradeables. The persistence of a high
core of inflation pressures fmm services affects the whole
of the economy through the indexation of salaries to a glo-
bal measue of inflation
. The expansion in the number of temporary worfters since
1985 has actually magnified the degree of. segmentatbn in
the labour market. The rigidities are mostly embed&d in
that part of the market where permanent workers predomi-
nate; they explain why rwmitwlwages luve not responded
to comparalively high levels of urcmployment utd at the
same time, contribute to the persistence of that level of
unemployment. The principal features are : evidence of
mismatch the difficulty of new entrantrs especially young
workers in penerating the permanent sector of the labour
market, reduced job search, and the compression of regio-
nal pay differentials.
. Fiom the regional side, the problems of finding a job in low
activity regions, and the obstacles to formal employment
creation in the private sector in those regions, are exacer-
bated by the structure of collective bargaining. National
collective bargaining tends to be conducted within Orc high
activity regions; the transmission of national wage settle-
ments from high-activity to lower-activity regions leads to
a comparatively low degree of dispersion in regional wage
differentials. But unlike experi€nce in some other European
countsies, a more cen&alized collective bargaining has not
contributed to sorne disciplinary effect in wages growth. In
terms of output levels, therecent upswing in economic ac-
tivity has failed to prrodrce a hend towards regional conver-
genca The diversity of performance between backward and
p'roqperous regions has not been corrected. This re,presents
a fiscal brnden and limits the potential market of the gro'
wing regions
. Although a significantreduction has been achievd the ge-
neral govemment deficithas persisted. Atthe same time, ra-
gional administrations have also had increasingly
imbalanced accounts which have been ur additional obs-
tacle to roducing the overall deficiL As regrds expenditure,
the possibility of exceeding budgetary limits, the high level
of subsidies to public enterprises and a lack of efficient
control over expenditures are the principal features that still
exisl On the revenues side, the extensive fiscal fraud and
the long delays in achieving a consolidated tax system are
the main structural problems.
. From the comparison of Spanishfinancial institutiors with
those in other countries, they seem to have had traditionally
high€r ttran average intermediation margins. The multipli-
city of buks and overb,ranching involve diseconomies of
scale. This, combined with overstaffing, has maintained the
cost of channelling rtsourc,as at a high level. However, the
intensification of banking competition has caused, since
1990, a ubstantial decline in intermediation margins
. The role of lhe Spanish Stock Exclnage in charurelling pri-
vate sector savings towards inveshnent projects is a modest
one. Moreover, the low level of market capitalization (pri-
mary market) and the very limited volume of ransactions
(secondary market) denote a clear lack of development in
the Sponish bond market, with the exception of the public
debt market organized by the Bank of Spain.
These factors taken together are both symptoms ard causes
of the persistent grp between rpd incomes in Spain and those
in the richer member countries of the Community.
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2. Problems of stabilization
An lmprovement ln supply prospects led to savlng-ln-
vestment lmbalancc...
hom the fust half of 1988 onwards the Spanish economy
started to show signs of overheating which became more ob-
vious in the following year. From 1986 to mid-1990, domes-
tic demand has been growing fast and progressively in
excess of output, reflected in a trade balance deterioration
and, from Spring 1988, causing a rise in inflation. Buoyant
domestic demand was pushed upwards not only by n"ry
shong investrnent but also by private and public consump-
tion
The high rate of ernployment creation, associated with accel-
erated economic growth, was reflected in a sustained rise in
household disposable income. This upward trend was reirt-
forced by increases in non-labour income also. In addition,
asset inflation resulted in a significant "wealth effect" for
asset holders, while simultaneously diverting household ex-
penditure flows from investment into consurnption goods.
Finally, as consumer expectations turned markedly positive,
after several years of depressed economic condrtions, the
household saving rate fell.
... and the eoonomy overheatcd...
The incapacity of domestic saving to ltnance the srong in'
vestrnent caused a growing current account deficit. The en-
ding of ttrc period of budgetary adjustment meant that public
saving did not hcrease enough to compensate for the re-
duced household saving rate.
The p,resence of very sffong domestic demand, while con-
straints from productivity capacity left indigenous supply
unable to respond and to adapt quickly to the new require-
ments of the domestic market, caused a switch to external
sources. Thus, the shift in internal demand towards imported
goods sharply increased the hade and current account defi-
cits. A substantial fall in tourism receipts (fromi.2%o of GDP
in 1986 to 3.8Vo in 1990) turther aggravated the deficit in the
current account balance.
At the same time as domestic demand was growing clearly
faster than that of Spain's main trading parfil€rs, the reap-
peiranc€ of accelerating inflation in the second half of 1988
togetler with a significant nominal appreciation of the peseta
caused a zubstantial loss of external competitiveness which
negatively affected trade in goods and services.
On the other han4 one of the main underlying factors behind
the current inflationary p,rocess is the pressure from domestic
demand on services. That sector, which still remains very
closed to external competition, is able to transmit excess de-
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Greph l0: Reel domestlc demend & lmporls of goods
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mand to prices, becoming the hard core of inflation and an
obstacle to its reduction.
In 1988 ard 1989, there is some eviderrce that rising proht
margins contributed in the same proportion to final prices
than did wage inflation : it seems that the presence of very
strong domestic demand produced increased mark-ups. In
1990 and 1991, however, the fast increase in nominal wages
was the main factor behind the rise in frnal prices. External
factors, namely import prices and the exchange rate, have
been playing an important role in partly offsetting the posi-
tive contribution to prices from domestic factors.
.- lncomes pollcy became less effectlve..-.
After 1986, the possible scope for a zuccessful anti-inflation-
ary policy was redrced. In 1986, increased tension in indus-
trial relations meant that only the wage provisions of the
Social and Economic Agreernent (AES) negotiated in 1984
were implemented" Since 1987, no further social pact be-
tween economic agents has been reached Further, the offi-
cial inflation target for 1988 (3Vo) was too ambitious and
damaged the credibility of tlre economic authorities. This led
the unions to ask for catching-up clauses in their collective
conventions for that year while high profit margins made
employers more ready to accept both the indexation formula
and the high wage claims. The inflation target was again
overshot in 1989, triggering a prrcess of wage "catch-up",
despite ERM enEy : compensation per employee in 1990
rose by 1.7 percentage points faster than in the year before
and unit labour costs reversed the previous downward hend
increasing by 6.6Vo in the total economy. These develop-
ments took place in a context of very strong demand growth
which never helps wage moderation.
1987 1988 1989 1990
consump- 5.7 5.1 6.6 6.4 5.8
Final Uses 5.0 4.8 5.9 5.7 5.2
Of which contribu- 5.3 5.0 6.0 6.3 5.6
tion of domestic
(l) Includes contributions of unit labour costs, net indirect
t xes, gross operating surplus end the exchange rate change
required lo comlrcnsste for movements in domestic labour
costs relative to those of comoeti
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... as flscal pollcy dld not respond ...
Uncertainty about the extent of overteating as well as a
breakdom in the socid dialogug and tbe apparently com-
fortable budgetary position achieved by 1988 (a primary bal-
ance close to z€ro and a decline in Ore debUGDP ratio)
resulted in a budget for 1989 that was clearly expansionary.
As a result domestic demand continued on an upward tend
with anannual growthrate above 8% in the finthalf of 1989.
During 1989, some restrictive measurcs were implenrnted
in order to reduce the expansionary effects of the initial bud-
geL These measuts (earlier payment deadlin€s as well as
higher advanced Payren$ of corporation taf and ircr€ases
in wittrholding tax) augnrnted levenues in 1989. But since
they were not accompmied by changes in income tax, they
implied a reduction in revenue in 1990 and 1991.
In addition, after several annual rwisions to the saluies of
public worters and state pensions in line with official infla-
tion targets which were lower than the acEal outtum for in-
flation, the so-called "social debt" also had to be paid in
1990.
On the other hand" institutional difficulties hampered budge-
tary policy. The Constitutional Courtdidnot accept elernents
of the income tax legislation, thus, putting back the fiscal
calendar for 1989 by several months and defenfury ircorne
tax repayments to the next year. Consequently, ret borrow-
ing by general govemment was reduced by 0J% of GDP in
1989,butraisedWO.4% in 1990 and0.2% in 1991.
Moreover, the b,ringing forward of the general election to
October 1989 acted as ur additional obstacle to change in fis-
cal policy while the expansionary policies of regional gov-
emment similarly excluded any sigrrificant moderation of
expenditures.
Consequently, the net borrowing of gemal govemmenthas
slightly deteriorated from the low level rpcorded in 1987,
allowing for changes in the fiscal calendr.
Grrph 13: Nct lendlng or net borrowhg of 3ocrd
govertrEctrt
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lcavlng monetary pollcy heavlly burdened ...
The absence of a wage concertation policy for 1989 and the
procyclical or, lt best, neutral stance of fiscal policy left
monetary policy the sole instrument for fighting inflation.
But monetry policy faced significant constraints: conditions
of strong external confidence and a fast-growing economy
encouraged very zubstantial capital inllows and created the
well-lnown dilemma betweem: (i) allowing the peseta to ap-
preciate, at the expcnse of a deterioretion of the fonaigr sec-
tor, while the trade deficit was alresdy large; (ii) reducing
$ort-t€rm int€rest rates, pro&cirU in consequence a loss of
control of monetary aggregates and an un&sired domestic
demurd exprnsion that would contribute to the overheating
of theecononry.
The nature of the dilenme can be seen in that the restsictive
stance of monetary poliry frorr Octob€r 1988 onwards (in-
t€rest rates rose from 105% in Septerrber 1988 to 14.5% n
July 1989, remaining at arotmd this level into 1990) furtuced
short-term capital movements that benefited from interest-
rate differentials in a framework of favourable expectations
of the stability, or even appreciation, of the peseta. At the
sanrc time, a substitution from internal to foreign credits took
place in order to cope with the high€r than expected growth
of private sector demand for credit (L5% ln 1988 against
Ll% tzr;se[ed|). As a result the growth of the targeted mon-
erary oggregate (ALP) in the first half of 1989 accelerated
and, zubsequently, moved above (outcome of 10.4%) the
uppet limit of the target range ulnounced for 1989 (6.5%
9.5%).
In respmse, the Bank of Spain applied restrictive monetary
policy measures in January 1989 @oth the compulsory
reserrre coefficient and the inte,nention rate were raised) utd
additional measures to discourage capital inflows (r ?i%
qpecial non-interest bearing deaosit with the Bank of Spain
on new foreigrr borrowing by banks, and a 30% mandatory
and non-remunerated deposit with the Bank of Spain on the
unount of new foreign finarrcial cr€dits and loans by com-
panies).
-. 
whllc ERM cntry was beLry prepared...
TheERMentry6i6a61imFly a "qualitative jump" in thegui'
delincs and imple,mentation of exchange rate policy. On the
institutional and t€chnical side, the authorities had already
introduae4 since 1987, some specific changes in view of an
EMS integration in the npdium t€rtrl:
(0 the Bank of Spain sigred, on 12 May 1987, the Adhe-
sion Act to the Basle Agreement according to which
Spain puticipated in the process of creation, utilisation
and remuneration of ecu's in the framework of the
FECOII4
(ii) The Bank of Spain afuitted the ofticial quotation of the
ecu from I July 1987, which implied thp consideration
ofthe ecu as another foreigrr currency;
(iii) A set of almost imperceptible institutional changes
wae applied in ord€r to promote ttrc required adapta-
tionto thenewEMS rules. Aclearexample of the latter
were the liberalisation measures of 4 Fehruary 1988 in
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the exchange martet that supprassed the interventionist
procedures, theprominentrole sf ths f,ank sf Spain and
the zubstitution of the US dollar by tbp DM as the in-
tervention currencll
... and constralnts were lncreaslng.
On the policy instnrment side, tb efficiency of monetar5r
policy has been increasingly constrained since 1986 by ex-
change-rate developments in combination with some lib-
eralization of capital moyements. In particular, during
1986-87 the monetary authorities se€m€d to be watching the
DI\4&ta rate closely and from Feb,nrry 1988 to Iure 1989
the peseta was already I "de facto" member of the system
when the Bank of Spain shadowed the ERM snd intervened
in the exchange markets accordingly. When the new ex-
change market inte,lrention system was introduced in Fe-
b,tuary 1988, the authorities decided to fix a central rate
vis-tr-vis the DM with a +14% fluctuation bands. Official
ststem€Nrts prompted the markets to produce, in effecl a
downward realignnrnt of the pesefa in tbe months leading
up to official ERM entry.
It was thus peftaps in the period leading up to ERM entry
that monetary policy was most constsained. Inflationary
pressures were building up in 1988 and tbe frnthalf of 1989.
The initial inflation target for 1989 (of 3Vo) htd first to be
revised to 5% and then abandoned. This situationcould have
been counterbalanced through a policy of wage moderation
and a morp restrictive fiscal policy. Considerations of short-
te,nn stabilization would - in the absence of assistarrce frocr
fiscal or other policies - have pointed to a tighter moretar5l
policy that if maintaine4 would have inevitably induced a
sipificantly higher rate for the peseta" However, the auth-
orities hadERMentry inmin{ ents5r at ahighratemightnot
have been compatible with the medium-term needs of the
Spanisheconmy.
A dilemma of this sort may imply that the concept of the
"right" raie for entry is irrelevant Enrbracing ttre ERM disci-
pline wi0r all its credibility advantages ratber implies tha! in
a dynamic economy, any elrtry rate means accepiing policy
implications in otber areas.
The decision to enter the ERlvf, on 19 June 1989, according-
ly ernphasized the need for a tighter stance of fiscal policies
and for additional support to monetary policy. As arcsult, in
early July 1989 the Governrrent and the Bank of Spain ap-
proved additional restsictive fiscal and monetary measures
and intoduced a system of credl'f ceiliags for ewh individual
bank Tbese measures proved to be effective in decelerating
domestic d€mand in 1989 Q.8%) and though L99O (4.6%),
and so the authorities lifted the credit ceilings on 1 Ianuuy
1991 and the mandatory deposit on foreigrr bo,rrowing in
Much.
Entry into the ERM immediately reduced short-term capital
moverents of a speculative nature since the expectations of
further appreciation of the peseta were frustrated, but up-
gradd tbe status of the currency vis-l-vis intemational in-
vestms and attacted more permanent capital flows given the
preveiling high interest-rate diffe,rential. By the time of entry,
inflation had already accelerated but demand pressures wene
dready at or near their peak Thereafter, the position of the
p€seta near ttp top of the band undoubtedly contributed to
containing, and ultimately reducing, the inflationary prass-
ures already existing.
Nonetheless, the Spanish experience has again suggested
that in s context where capital movements have become
more intense and interest rate sensitive and within an ad-
justable-peg regime such as the EMS, domestic monetary
policy has a reduced margin of manoeuvre. Although targets
for both mmey aggregates and the exchange rate can be set
consistently (ex ante), any disturbance, whether to money
demand or to aggregate demand, in either Spain or some
otber important ERM countries, may make the two targets
inconsistent ex post ifthere is no policy offset in otlrer areas,
notably fiscal policy.
Grept l{: Blhtcrel spreed betreen the Pcsetr rnd lhe
wcrlcst ERM currency
,r
tt
!0
I
a
t
,
0
The Economic and Financial Situation in Spain ll
3. The pursuit of convergence as EMU
progresses
Nomlnd dlsequlllbrla are belng reduced ...
The restrictive measures adopted in 1989 started to ov€r-
come the main disequilib,ria in the Spanish econmry in the
course of the following years. The Gulf Ctisis an4 conse-
quently, a firther wors€ning in expectations also helped in
the acljusfirent Thuq the main feature of Spain's economic
performance in 1990 and 1991 was r slotvbwn in bmestic
demand which halted the growth in the hade deficit and
slightty redrced the i$lation rate, despite the tempmary ef-
fect of oil price increases.
The improved trend in the trade balance (from -6.3% of GDP
in 1989 to -5.4% in 1991) was made possible by lower
growth in the imports of capital and intermediate goods as
well as by tbe slowdown in domestic demand and the emer-
ge,nce of extemal martets - Spanish trade has been positively
affected by Crerman unification'- which have raised exports.
Nevertheless, the current account deficit remained above 37o
of GDP due, mainly, !o structural problems in the tourisnr
sector.
Behind these trends remain serious imbalances which
tbreaten short-term prospects for the economy. Within do-
mestic dernand equipment investment appea$ to be particu-
larly sensitive to the restrictive measures and the
deterioration in expectations, while building investnent re-
mains zupported primadly by public sector activigr and con-
srmption growth in nondurable goodsrernains high"
The deceleration in domestic desrand has not been suffici€nt
to dampen the hard core of inflation Services prices (+9.9%
in the twelve months to October 1991) are i&ntified as the
main source of inflationary pressure. At the same time, lower
demand as well as thereappearance of internal costpressures
has squeezed profitability, rasulting in a slowdown in invest-
ment and in a deterioration in the previously favourable ern-
ployment trend (employment grew only by 0,5% in the
second half of 1990, and did not change in the frst half of
199r).
.- but rlsks perslst both ln the short term and ln the
long term.
Some confidence about moderation of disequilibria, com-
bined witr the optimism associatedwith the special events of
192 - Spain will host the Olympic Games arrC the Universal
Fair - couldrestore the economy to a temporary nqv expan-
sionary palh. If, however, economic agents have not changed
their previous patt€rns of behaviour, it will be very likely that
a further serious adjustment will be necessary theneafter.
The sharp increase in salaries in 1990, followed by insuffi-
cient wage moderation in 1991, is carsing a shift in inflation-
ary pressures from the demand side to the cost side. Despite
a slowdown in economic growth, the improverrent in nomi-
nal convergence could be lower than reqired. The rise in in-
direct taxes planned for January 1992 and January 1993
could delay further a rapid re&rction in the inflation rate.
The main goal for the economic authorities has been and
should be to maintain the internal and external confidence in
prospects for the economy, avoiding a situation in which ex
post rehrnrs or investments re depressed. Improved econ-
omic efficiency shouldbe &anslated in themedium term into
productivity and external competitivity gains, to allow a
non-inflationary and sustained path of economic growth.
However, an improvenrnt in competitiveness would dlow
extemal demand to more actively support domestic prodtc-
tion" The required stability in the exchange rate after the
peseta's entry into the ERM means that competitiveness
must be maintained in the labour martet ttnough control of
the treNrd of domestic unit labour co$s relative to competi-
tqs.
Areduction in the inflation rate, transnritted to costs, would
help the tradeable sectors of the Spurish economy to expand
their $ale of extemal martets.
Thc crdibility of anti-inflationary policy has played an im-
podant role in therecent prosperous period and it has been
reinforced by ERM entry. The efforts to follow a credible
path towards nominal convergence with the more stable
countries has been a condition "sine qua non" for triggering
the zuccessful catching-up process. Nevertheless, it is essen-
tial to ensure that the catching-up prcess is sustainablq i.e.
consistent with nominal stability so as to avoid the risks of an
irregular "stop-go" path in economic growth.
In any case, the catching-up already achieved by conzump-
tion in drnable goods and investrnent in equipment, suggests
that a new shong recovery will not induce so high a growth
rate in domestic demand and, consequently, the same level of
disequilihia as experienced in the late 1980s.
Structural lmprovement ls stlll ncoessary:
As far as supp$-side policy is corrceme4 the flexibility of
the diffenent martets fo,r factors of poduction in Spain has to
be firther enhance4 dong the lines suggested in earlier sec-
tions. Special attention should be paid to eliminating rig-
idities in the permanent workless' segment of the labour
ma*et and !o inhoducing higher competition levels in the
service sector, namely, in transport, communications and
health care services" Moreover, other policies of a structural
nature should also be implemented in order to introduce
greater price discipline in the non-tradeable sector of the
economy.
The successfirl implenrentation of this policy would irrrease
the overall efriciency of the economic system paving the way
for higher expected r€turns on real capital, encouraging in-
vestment (which initially contributes to demand but not to
supply), and for more optimistic real income expectations,
2 Spanish exports of goods to Germany ro*by 23% in 1990 arrd399o in the first ten months of 1991.
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leading to redrced savings ratios. Thus, such supply-side im-
provernents might also trigger a renewed demand boom.
Wage moderatlon ls deslrable.
A policy of wage moderation would conhibuteto aoiding
the risk ol a re-emergence of overheating ia the ecornmy,
and help the convergence process as has been the case in a
number of other ERM countries. Such a policy could involve
agreements, extending over otre to thee yean, and difreren-
tiated according to sectoral andregional p,rodrctivity levels
A slowdown inreal wage costs would redrce the pressure on
demand though a rpduction in the real disposable incores
of households and would positively affect the cost formation
Proqess.
But, a policy of global wage moderation might prove to be
ineffective in damping inllation since employers would be
more ready to widen profits by sirnply increasing prices in a
context of booming demand. The slowdown of demand in
1991 offers a good opportunity to pursue this moderation
One possibility worth considering could be that both em-
ployers and employees should be ready to accept that a part
of their revenues would be devoted to build up pensions
funds and to finance training courses to cope with the labour
market mismatches.
Monetary pollcy must be kept tlght ...
In 1991, the constraints on monetar5l policy have become
more evident as very heavy net long-terur capital inflows
(24.5 bn$ from January to September 1991) have tended to
interfere with the implernentation of the ligidity control in
the economy. The continuous stnength of the peseta in the
ERM and some moderation in inflationary pressur€s led to a
reduction in interest rates by between two and thee points in
the fust half of the year.
As Stage 2 approaches, the possibility of an independent
Spanish monetary policy response would be further limitd
by full capital liberalization' and a move to the narrow ERM
band. Credibility of the stability-oriented Spanish economic
policy would however be rcinforced and the parity-grid of
the pre-1991 period would be more credible for economic
op€rators even in the presence of short-term prospects of
economic divergence vis-l-vis ERM counhies in t€rms of
domestic demand growth, price-inflation and current ac-
count widening. As long as full nominal convergence has not
been achievd monetary pohcy, although subject to con-
stsaints, should remain restrictive.
... medlum.term budgetary ecflon b necded and f,scal
reform remalns lmportant
Amajor contribution from budgetary policy to counteract e
period of nominal divergencc in output and price perfor-
mance might be required. Howerrer, there would clearly be
both practical limitations and drawbacks to an active
countercyclical use of fiscal policy.
Eirst countencyclical changes in tax rates or experditures ue
likely to be inimical to the zupply-sida Moreover, the pro-
cess of closer monetary integration will force all member
counhies towards sonp form of (nef) tax competition Sec-
ond" fiscal fire-tuning may become procyclical rather than
stabilizing since inadequacies in forecasting, the existence
of lags and uncertainty about the final impact of frscal policy
may appear. Thir( the proce.ss of regionalisation inaugur-
ated in the 1978 Constitution has led to some &gree of fiscal
federdism in which thp control of the central authorities over
expenditure magnitudes fm the public sector as a whole has
beenredrced.
The key issue for fiscal policy will not only be its role as a
demand stabilizer but rather its imprct on the suppty side
though : (i) the implementation of the tax reform wouldre-
duce tax frau4 the deductions allowed to the corporation tax
and the tax burden for households and would harmonize in-
direct taxes with the EC; (ii) thereshaping of public expen-
diture - narnely subsidies to corporations - to diminish the
weight of cururt expenditure and to maintain public invest-
ment so as to improve the supply-side of the economy.
3 Recently, economic authorities have announced the rernoval of the remaining capital movements rcstsictione before lanuary
L992.
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4. Summary and conclusion
Spain has in recent years enjoyed a period of strong growth,
sparked mainly by the important stnrctural changes that
preceded and accomprnied the country's accession to the
Community.
Although this dynamism - reflected in particularly sfong
growth of investment - can be expected to prodrce, event-
udly, a sharp improvement in productivity and potential out-
put its manifestation has so far beeir largely in an expansion
of de,rnan( together with strong growth in employment, not-
ably in services.
Demand in the Spanish economy ran atpad of shoil-term
potential, pmducing a real appreciation of the peseta and the
emergence of a large curqrt-aecount deficit The very srb-.
stantial catching-up in consumption, mainly for durable
goods, and investment which already occurrcd during the
second half of tbe 1980s zuggests that growth in the next few
yean is likely to be le.ss hectic than experienced in the p€dod
following accession to the Community. In consequence, the
risk of rc-emergence of disequilibria on the scale experi-
enced in the late 1980s will be much less. What is more, the
persistence of existing imbalances and the requirements for
entry to EMU preclude any possibility for expansionary
economic policies. So, while growth will remain above the
Community average (real GDP should expand at a rate
slightly abve3Vo in 1992), the economy can now be said to
have entered a new phase in which real activity and employ-
ment will expand at a more moderate pace. It might be ex-
pected that recent reductions in both the current account
&ficit and the inflation rate will be canied forwar4 this lat-
ter after absorbing the effect of TVA increases. A pe,rnature
relaxation of policies combined with expectations linked to
the special events of 1992 could lead to an undesirable "stop-
go" process, in tum putting long-terrr capital inflows at risk
The key to avoiding such an outcome lies in an improvement
of competitiveness via greatermoderation of domestic costs,
a process in which the expectations-shifting impact of the
ERM will play arola
In any evenf the spurt in growth in recent years has not yet
restored the relative income level (vis-i-vis EC parhers) of
the early 1970s. This reflects both the accelerated growth
momenh,rm in the core Community countries and the nega-
tive effect of remaining structural deficiencies in Spain.
These persist in labour markets, in public financg in u in-
adequately competitive stnrcture of many sectors, most not-
ably senices, including financial services. Such stnrctural
improvements would lead to an increase of productivity and
competitiveness which, in turn, would permit the current
process of real and nominal convergence to be maintained.
14 Statisthal Annex
Thble 1: Flnal uses ofgoods and servlces and other key agregates ofthe Spanlsh economy
1985-88 1989 1990 1991(a) 1992(a)
% change over precedlng perlod at constant 1986 prlces
Private consumption
Public consumption
Gross fixed capital fcrnation
4.9
6.2
12.7
10.2
16.4
5.5
7.6
t3.7
14.9
tz-L
3.7
4.4
6.7
to.7
t.2
3.1
4.2
2.2
5.3
-2^5
3.3
3.8
3.6
4.0
3.0
of which: construction
equipment
Exports ofgoods and services
ofwhich: goods
tourism
Irnports of goods and se,lvices
of which goods
GDP atmartetoricqs
4.4 2.9
4.0 6.4
4.5 :7.2
4.2 6.7 7.0
8.3 8.5 7.4
6.0
7.516.3
17.4
4-9
17.0
17.7
4-8
-8.6
8.1
7.4
7-7
1.0
8.1
8.5 7.8
2-S q_1
% change over precedlng perlod
Industrial production
Employment
Unemploymentrate
Compensation of employees per head
u.L.c.
Impllclte prlcc deflators:
GDP
Private consurnption
Expods ofgoods and services
Irnports ofgoods and serrrices
Terms of trade
3.6
3.1
20.3
7.5
5.9
4.5
3.6
t7.t
6.1
4.8
{.1
2.6
16.1
7.7
6.7
.i,
15.8
7.8
5.9
- 
t.,
15.5
7.0
5.1
7.3
6.5
1.3
45
6.1
7.0
6.6
4.4
2.3
2.O
7.3
6.4
t.7
-1.2
2.9
6.7
5.8
1.6
-0.4
2.0
5.8
5.6
3.5
3.2
0.3
Trade balance (Fob/Fob) in % of GDP -3.8 -6.3 -5.7 -5.4 -5.6
Current receips of General Gover:unent
Current expenditure of General Govertrment
G.F.C.F. of General Governrnent
t4.6
11.4
17.5
t3.9
10.1
13.0
11.9 tt.z
11.9 10.8
15.0 9.313.9 26.9 26.8
Net_bsr-o_w-Eg-Qpsal_9-ojy@srsrrt-r$_96-.o-f_QD_P_---- 
__-:!2__---_-__-27--------_{,0____---_-:-3_.9_____-___:3_.f___
Money zupply (ALP) - end of year
Intemal credit private sector - end of year
12.7
14.7
11.0
17.6
11.8
t0.2
8.5
8.1
8.3
9.0
(a) CommissionForecasteOctober-November1991.
SOURCE: I.N.E. and M. of Economy.
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Table 2: Flnal uses ofgoods and servlces (constant prlces, quarterly flgures)
1989-m 1989-rV 1990-1 1990-tr r990-m 1990-rV 1991-1 1991-II
percentage change over precedlng quarter
Private consumption
Public consumption
G.F.C.F.
Domestlc demand
Exports ofgoods and
serrrices
Flnal demand
Imports of goods and
services
7.1
7.6
13.1
8.7
0.4
7.4
tt.2
3.2
4.0
10.5
5.2
2.6
4.8
7.6
2.8
2.6
6.1
3.6
3.9
3.8
4.t
3.1
3.7
6.7
2.0
4.3
1.0
2.2
6.9
2.5
3.6
1.0
2.0
7.5
2.9
4.1
1.1
2.7
6.3
3.5
5.5
0.8
3.3
5.5
3.7 4.1 2.9 2.8 3.3 3.6
8.0 8.0 4.4 3.5 6.5 8.5
cDP 6.4 4.1 2.6 3.2 2.5 2.6 2.4 2.4
1989-Itr 1989-rV 1990-1 1990-tr 1990-m 1990-W 1991-1 1991-tr
percentagc change ovcr preccdlng year
Private consumption
Public consumption
G.F.C.F.
Domesdc demand
Exports of goods and
services
Flnal demand
Imports ofgoods and
services
GDP
6.0
8.4
13.8
8.3
2.5
7.3
17.3
5.1
5.7
7.4
13.1
7.8
2.1
6.9
13.9
5.3
5.0
5.7
I 1.3
6.7
2.2
6.0
11.0
4.8
4.2
4.6
8.2
5.3
3.4
5.0
8.7
4.1
2.9
3.8
5.2
3.7
5.0
3.9
7.0
3.1
2.8
3.6
2.8
2.9
6.2
3.4
5.9
2.7
2.8
4.0
t.6
2.6
6.8
3.3
5.6
2.7
L7
4.4
1.0
2.5
6.6
3.2
5.7
2.5
Source: I.N.E. and Bank of Spain.
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Thble 3:
Total employment
Agriculture
Lrdustry
Conshtction
Serrrices
Total wage and salaryearners
Agriculture
Industry
Construction
Serrrices
of which
Permanent contracts
Agriculture
Industry
Construction
Serrrices
Flxed term contracts
Agriculture
Industry
Construction
Services
Employment evolutlon
(% change over precedlng year)(a)
2.8
-3.0
0.6
11.9
4.0
-L3
-t6.2
4.t
-3.76
0.1
32.7
18.5
29.3
4.5
34.7
4.L
-7.6
4.3
8.7
6.3
6.0
-14.8
4.3
11.3
8.3
1.6
-9.04
-0.5
0.4
3.7
19.0
-n.0
23.9
23.9
25.7
1.7
-&1
0.7
6.1
3.6
3.7
L5
t.4
6.1
4.5
- 1.1
-5.92
-2-l
1.1
4.6
15.9
tt.2
12.6
10.9
2fi.4
15.1
-10.1
4.0
36.4
2n.9
-L7
-n.t
-9.8
-5.0
3.7
87.2
tt.7
79.6
108.8
107.8
19elo)
0.5
-8.2
-3.2
5.0
3.3
-1.8
-3.9
-5.8
- 1.1
o.4
9.8
L2.2
5.3
6.5
t2.7
Tochange
8.9
-n.2
3.3
32.O
16.0
t.7
4.2
-3.1
3.0
3.6
4.6
-1.0
1.1
13.8
5.8
(a) IV Quarter figures.(b) tr Quarter figures.
SOURCE : BPA - Bank of Spain.
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Table 4: Prlces (yearly changes ln %)
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
General CPI
average (b)
end ofperiod (b)
General CPI without energy and
non+laborated food products (a)(b)
Services in CPI (aXb)
Private conzumption deflator (c)
GDP deflator (c)
Export prices (c)
Import prices (c)
8.8
t.3
9.0
10.8
8.5
10.5
-1.7
-14.5
5.2
4.6
5.2
8.0
5.7
5.9
2.6
0.8
4.8
5.8
6.1
7.6
5.1
5.6
3.1
1.1
6.8
6.9
7.t
9.2
6.6
7.O
4.4
2.3
6.7
6.5
6.1
9.7
6.4
7.3
1.7
-1.2
6.0
5.5
6.2
9.9
5.8
6.6
1.6
-0.3
1988-1 1988-II 1989-1 1989-tr 1990-1 1990-tr 1991-I
Consumer price index (a) annual % change
General
General without energy and non-elabor-
ated food prod.
Servlces
Residential property
Hedth care
Intercity public Eansport
Leiswe
Tourism
Housing services
Urban transport
4.4 5.8 7.1 6.9 5.5 6.5 6.2
5-4 5.1 7-O 7.1 6-7 6.1 6.3
6.3
9.0
5.5
9.0
7.2
6.6
8.5
8.3
9.2
3.8
5.9
7.4
9.7
7.7
8.4
8.0
3.4
5.7
8.8
I 1.1
4.6
8.6
8.0
5.1
7.3
9.2
8.0
4.9
8.3
9.9
9.7
6.6
9.7
1 1.1
3.2
6.4
10.5
8.2
6.3
10.1
13.4
6.8
6.3
12.5
6.8
7.1
9.7
10.5
13.4
(a) End ofperiod.
(b) Only l0 months for 1991.
(c) Commission forecasts Oct.-Nov. 1991 for this year.
Source: I.N.E. and Bank of Spain.
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Thble 5: Contrlbutlon of the change (%) oJ the prlce deflator of total flnal uses
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991(c)
Unit labour cost norn(adj.) (a)
Gross operating surplus (adj.) (a)
Ind tax net subv.
Import prices
-lnport prices excl. norn eff. exch. rate
-Nom. eff. exch. rate
Total flnal uses
-Domestic factors (b)
3,0
1,6
oA
0,1
0,0
0,1
5,0
5,3
2,4
2A
-0,1
0,2
0,7
-0,5
4,8
5,0
2,5
2,5
0,8
0,4
1,1
-0,7
5,9
6,0
3,4
2A
o,2
-0,2
0,4
-0,6
5,7
6,3
3,0
2,1
0,4
-0,1
-0,1
0,0
5,2
5,6
(a) Excluding imputed compensation of self-employed.
(b) Domestic factors include contributions of unit labour costs, net indirect taxes, gross operating surplus and
relative unit labour costs in national currency
(c) Commission forecasts October-November 1991.
Table 6: The balance of payments ln Spaln (as % of GDP)
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 l99l(a)
Trade balance
Service balance
Transfer balance
Current balance
Long-terrr capital balance
Baslc balance
Short-term capital balarrce
Central reserves change
Memorandum ltems:
Cenhal foreip reserves
Foreign dett
-L4
4.1
0.4
2.1
-0.6
1.5
-0.1
1.1
5.0
9.8
-3.9
3.5
0.8
0.5
3.3
3.8
0.3
4.9
10.0
9.1
4.7
2.7
1.1
-0.9
2.9
2.O
0.2
2.8
11.5
9.2
-6.4
2.3
t.2
-3.0
4.5
1.5
-0.1
t.2
11.0
8.5
-6.0
1.8
1.0
-3.2
3.9
o.7
0.0
t.7
10.6
8.7
-6.0
1.8
1.4
-L8
6.2
3.4
0.4
2.4
12.2
10.4
(a) - Estimations.
Source : Bank of Spain - Cash register
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Tbble 7: Imports and exports ln volume terms (% annual growth)
1986 t987 1988 1989
Imports
Total
Non+nergy products
Exports
Total
Non-energy products
16.7
23.8
26.0
27.0
18.5
21.9
16.8
17.8
4.7
5.1
9.2
10.8
tL2
12.4
1991(a)
10.0
10.9
12.2
t2.9
Accumulative
growth
89/91
109.5
124.r
7.6
8.2
7.0
7.3
(a) - Only 10 months
Source: M. of Economy.
Table t: Geographlcal breakdown of goods trade
A.Imports of goods
(% of total imports)
1986 1987 1990 1991(a)
Difference
85/91
22.0
23.0
-L9
1.2
0.5
1.6
-t2.6
From:
OECD
*EC
* EE.IJU.
* Japan
* Others OECD
New ind. counties
OPEC
56.5
36.6
10.9
3.4
5.7
1.0
20.0
71.8
50.5
9.9
4.9
6.5
1.6
1 1.1
73.9
54.5
8.3
4.5
6.6
2.2
9.5
77.5
56.8
9.0
5.1
6.6
2.6
6.7
77.7
56.9
9.t
4.8
6.9
2.4
7.5
78.7
59.5
8.4
4.4
6.4
2.3
7.2
78.5
59.6
8.0
4.6
6.2
2.6
7.4
B. Exports of gmds
(% oftotal exports)
OECD
*EC
* EE.tru.
* f.pan
* Others OECD
New ird countries
OPEC
69.9
52.1
9.9
1.3
6.6
0.9
7.2
77.4
60.5
9.2
1.1
6.7
0.9
5.6
79.3
63.7
8.1
1.1
6.4
1.0
4.5
80.9
65.6
7.9
1.2
6.3
1.4
4.5
81.6
66.9
7.5
1.2
6.0
1.2
3.9
82.1
69.3
5.8
1.1
5.8
1.1
3.5
82.5
71.3
4.9
1.0
5.3
1.3
3.4
1990 1991(a)
Differencc
8s/991
12.6
19.2
-5.0
-0.3
-1.3
0.4
-3.8
(a) - Only 10 months.
Source: Bank of Spain (Customs basis).
2A Statistical Annex
Imports of gmds
(/o of totalimports from the EC)
Table 9: Geographlcal breakdown of Spanlsh lntra-communlty trade
1985 1986 t987 1988 1989 1990 1991(a)
Accumulative nominal
growth 198511999 (%)
Germany
Belgium-Luxernb.
France
Denmark
Greece
hland
Italy
Holand
Pornrgal
UnitedKingdom
Total EC
29.01 30.09 29.63
4.49 5.21 5.80
25.75 23.81 
'1.t51.25 1.30 1.32
0.53 0.45 0.53
1.29 1.13 1.08
12.38 14.49 15.19
5.4 5.59 5.60
z.tr 2.52 3.11
t7.77 15.41 t2.60
100.00 I00.00 r00-00
28.53 28.23
5.14 5.57
u.to ,t.72
1.19 1.23
o.u 0.35
0.92 0.97
16.83 17.27
7.03 6.60
3;12 4.19
t2.to 10.85
100-oo rff)-00
27.57 27.2t
5.20 4.85
25.07 25.61
t.u 1.25
0.35 0.39
0.92 0.90
16.93 16.41
6.87 6.66
4.29 4.67
11.56 t2.05
IOO.OO lff)_ff)
t86.2
230.O
203.4
205.0
tn.L
113.0
3M.4
273.7
576.7
105.9
205.r
Exports ofgoods
(% of tolral exports to the EC)
1985 19871986 1988 1989 1990 1991(a)
Accumulative nominal
growth t9851199 (Vo)
Germany
Belgium-Luxemb.
France
Denmark
Greece
kland
19.56 18.92
4.68 4.71
30.14 29.67
1.38 t.t4
l.t4 1.03
0.67 0.63
13.29 14.00
9.2t 8.19
5.54 7.08
14.4 t4.&
100.00 100.m
t8.4 18.03 t9.36
5.2t 4.80 4.38
28.49 29.33 30.19
0.95 0.87 0.t9
1.08 t.rz 1.10
0.66 0.71 0.49
14.76 14.2t 15.52
7.21 6.7t 6.61
8.54 9.N 8.76
t4.65 14.83 12.80
1m.00 100.00 r00 00
142.4
82.7
87.4
97.O
181.0
fi.2
143.9
14.8
3s9.6
35.3
101.1
Iraly 13.61
Holand 10.11
Portugal 4.ll
VnitdKingdom - 16.22
Total EC 100.00
18.49
4.83
29.98
1.20
o.77
0.67
22.29
4.39
27.94
t.t7
1.07
0.53
16.51
5.77
9.40
10.91
100-oo
Intra-communlty trade balance
(% of Spain's GDP)
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 199r(b)
Germany
Belgium-Luxemb.
France
Denmark
Greece
kland
Italy
Holand
Portugal
UnitedKingdom
Total EC
-0.4
0.1
0.6
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.2
0.1
1.2
-0.8
-0.1
0.4
0.0
0.0
0.0
-0.1
0.2
o.2
-0.1
-0.3
-t.2
-0.2
0.1
0.0
0.0
0.0
-0.4
0.1
0.3
0.0
-1.4
-1.3
-0.1
-0.1
0.0
0.0
0.0
-0.5
-0.1
0.3
0.0
-1.E
-1.5
-0.2
-0.3
-0.1
0.0
0.0
-0.7
-0.2
0.3
0.0
-L6
-1.3 -1.0
-0.2 -0.1
-0.2 -0.4
-0.1 0.0
0.1 0.0
-0.1 0.0
-0.5 -0.3
-0.2 4.2
0.2 0.3
-o.2 -0.3
-L4 -2-l
(a)- Only9months.
(b) - Estimation for 1991.
Source: Eurostat
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l. Goods and servlces 2. Goods
Tbble 10: Degrec of openness , lmport penetratlon, and export actlvlty ln Spaln and ln the EC countrles
1980- 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
1985 (a) 1980- 1986 1987 19881985 1989 1990 1991(a)
SPAIN
Degrcc ofopenncsr
Import penctration
Export activity
EUR1I
Degree of qrenneu
Import penctration
Export acrivity
GERMANY
Degrce ofopennesr
Import penetration
Bxpotrctivity
FRANCE
Degree of qrnness
Import penetration
Export activity
ITALY
Degree ofopenness
Import penetration
Exportrtivity
UNTIBDKINGDOM
Degree of openners
Import penetrrtior
Expotrtivity
40.8 45.5
17.2 l8.E
20.t 22.4
58.9 62.4
22.6 23.7
29.6 31.2
57.r 59.5
2t.7 22.2
29.4 31.0
6.2 47.2
18.8 19.5
23.O 23.0
u.o 6.4
18.2 19.2
21.8 22.7
54.4 5E.0
20.9 223
28.0 29.2
48.8 5l.l
20.9 22.4
22.5 22.5
aJ 66.0
24.5 25.3
31.6 32.1
59.9 61.0
22.6 23.0
30.7 31.2
48.8 51.0
20.4 2t.t
23.2 24.2
4t.3 49.1
20.t 20.8
22.t 22.t
59.2 60.3
22.9 24.2
29.5 28.3
54.0 55.5
24.5 25.4
22.1 22.2
69.1 1tS
26.2 26.8
33.6 34.E
il.6 67.7
23.9 24.9
33.2 34.6
539 55.5
21.9 225
25.9 265
52.1 54.8
21.8 22.6
24.1 25.5
62.4 63.7
25.t 25.2
289 30.r
31.7 35.1
15.3 16.9
13.2 t4.3
49.1 52.6
19.5 20.7
23.9 25.5
47.7 50.8
r7.5 lE.4
25.4 27.1
39.0 40.1
16.7 17.4
18.4 r8.5
37.2 39.9
16.4 17.3
t1.t 18.5
42.7 6.4
t7.2 19.0
20.9 22.0
38.4 41.0
l9.l 20.4
t4.5 14.9
54.2 55.0
21.4 22.1
25.E 26.4
51.3 52.5
18.9 19.2
26.9 27.5
41.5 43.7
lE.l lE.9
r8.E l9.E
41.4 42.t
tE.z lt.6
r8.5 lE.6
47.3 48.t
19.3 20.6
22.2 21.6
4.4 46.2 48.9
22.5 23.1 24.2
l5.l 15.8 16.7
58.6 fi.3 62.6
22.9 23.3 24.0
2'1"6 28.4 29.6
55.7 58.0 64.0
20.2 21.2 23.0
29.2 299 32.5
45.7 {t.O 47.4
19.5 19.9 20.0
20.E 21.3 21.6
443 45.0 45.E
19.2 19.2 19.6
19.7 20.1 20.3
50.8 52.t 53.0
21.4 21.5 21.4
22.2 23.4 24.5
58.2
26.4
23.t
74.0
27.4
36.2
74.4
26.6
38.1
56.0
22.6
26.9
55.9
23.1
25.8
64.5
25.0
3l.l
(a) Commisrion forecasr October-November 1991.
EURII: PPS EURII; ELIRI2 excl. Spain
Noteg: - Degrec of openners : ratio of erporto plus imports to GDB in real termr
- lmport penetration: ratio of imports to final demand, in real terms.
- Erport activity: ratio of erports to GDB in real tcrms
SOURCE : CommimionServicer.
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1980 1981 1982 1983 lg84 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991(a)
Table 11: Nomlnal and effectlve exchange rates (lndex 1980 = lfi))
Nmrlnd exdrenge rrtes
Pesetas per
- USD
.DM
. ECI,.I
100.0 12t.5 153.0 199.8 x24.2 237.0 195.3 172.t t62.4 t65.2 t42.t 146.1
100.0 103.5 114.5 l4L2 143.3 l,{6.8 t63.7 t74.0 l6t.l 159.6 159.t 158.5
100.0 103.1 107.t t27.9 t27.0 t29.5 138.0 t42.8 t3t.2 130.9 129.9 128.9
Nmrlnd clfecilveerdrrngeretes 100.0 90.4 t4.9 70.3 68.6 6l.1 66.0 6.2 68.2 71.0 74.7 74.3
reletlve to 19 lndustrid countrles
Rcel effectlve exdrrngc retcs rclrtlve
io 19 lndusarld countrles
Double cxporis welghts
-Price defl,atorgror doarestic 100.0 92.7 91.5 79.7 t2.2 t3.4 875 89.8 94.3 100.8 108.6 110.1
prodrct
-Unitlabourcosts; totaleconomy lfl).0 93.1 n.2 793 79.0 78.6 80.4 t2.4 t6.4 91.3 975 975
(a) Cornmission Forecasts October-November 1991.
SOURCE : Commission Services.
1980 1981 1982 1983 19M 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991(a)
Table 12: R.eceipts and expendlture of general govcrnment (as percentagc of GDP)
Indirect taxes
Dirccttaxes
Dircct taxer adjusted (b)
Social security onrributioos
Other current receipts
Totd currcnt receips
Total anrrcnt receipts adjusted (b)
Currenttransfers 16.2
toenterpris$ 2.1
to households 12.7
to the rest of the wonld 0.1
Acrual interest payments 0.7
Gorrenrmentconsumption 12.7
Canpensatiur of employees 9.E
Purchases of goods and serviccr 2.4
Total currcnt expendiOre 29.7
Grcs saving 0.5
Grcs saving adjusted (b)
Net capital transfers
Gross frxed capital formation
Total expenditurc
Na lendign(+) or net bonowing(-)
Na lendign(+) or net borrowing(-)
Adjusted @)
Grms prblic deb
6.6
7.0
l3.l
3.5
30.2
1.3
1.9
32.8
-2.6
17.5
7.3 7.8
7.2 6.8
13.4 13.3
3.8 4.0
31.7 3r.9
t7.6 rt.l
2.0 2.5
l4.l 14.0
0.1 0.1
0.8 1.0
13.2 r3.4
10.3 10.2
2.4 2.6
31.6 32.4
0.1 -0.5
r.7 2.O
2.3 3.1
35.6 37.5
-3.9 -5.6
21.6 26.8
8.5 9.0
7.9 8.3
13.7 l3.t
3.9 3.4
34.0 33.t
18.8 18.E
2.6 2.8
t45 145
0.1 0.1
1.3 2.0
13.9 13.7
10.6 10.5
2.7 2.7
34.0 34.6
0.1 -0.7
2.0 t.7
2.t 3.0
38.8 39.3
-4.t -5.5
33.1 39.9
10.5
8.2
45.2 6.2
13.0 tz.t
3.8 4.2
34.7 35.7
l9.l 17.6
2.6 2.0
t4J 13.9
0.r 0.1
3.1 3.9
13.9 t4.7
10.5 10.3
2.7 3.3
36.1 362
-1.4 -0.5
1.9 1.8
3.7 3.7
41.6 41.7
-69 -60
10.4 10.3
10.3 10.5
12.8 t2.5
4.0 4.0
37.4 37.2
17.2 17.4
1.8 2.1
13.8 13.9
0.1 0.1
3.5 3.3
15.1 14.8
r0.4 10.5
3.7 3.3
35.r 355
t.6 1.7
I.3 1.2
3.5 3.t
n.6 ,()5
-3.2 -3.3
6.6 42.9
10.4 9.9 9.9
t2.0 ll.7 t2.2
ll.3 tz.t t2.4
12.7 13.0 13.4
4.0 4.1 4.2
39.0 38.6 39.6
38.3 39.0 39.8
t7.6 18.0 rts
1.8 1.8 1.8
14.0 14.6 r5.l
0.1 0.1 0.1
3.4 3.5 3.6
15.r 15.1 15.4
10.5 10.7 10.9
3.6 3.4 3.4
35.1 36.6 37.5
3.0 2.0 2.r
2.3 2.4 2.3
1.4 l.l 0.t
4.3 5.0 5.2
41.8 42.6 43.5
-2.7 -4.0 -3.9
9.5
8.4
-3.4
u.2
-3.6
445
-3.7
45.6
(a) CommissionforecastsOctober-Novcmberl99l.
O) Adjusted for delaying tax reimbuncment for General Governmcnt in 19E9, 1990 and 1991.
Source: CornmigsionScrvicer.
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Table 13: Monetary and credlt lndlcators (annual % change)
Source: Bank of Spain.
M3 ALP MI M2 Domestic
Credit
Expansion
Target Outcome Target Outcome
1980
1981
1982
19E3
tgu
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
r99l
t6-20 16.1
14.5-18.5 15.7
13.5-17.5 t5.2
t2.7
t2.9
6.3
4.1
6.3
tt.2
10.5
14.8
15.4
15-19 r7.7
14-18 15.8
10.5-14.5 r4.4
11.5-14.5 13.3
9.5-12.5 rz.L
6.5-9.5 t4.6
8-11 tz.l
6.5-9.5 r0.4
6.5-9.5 11.3
7-tL 12.1
12.2
12.5
6.9
6.7
7.7
t2.o
13.0
t5.2
17.8
14.9
27.0
16.4
Lt.4
11.6
E.0
E.7
'l.l
11.5
12.9
tt.7
15.6
11.5
17.9
14.0
r9.8
19.8
20.1
r6.t
11.6
14.8
13.3
14.3
15.4
14.8
r0.2
12.5
Thble 14: Counterparts of money creatlon
1980 1981 t982 1983 Lg8/. 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
1. ALP t6g
2. Inlemalcoilerpanr 19,1
(2=3+4+5)
3. Lerding to rtete recor 48,0
4. I-endingtocmrpan.& llJ
hous.
5. No<noretaryliabilities 335
6. Bxrcmaloounterpartr -325
(6 
= 
7+8)
7. Net omcid r€scrves -4,6
8. Na exrcmal lending 262
by coomercial bankr
17,1 16,6
16,l t9.l
52A 6t,4
t6J r5,1
873 31,6
53,1 -575
30,9 -2f,6
t1:t 7g
16,0 t33
t4J 9,7
513 53,9
102 1,8
30,5 295
t20l 169,4
345 69J
E,5 8.4
12,6 142
r23 tta
233 t3J
89 t4S
20:t 339
19,9 633
153 8s2
4,6 23q8
r0,9 llp
t2,t t2,8
tzp to,9
t62 llJ
26,6 6,6
-2,4 -10,1
7A 4,r
28,O 283
12,9
129
35J
75
29,6
t3,3
-t8J
4ts
lt3
11,3
t2,o
t7,l
36,4
113
2sJ
729
Source: Banco de Eepafia
A Statistical Annex
Table 15: Interest rates
Short-term(a) Long-term(b)
Nominal Inflation adjusted(c) Nominal
annual averagc
Inflation adjusted(c)
1986
1987
1988
i989
1990
1991
11,66
15,82
1,1,54
15,03
15,16
13,20
2,68
9,89
6,23
7,89
8,23
6,99
lL,37
12,77
I1,81
13,82
14,71
14,39
2,41
6,99
6,39
6,76
7,85
6,U
1991
1991
January
Febnuary
15,16
14,74
14,52
t4,25
Source: CommissionServices.
Notes: (a) 3-month interbank rates.
(b) Central Government bonds: 2 to 4 years
(c) Private consumption deflator
Table 16: Economlc performance relatlve to EUR-7 (a)
1986 t987 1988 19E9 1990 19910)
GDP at constant prices, Vo change
SPAIN 3.2 5.6 5.2 4.8 3.7 2.5
EIJR-7 2.3 1.7 3.5 3.5 3.8 2.2
GDP per head of population (in PPS)
Index EUR-7=100 66.3 68.8 70.1 71.3 71.7 72.3
Domestic demand at constant prices, 96 change
SPAIN 6.0 8.1 7.1 7.8 4.6 3.1
EUR-7 3.7 2.6 3.4 3.2 3.9 2.0
Private consumption defl ttor, 7o change
SPAIN 8.6 5.7 5.1 6.6 6.4 5.8
EUR-7 1.2 1.8 2.0 3.3 2.8 3.2
Total employmenl % change
SPAIN 1.4 4.5 3.5 3.6 2.6 0.7
Er.JR-7 1.0 0.6 0.8 1.2 1.9 1.4
Unemployment rate, 7o of civilian labour force
SPAIN zr.t 20.4 19.3 t1.t 16.1 15.8
EUR-7 8.6 8.5 8.2 7.6 7.3 7.3
Unit labour costs,96 change
sPArN 7.6 5.6 4.5 4.8 6.6 5.9
EUR-7 2.5 2.t 0.6 1.2 2^6 4.4
Current accountbalance % of GDP
SPAIN 1.6 0.0 -t.l -3.2 -3.5 -3.1
Er.JR-7 2.3 1.9 2.1 2.4 1.6 0.9
Gerpral Government defrcit"% of GDP
SPAIN 6.0 3.2 3.3 2.7 4.0 3.9
Er.rR-7 2.7 2.6 L5 1.3 2.4 2.8
Nominal effective exchangeratg 1985=1S 1s; 92.O 88.5 92.5 97.3 97.1 98.2
(a) EUR-7: B DK D F IRL L NL.
(b) Commission forecasts October-November 1991.
(c) against EUR-E (EUR7+ITA), double erport weights.
SOURCE: Commission Services.
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Introduction
The remarkable feature of the recent histo,ry of the laborn
market has been the very high level of unemployme,nl Rates
of increase in nominal wages have neverttreless remained
well above the average for the narrow-band Membet States.
Unemployment has more recently fallen from Ore very high
levels of the fint half of ttre last deca&, promoted by the in-
troduction of temporary contracts and the expansion of the
Employment Promotion Prograrrmes. The expansion in em-
ployment has been concentsated in lower-paid jobs in ser-
vices, and has contributed to overall wage moderation during
a period of rapid economic expansion
The labour market nevertheless rpmains segmented into a
temporary and a pe,ruranent sector. Wage growth began to ac-
celerate much faster in 1988 and 1989, and the data suggest
that this acceleration was concentrated within pay settle-
ments in the permanent sector. The Chapter investigates the
reasons for this acceleration and attcmpts to explain why the
non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment (the
NAIRU) is particularly high in Spain compaed with the rest
of Europe. The principal explanations are to be found in the
rigidities in the permanent se€tor of the labour market, com-
bined with the inappropriate levels of skills on offer from
amongst the unemployed"
1. Theoretical framework on labour market
rigidities and the path of nominal wages
1.1. The Non-Acceleratlng Infladon Rate of
Unemployment (the NAJRU)
The Non-Accelerating Inflation Rate of Unemployment
CII{E NAIRU) is a corrcept which embodies the identifica-
tion of a behavioural relationship betrreen the rate of in-
crease in nominal wages arrl the level of unemploymeirl In
its most basic form, the concept states that there is one level
of unenrployment at which workers are willing to accept the
wage offers which are compatible with firms'pricing ambi-
tions. Wage offers are made and negotiated within a frame-
work of expectations about the rate of growth of nominal
GDP. Wages are the dominant elenrent in production costs
and exercice I strong influence over the rale of increase of
prices hices are an impodant influerpe upon workers'ex-
pectations for the rate of incleas€ in nominal wages. The
level of unemploSrment which eventually exercices a con-
straint upon the rate of increase in nominal wage.s is &ter-
mined by structural features in the labour and product
markets"
The current level of unemployment also comprises a cyclical
element, so that the level of measured uremployment may
find itself either above q below that equilibrium level which
is consistent with stable prices The cyclical element is the
outcome of the effect of various "shocks" which intrude
upon labour and product rnartets rnd which will require an
adjustment in the rate of growth of nominal wages . The
speed and efficiency with which wages rcspond to cyclicd
changes in unemplo5rment will be stsongly inlluenced by
various structural features ard institutions in thp labour mrr-
keL The speed ud effrciency of adjustrrent also det€rmines
the time which is required for uremplo5ment to rehtm to the
equilibrium level which is consistent with a stable path for
pTlces.
The various shuctural features and institutions which deter-
mine the level of unemployment which is consistent with
stable prices, and which detersrine thc s@ of adjushe,nt
of the rate of change of nominal wages to cyclical changes in
unenrplo5nnent can be identified as follows.
. Misnutch, vhich implies that an important part of the avai-
lable laboursupply is unathactive to employ given the state
of technology and Ore potential productivity of that labour
in relation to the disnibution of nominal wages by occupa-
tion, industry or region,
, Job search, where the unemployed (o,r potential employed)
search le$s had for wodq perhaps because ure.mployrnent
berpflrts have beconre more generous (the rescrvation wage
hasrisen) or because of discouragement unongst theunesr
ployedatttrc difficulties ofgaining access to wqtoreooess
to better or permanent job oppotrnities,
. I*gislative feafires, where employment legislation (per-
haps relating to hiring ad fidng procedures or the level of
employer contributions to social funds) impose additional
costs upon ernployment and discourage the use of labour,
. Union militancy, where worters in perrranent jobs or in
sectors containing particularly skilled wqhers arc able to
exert important influenoe over the &veloprnent of employ-
ment legislation and over the conduct of laborn rclations
within the wider labour markeL
The combination and sbength of ttrese features elso deter-
mines the ability of worters to resist a reduction in the net
real wage when 'shocks'appear. Primary examples of
'shocks' include:
. Tates, where rising taxes (pertraps ernployee contributions
to Social Funds) lead to corryensating increases innominal
wages urd a rise in overall costs of emploSment per worker
because the path of nominal wages is uchangd
. Relative imprt pices. where the undedying td in the
price of imports is raised rplrtive to the price of final do-
mestic ouput leading !o arise in the price of final domestic
output relative to value-addd urd
. A pro&tctivity slowdovrn,whaethe tnendrate of growth of
productivity turns down (for whatever reason) end the
coruqluenees fo,r wtge growth areresist€d Nominal wagas
sustain their previous pafh.
The effect of these structural features or imperfectiors is to
strift the relationship betweenreal wages and productivity in
favour of real wages for those in wodc The following exem-
ines the circumstances which eneble ttris shift to be achieved
in practica
1.2. r'Insldcr.outslder" and hysteresls
The manner and circumsturces in which workers (unions)
are atile !o impose upwad rnoyements in the real wage, or
resist downward presules upon the real wage, has been the
subject of sophisticated analysis. The most convincing ex-
planations are based upon developm€nts of the "insider-out-
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sider" models of the labour market In these modelq unions
select the wage by virtue of their "insi&r" power and firms
choose the number of worters they will employ. "Insid€rsu
will encouage therecruitnent of "outsiders" only fc as long
as additional r€cruitmffit rddq to the marginal rcv€nue pro-
duct of those in wort
'Outsid€rs' will be willing to enter wort povided the ex-
pected marginal rev€nue product exceeds the reserrration
wage, measured by the level of out-of-work income. "In-
siders" will exercise and maintain tbeir power by corutruct-
ing nrles and codes which can be used to resbict access and
raise labour tumover costs for firms. Powermay very well be
exercised though tade unions, but this is not a necessary
condition. The possession of power may be zupported by the
complexity of production tecbniques inside the
enterprise (and tbp rssociated complexity of skills) or power
may be won by the ftrmation of informal coalitions unong
those with higher or professional skills.
The incentive to exclude "outside,rs" is enhanced if "out-
siders" have lower o,rder skills and abilities corryared to "in-
siders". "Insidersu will then pefer to maintain barriers to
emplolment and captrne for thenrselves the additional rent
from future increases in profits. The situation will be sustain-
able provided firms are willing to rrgotiate only with "in-
siders". However, firms may be quite wi[ing to deal only
with "insiders" because recruihent of "outsiders" has cer-
tain d*s of failure (choosing the wrong worters) and ttrcy
may prefer to maintain good relations with the highly-skilled
(and more productive) 'insiders".
The oulcome is consistent with behaviour which finds fimrs
prefering to invest in labour-saving capital equipmentrather
than recnrit new wortery and being encouraged to do so by
"insid€,rs" because tbe benefits for their "insid€r" ncvenue
product (and subseguent real wages) are superior. The poten-
tial for "insid€r" behaviour will be fiuther enhanced where
fimrs re operating in oligopolistic ormonopolistic mar&ets,
because firms will then have fewer irce,ntives to resist thp
construction ofberriers to'insider" enFy and will be able to
pass on cost pressures in highq product pricesr. In fact, "in-
siders" will have still fruther ircentives to enect barriers (and
capture economic rent) wbere product martets are subject to
restricted competition because their bargaining shategy is
also srbject to fewer constraints.
Separate analpis has claimed !o find evidence of hyste,resis
in the labour markeL Hyste,resis might be seen to occtr when
the laborn martet establishes eErilibrium at a given level of
unemployment and then (ceteris paribus) maintains that
equilibrium level of unemploymlent into the future. How-
ever, the equilib,rium level of unemployment which is estab-'
lished is in no sense unique and there are various (perhaps
numerous) levels of uncmployment which might be consist-
ent with a sirnilar path of real wsges. History then matters
and the best explanation of current levels of urrmplo,4m€nt
is past levels of unanploymenL The implication is that rates
of changg rather than any particular level, of unemployment
influences real wages. The hysteresis proposition is at least
partly consistent with the "insider-outsider" model of tlp la-
bourmarket
In the specific case of Spain, hysteresis could be said to be
gestating during the years before dernoctatisation when the
rate of technological adjustnent to changes in the structure
of demand and prices on world markets was delayed by
policies for trade, industry and the labour market. The
"shock" of the change in inflation r€gime at the beginning of
the 1980s led to a widesp,read release of labour (and aban-
donment of capital) and a very fast rise in urrcmploymant.
The rise in urcmployment was so fast that th'e labour market
was unable to cope with tbe required adjustment" Unemploy-
ment was then locked in at the higher level by malfurrctions
in labour and product martets, and particularly by the effects
of inactivity upon the *ills of those displaced into unem-
plolmenL One important implication of hysteresis is that the
effects of unemployment on job-seekers are cumulative and
skills and motivation &teriorate with duration of unemploy'
rentspell.
The explanation for the failrne of real wages to respond to
the high Ievels of uremployment is nevertheless incomplete.
The important, remaining questions are why "outsiders" fail
to approach firms directly and why Otey do not set uP new
businesses in order to compete with the "insiders". The
answer to the frst question might be that frms delegate a
compon€Nrt of screaning costs of new wor&ers to "insid€,rs",
and "insiders" have irrcentives to exclude mury of the new
applicants.
The answer to the second question may be that "outsiders"
lack the required skills and knowledge for forming coalitions
with other "outsi&ns" and may be unable or unwilling to ac-
cept the risks inhe,rent in forming new enterprises. The rules,
stmcture and gerrrosity of the unemployment benefit rystem
may offer strong disincentives. The creation of new enter-
prises, or the adoption of innovative worting pattcrns which
might enable re,entry to wortg may be discouraged by ntles
and regulations and by co&s of conduct constuctod by "in-
siders". One further poblem is that access to capital martets
for "outsiders" may be restricted because of collateral re-
quirerents and the essociatedrisks attacbed to borrowing.
13. The slgnlllcancc of the structure of collecdve
barplnlng
Other reseuchhas adopted elerrents of both the "iruider-out-
sider" and hysteresis proposals rnd asserted that institutional
features in the bargainin! system l may lead to failures in the
adjustment of real wages to particular levels of uremploy-
mnt ard that these failure.s may be durable" Spain appears to
have a rystem of collective bargaining which combines both
See, for example, Calmfors, L. md Driffill J. (1988). "Bugaining Stucture Corporatism and Mrroecommic Performurce",
Economic Policy,Number 5.
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elements ofnational and decentralised bargaining 2. The ana-
lysis zupposes that nominal wages are detemrined by rcfer-
ence to labour market conditions in the regions, or local
labour markets, which are experiencing the most buoyant
conditions. Nominal wage increases are then transmitted
throughout labour markets in low activity regions. The rig-
idity of wage detennination is ernphasised by failures in la-
bourmobility.
The inefficiencies imposedby the stmcture of collectivebar-
gaining will be magnified by failunes in expectations regard-
ing the future path of domestic demand and inflation.
Inflation surprisas will be resisted in wage determination in
the high activity regions or labour markets and these will
again be transxnittd across all labour markets. Failure by tlre
monetary authorities to implement the stated path for mon-
etary and fiscal policy will encourage settlements which at-
tempt to urticipate the path of inflation in the deterrrination
of real wages, thereby cultivating an inflationary attitude in
economic life. The persistence of inflationary expectations
(or the pre.sumption that growth in nominal incornes will ine-
vitably be faster than predicted by offrcial projections) com-
bined with inefficiencies in the hybrid system of collective
bargaining will also zubstantially delay the speed of adjust-
ment of real wages to changes in the rate of growth of econ-
omic activity.
2. Rigidities in the labour market and wage
determination in Spain
2.1. The sources of rlgldlty ln the permanent sector
of the labour market
Various factors impede the speed and efficiency of adjust-
ment in the case of Spain. Research evidencer zupport the
probability of pervasive mismatch in the labour marke!
. large inter-indrstry shifts of employment have taken place
during ttre past two decades, but industry-specific unem-
ployment rates (relating to individral job-seekers) appes
to have persistd
. high pay differentials can be identified across occupations
and sectors, and an important part of these differentials re-
mains after adjustments are ma& for the personal charac-
teristics of those in worL
The adjustment for personal characteristics inctu&s facto,rs
such as correnhations of male or female workers by sector,
corhparative investment in human capital, marital stafus and
tenure of work contracL The size of residual differential by
s€ctor appean particularly significant in banking and finan-
cial serrrices. The prese.nce of important residual pay dif-
ferentials can be interp,reted in various ways. However, the
pattern of differentials is suggestive of a labour market
where firms pay wage premia in order to retain scarce wor-
kers. Wage premia for retention are surp'rising at a time when
levels of unernployment have been particulady higlr.
The evidence from wage diffe,rentials can be supported by
reference to statistical analysis which identifies wide dif-
fsrences in the probability of entering and leaving unem-
ployment across particular groups of labour market
participants. After adjustrnent for the characteristics of irdi-
vidual job-seekers and sectoral composition by regioq the
differences in entering and leaving unemployment are perpe-
tuated. The statistical eviderce also suggests important wast-
age of skills, so that duration of unemployment has
important consequences for rubsequent unernplo5ment ex-
perienoe and dratiqr has cumulative conseguerpcs for thp
speed and probability ofre-entering work Certainly, the very
high levels of long-tenn rmemployrrent (as a propotion of
total unemploynrent) would indicatepotential fo wastage of
skills amongst important parts of the labour supply. The
problerns of re-entering wort have also contributed to de-
clining participation (partly discouraged worker effects)
amongst older workers, and led directly to the errcourage-
ment of early retirement programmes.
The rational response to shortage of experienced workers
(the requirement to pay wage prernia) is to educate ard train
yorurg workers, because young workers will have made the
least investrnent in human capital and should expcct to r€-
ceive the lowest relative wage, The concentration of unem-
plolm.ent (and long-term unemployment) unongst young
people suggests that fimu have been required to accornrno-
date the inflexibilities within tbe p€rmanent sector of the la-
bourmarket byreducing tlrerecruitnrent of new entrants (see
tables 6 and 8). The apparent cornpression of the overall pay
distribution (and a narrowing of age-related pay differen-
tials) negotiated though collective bargaining should be ex-
pected to have contributed to a reduction in the nunrber of
entry-to-wort jobs for young peopla The compnession rp-
pears to have been particularly emphatic duing the sbeng-
Orcning of national collective bargaining drning the 1970's.
The situation may have been made worse by ttre priority
given to thc negotiation of minimum wages though free col-
lective bargaining. The cffect of this priority is to further in-
cr€ase the employrrnt costs of new entrants to work and to
re&rce the incentives for frms to offer training and educa-
tion to those at the lower end of the pay disuibution.
lob search- Mismatch may be enhanced where labour mo-
bility across areas, regions or bordsrs is reduced or where
mobility across occtpations within the same area orregion is
constrained The statistical evidence indicates a substantial
2
3
The collective bargaining system in Spain displays more ten&ncies towards entralised than &entsalisod bargaining.
Vinals.J, et aI, "Spain and the'EC gla 1992' shock', in Unity with fliversiry in Funrpean Economy : the Communiry's
Southern Frontier. editors C. Bliss and J. Braga de Mrcedo, Cambridge, 1990.
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fall in inter-regional mobility within Spain during the period
since about 1g604. Crose-border migration has reversed dur-
ing tlrc same period, and particularly after 1973. The major
explanation for the decline in migration is the trend rise in
national ard European unenrplolm.ent coinciding wi0t t}p
first oil price "shock" in 1973. The effect of rising unemploy-
ment (particulady on the scale experienced in Spain) is to in-
fluence the perceptions of potential migrants about the
probability of re+mployment in the new region Tbe re+cr-
ployment prospects of older workers will anyway be smaller,
and the expected rate of retum for ol&r workers will prob-
ably be modest in comparison to costs because of the shorter
period during which older workers can expect to receive
earnings in the new job and region The irce.ntives for migra-
tion are then low, particularly wher,e the skills of potential
migrants re inapproprirte for vacancies in tbe higher activ-
ity rcgions c whene barriers to entry-in the sectors conc€n-
trated in those regions are substantiaP.
The rise in unemployrnent has also encouraged resort to the
informal sector, and has emphasized the attractions of re-
6aining in close proximity to the family unit That is particu-
larly important in Spain urd in Southem Europe. The family
is also often the nucleus of informal worting in tourism and
agriculture (see tables 13,14 and 15). The capacity of the
family to offer support may have been improved by the
household irrcorne effect of the rise in the number ard value
of pensiors which has rrise,n though the encourageurcnt of
early retirement prograrilnes. It may also have been im-
proved by special unemplolment berefit schemes, such as
that which exists for agricultural workers in Ardalucia and
Extrernadura The level of inter-regional mobility Sould be
influenced by the considerable differerces in regional hwse
prices, itself an outcome of the correntration of economic
activity in certain key areas or cities. The inllexibilities of the
capital market leading to the conce.nhation of inveshent
within those location, has had further implications for the
furrctioning of the labour martel The rigidity in the rcntcd
housing sectu has contributed to the problems cr€ated by
diffe,rences in regional house prices.
Furttrr evi&nce6 has zuggested that falling job serch may
be associated with improvements in the level of uremploy-
ment benefits. The combination of comparatively high sever-
ance pay and improved unemployment benefits should
certainly be expccted to redrce job semh during the early
weeks of unernploynenl although econoretric analysis has
found only snall effects arisrng from impoved levels of un-
emplo5ment allowances. The disincentives to job search
may nevertheless be magrrified where public employm.ent
seric€s fail to impose a r6gime which creates a direct link
between the payment of allowances or grurts and the purstit
of formal wort. Evidence suggestsT that the claiming of
allowancies ard corpurrent working in the informal sector is
relatively common in some regions or sectors.
Legblativefeatures,tb favoured position of those in perma-
nent and higher-skilled work is improved by employment
legislatior" and particularly by legislation relating to sever-
ance pay. The tradition of high severance pay, determined
partly by legal requirements but apparently enhanced
tlnough collective bargaining, has redtced the incentives for
firms to recruit additional laborn and also reduced the poten-
tial for releasing labour during periods of downtum in the
rate of growth of economic activity. The adoption of early
retirerent p,rogrammes (partly subsidised by government) to
atternpt to offset the effects of rising unernployment has at
the same timereduced labour zupply to the formal sector and
fintlrer improved the competitive position of those wo,rking
in pemranent jobs inside that sector. The adoption of eady
retirement fogrammes has reduced formal participation by
older worters in a labour market where participation is al-
ready v€ry low by European standards (see tables 7 and 8).
The very low levels of part-time working in the labourmar-
ket suggest a sipilicant rigidity imposed by employment
legislation, particularly when comparisons are made with
work patterns in other Member States. The alternative to
part-time working is the use of existing workers on overtime,
which is likely to be mqe costly because those already in
jobs have a preferential position in bidding fq the additional
work. The low participation rat'e (across the whole labour
force) indicates substantial discouraged worker effects, lead-
ing eitberto inactivity (and still lowercompetition inbidding
for work) or to r€sqt to the informal sector. High sev€ran@
paympnts will have frrther effects on labour zupply, particu-
larly where high severance payments are combined with the
inroduction of substantial improvements in unemployment
allowances.
Taxes onTbDs, employer contributions to the Social Fund
represent a high proportion of total government revenue
from taxation in Spain (see table 5). The levels of revenue
from 0ris form of taxation appear to have been particularly
high at the beginning of the 1980's. The proportion of taxa-
tion raised from employer conhihrtions has fallen in more
rccent years but rcmains higher than many of the Member
States and in comparison with countsies such as the United
States and lapan. Some analysts t claim to have fourrl an im-
portant correlation between the rise in the gap between
wages ard labour costs and tbe rise in the NAIRU duing the
past decada It is dilficult to imagine th8t the level of taxqs
upon jobs in the formel labour market could explain zuch a
substantial rise in rmemploymenL However, the level of tax-
4
5
6
7
I
Bentolila, S, ald IJ. Dolado, Mismatch and intemal migration in Spah 1962-1986, Burco de Esparlc 1990.
The evidenoe sugg€$ts ttrat significsnt differenes exist in ttre stsucture of industsy ard occupations rcrrss high-rctivity and
bw-artivity regions, although rcgiond wage differentials apeu to be compuatively low.
Bentolila, S, and OJ. Blancharrd, Spanish Unernploymurt, Bcornmic Policy- 10 APril 190.
Muo. J, et d, Analisis de lu fuiciones & Vida y Trabalr en Espanc @ 1987.
Dolado, IJ., Malo de Molinq LL md Zabalza, A. (19t5), Spanish industsial unernployment ; some explanalory factg
Eomnics.53.
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ation upon jobs may well have enouraged rcsort to working
in ttrc informal sector. The level of taxes on jobs may dso
have magrrified the "shock" to employment of the churge in
inflation r6girne at the beginning of the 1980's, encoruaging
firms to adopt strategies which would lead to a zubstitution
of labour in the long term.
2.2. The structure of collectlve bargelnlng.
The problems of enEy to wo,rt in lower-activity rcgions, and
the obstacles to formal ernployment creation in tbe private
sector in those regions, are exacerboted by the stnrcture of
collective bargaining. Nationwide agreerrents were used (as
a fomr of partrership) to reduce the core rate of inflation du-
ing the period of the 1970's but the reduction was achiwed
at the expense of implanting important inefficiencies in the
bargaining pr@ess, and in the labour market in generd, dur-
ing the subsequent p€riod. National collective bargaining
tends to be conducted within the high-activity regions rnd
the uansmission of national wage settle,menls from high-ac-
tivity to lower-activity regions is one of the factors in tbe low
response from nominal wage settlements to risingunemploy-
ment in the wider labour markeL The structure of collective
bargaining has contributed to a corparatively low degree of
dispersion in regional wage differentials
One indicator of the remlting rigidity is that sectoral wages
appear to be closely associated with the aggregate industry
(consumption) real wage ard appear to respond very little to
own-soctor variations in pro&rctivity nend or gercral labour
supply conditions in that sector or indrstry 9. The research
flrndings suggest a system of collective bargaining where the
principal influencqs upon nominal wage detennination by
sector is not the level of sectoral or local unemploynrcnt but
the relative level of nominal wages in comparison with other
se€tors. The regional transurission of nominal wage settle-
ments through the structure of collective bergaining is a par-
ticularly important issue at a time when entry to the
European Community is encouraging hade unions to pursre
pay increases which are consistent with a "catching-up" pro-
cess in imitation of pay levels in other Menrber States. The
extent of the transmission process should be expected to
have important implications for levels of urcmployment in
the lowq-activity regions during the period of adjushre,nt to
membership of the Exchange-Rate Mechanisrn"
2.3. The slgnlllcance olthc new temporary employment
The irnportance of temporary wort in ernployment expan-
sion is illuskated in table 2. During the period from 1987 to
1989, the total growth in temporary employment was
932,000 and this compares to an estirnated fall in permanent
employment during this period of 45,fiD. The growth in
temporary ernployment during these y€ars appears to be im-
portant across all sectors except agriculture but is particular-
ly concentrated in services. Nevertheless, growth in
permanent ernployment is also important in serrrices whereas
falls in employment were evident in Industry and Construc-
tion. Within the Services sector, growth in temporary em-
ployment in Comrnerce and Hotels and "othe,rs" (probably
gov€rnment agencies or public services) was particularly
strong. Cirowth was also strong in Construction
The irrreasing importarrce of tempcary employment in total
employrnent is confrmed in table 3. Temporary e,lnplo5mrent
has incneased from 18.6% of total ernployment in 1987 (frnal
quuter) to 31.5% of total erployment at the end of 1990.
The data in the table also illustrate the dominance of tempor-
ary employment in agriculture and construction and the
growing importance of temporary employment throughout
services. Ttr growth in Commerce and Hotels and in Trans-
port and Communication is particularly notable. Temporary
employrent in "In&rstry" recorded rapid growth during the
two-year period, and the rate of growth was comparable
across all the sub-sectors of the industrlr sector.
The data in table 7 strows that the growth in temporary ern-
plolmrent has coincided with an important expansion in the
labour force. The growth in population ased 25 ard over has
been particularly strong but the notable feature is a rapid ac-
celeration in participation amorryst wornen aged 25-54. The
availability of tunporary colrtract wort does not necessarily
explain the rise in female participation. However, it seenrs
reasonable to suppose that there is some association because
of the need to register at governrnent employme,nt offioes in
order to qualify for enfy to the Emplo,rnpnt Promotion Pro-
grammes. Changes in the rules relating to unemployment
benefits and pensions will also explain part of the rise in fe-
male participation and ttrer€ has been an importurt change in
attitudes about the extent to which women should participate
in work outside the honre.
The other important trend is the fall in male participation
rates, particularly surprising at a time when the rate of
growth in economic activity was rcaching very high levels
(table 7). The fall is concentrated not only amongst older
wqkers hrt dso in the age-group 25-Y, although most of
the effect will be apparcnt in the age-group of 45 years and
over. The information in table 7 can be compared with table
4, which drows that part-time employment has fdlen steeply
amongst males during 1988 and 1989. More surprisingly,
part-time ernployment ernongst females has fallen dtuing a
period when total employnrent growth was expanding rapid-
ly.
Recruihent urder the Eurplo5rment Promotion hogrammes
@PP) represented more than 50 per cent of totd hirings in
1988 and 1989 (table l) and tempcary contracts were used
for almost one-half of totd recruitment in the latter year.
Part-time jobs represented 15 per cent of total recruitment
under EFP in 1989, which is surprising in e labour market
wbere part-time worting is very low in comparison to most
of the other Member States (see table 12).
The economic eonsequenc€sr of the expursion of temporary
working under EPP are diflicult to estimate without full
Vinals,I et al, op.cil 1990.
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waluation evi&nce, It ie certainly beneficial for those who
have been out of wort for a prolonged period to re-
enter errployrrent and to improve their seerch credentials in
the labour market. However, the encouragement of an im-
portant prt of t€mporary conbact wqk has been achieved
though spedsl incentives and these should be expected to
have costs:
. temporarJ/ contract working may have displaced other job-
seekers c other forrns or sources of activity;
. tresoutrqss will have been diverted betwee,n sectols, and the
effecierry of that diversion is questionable;
. it is debatable wbether temporary contract wokers will find
permarrnt work at the end of contsact or whether they will
simply enter a prolonged penod of finther unemplo5menL
Employment Promotim hogranrnres do appear to have in-
cluded a number of raining and apprenticeship schemes.
Howerrer, inforrnation nceds to be obtained on the exte,lrt to
which tbese are gauine net additions to appre,nticeship and
Eaining positions m wherher they are rcally positions which
would have existed anyway. Tbe gality of haining deliverod
also needs to be investigate4 because this will determine the
extent of later employability and the potential for skill
augmentation in later career. Experience in other Member
States suggests Out traidng positions errbedded in special
employment prograrnmes are subject to low quality out-
comes and pom @ost-graduate) employability.
The temporary wqt sectu sneated by the Employnent Pro-
mation Prugrammes, and by the wider legislative inaova-
tbn, is unlikely to have many p€rm8nent benefits for the
quality of labour supply. Many of the individuals puticipat-
ing in the Programrnas e1 fosasfiring from the legislation,
have few incentives to acquire new skills and edrcation be-
csuse €ntry to the permanent sector of the labour mar*et (and
sccess to higherquelity jobs) remains zubject to the sarne
barrierg vhich existod prror to the changes in temporary
work legislation" firms have few incentives !o offer substan-
tial tsaining and education in ryecific *ills because tempor-
ary workers are likely to be replaced at tbe end of contract
and would carry any acquired skills ardeducation away with
thern
The introduction and &velopnrcnt of the Employment Pro-
nption Pmgrarunes atd the wider easing of reslrictions on
the adoption of temporary contrrcts have enabled rec,ruit-
ment of low-cost labour with the use of conhacts which pro-
vide much great€r flexibility for Fums. Ternporary contracts
created within EPP inclde financial incentives though dis-
regards upon employer social security conbibutions as well.
The recruitment provides enhanced flexibility be,cause tbe
tqnporary worters have been and ue employed mainly on
slrort-term contracts ard the terms of tlre contract irclu& tlp
legal right to much lower termiaalion palmcnts than for per-
manent sector workers.
One of the effects of the Employment Promotion Pro-
grommcs, and tlu wider legislative intovations, is that firms
have been able to redrce average compensation per worker
during a period when economic activity has accelerated
rapidly. The reason for this is that terrporary contracts have
opened up the possibility of recruiting workers into jobs
which are at the lower end of the skill-range and which will
be mostly suitable for young people and other lower-paid
workersi The availability of low-cost labour has also con-
tibuted to the shength of the expansion in the economy.
Thc development of EPP, and the prumotion of temporary-
conlract working, has made an important impact upon the
availability of lower-paid job opportunities and upon the de-
gree of flexibility in employment structures. It has been par-
ticulrly beneficial for very young job-seekers However, the
expansion in the stock of tenrporary workers since 1985 may
also have contsibuted to segrnentation in the labour markeL
Tlv Enployment Promotion Progranme and the wider de-
regulation have inhoduced alternative routes into work but
are unlikely to have had much effect upon the rigidity which
has existed (and which persists) within that part of the mar-
ket which contains perrnan€nt workers The major effect of
these rigidities is to redrce competition for jobs in Op per-
man€[t sector and to enable that sector to exert substantial
poc/€rs over the detemrination andrate of growth of nominal
wages.
3. Recent performance of unemployment,
wages and prices in Spain
During the last decade the evolution of nominal salaries was
chracterized by a growth rate mo&ration. The very high un-
enrploynent rate played a role in the deceleration of nominal
wage growth which was only reversed since 1989.
Despite the strarp fall in unemployment from 1986, the ex-
pansion in temporary contracts working has had important
benefits for wage moderation in nominal compensation per
employee of total economy.
Tbe associations between trends in wages, prices and unem-
ployrrent are investigated in Graph 1 which provides the
background to &e later analysis. The information in Graph 1
illustate.s the association between trerds in consumer prices
and the rate of increase in wages rrgotiated through collec-
tive agreernentslo. Ho*"ro, it also shows that the rate of in-
crease in wage settlements responded only temporarely to
ttle downward hend in coruiluner prices and began to move
ahead of the bend in prices in 1987. The prfurcipal factor ap-
peas to have been the rate of increase in earnings in "large
frms", which began to accelerate much more rapidly in 1989
rnd likely in 1990. The difference between basic wage settle-
nrnts negotiated through collective agreements and the rate
of increase in average earnings leported for "larger firms"
became much wider in 1989. The relative trends in pay data
10 tn gradr 1, tlre figuee of "collective agrements" and "mminal cornpensation per employee" talce into account the effoct of
the safeguard clause (differancc betwoen outwn inflation and the expected figure) in the year of paymenl
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reveal thc build-up in the pressure of wage increases (and of
rising labour costs) which now needs to be reversod"
It also shows the modi$ing etrect of the innovations for tem-
porary working upm nominal compensation per employee.
The rate of growth in average esmings had begun to move
away from the hend in nomind compensationperemployee.
Ternporary contract workers have been rpcruircd into lower-
paid jobs ard the rate of increase in nominal compe,nsation
per employee was consequently on a downward trend be-
tween 1986 and 1989.
The hend in nominal unit labour costs inrelation to the level
of unemployment is consistent with research findings at
OECD, and is broadly supported by evidence taken from the
Quest model of the Commission Services. The qrnthesis of
that evidence" shows that wages are highly responsive to
rises in the consusrer price index but adjust mue slowly to
downward mov€rnents in thrt in&x. The lerrel of measured
unemployment which is consistent with mo&ration in the
rate of growth of nominal wages is v€ry hiSh in comparison
to other Mernber Statesr.
The downward trend in compensation per ernployee com-
bined with increases in pro&ctivity caused a deceleration in
the growth of nominal unit labour costs for the total econ-
omy, which actually fell in red terms (see Table 16).
The deceleration in wage growth rates has hanslatod to a de-
crease in price inflation as well. According to the figures in
Table 17, the price deflator of total final uses went down
from a growth rate of 14% M 1980-1984 to 6% in the second
half of tbe decade. Sirrce 1987, exchange rates have played
an impctant role by reducing positive contribution to prices.
In 1988-1989 the contribution ofunit labour costs to therise
in final prices was the same as that of the gross operating sur-
plus. So, it seems that the pres€nce of very strong domestic
dernard has induced prices rises thougt an increased mart-
up !o the sasrc extent as through labourmarket pressures.
In 1990 and 1991 the conclusion is not the sarne; it was the
high incr€ase in nominal wages which mainly caused the rise
in the frnal uses price &flator.
The lack of confidence in the inflation target the accelera-
tion of inflation in 1989 and less cooperation from trade
unions explain the high increase of nominal compensation
per employee in 1990 in comparison with previous years.
However, there is another factor which shows the tlreaten of
relying on the downward path of salaries until 1990. The
composition effect from the entry of non-permanent workers
into the labour markets lowcrs the growth rate of salaries
when a favorable economic context allows a continuous in-
qease in new employmenl When expectations change and
demard is not so strong, the reaction from firms may be to
lay-off temporary workers So that a new upward drift in
wages may be intso&ced"
1 1 OECD, Spain, Economic Surveys, OECD, Puis, l9S6.Commission of 0re European C.ommunities, One MarkeL One Money,
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4. Summary and conclusions
The labow market in Spain exhibits features which are par-
ticularly consistent with "insider-outsider" and hysteresis in-
fluences upon wage determination The associated rigidities
in the labour market erplain an insensitivity in the response
from nominal wages to comparatively high lwels of unem-
ploymeng and contribute to the continuation of those high le-
vels of unemploymenl
The principal feahres which indicate "insider-outsider" and
hysteresis in the labour market are:
. evidence of mismatch, partly an outcome of a decline in in-
ter-regional mobility but mole accurately areflection of the
inability of the education and haining markets to bring
about zuffrcient improvements in the quality of the stock of
labour across the overall labourmarkef,
. the difficulty of new €ntrants (yoong workers) in pem.etra-
ting into the permanent sector of the labou marke( partly
because the pattem of pay diffe,rentials redrces the incen-
tives of fums to recmit new entrants but also explained by
the influence of "insiders' over the level of tumover costs;
. reduced job search, itself an outcome of persistence in
unemployment but aggravated by changes in unemploy-
ment allowances and pensions and promoted by high levels
of severance payments and other berpfits for those in hi-
gherquality jobs;
. the compression of regional pay differentials, attributatfle
to the syste,m of collective bargaining and which can be ex-
p€cted to have fintherreduced theefficiency oflocal labour
markets in allocating workers to jobs.
The outcome of these various feature is aredrction in com-
petition for those in the permanent sector of tbe labour mar-
keL The power of workers in the permarcnt sectu to dictate
the terms and conditions of employrnent encouragesrcsort to
working in the informal sector by those &nied entry to the
peflnanent sector.
The rigidities and inflexibilities in the labour malket have
hportant implications for economic performance in the fu-
ture,
o entry to the exchange-rate mechanism ard the completion
of thelntemal Ma*et will place increasing emphasis upon
stability in bends in nominal wag€s,
. the tendency for wage growth to accelerate even at high le-
vels of unanployment places a constraint upon the growth
of productive potential,
. the correntration of unemployment (and particulady long-
term unemployment) amongst young people has serious
implications for the quality of future labour supply.
The success of the temporary contract initiative illustrates
that a strong, potential demand exists for lower-paid wor-
kerc. However, much firmer links must be created between
the tempcary and permanent sectors of the labour market if
lower-paid workers are to have sufficient incentives to gain
education and skills in the longer-term. Mismatch, combined
with baniers to entry to the permanent sector, are at the core
of theproblem of unemplo5rmenl
The completion of the Internal Market may have important
benefits fo,r the stmchre of collective bargaining in Spain.
(]reater competition in product markets should encourage
firms and industries to adopt a different attitude to pay deter-
mination and impose greater wage moderation upon the per-
manent sector. However, the more efficient bargaining
solution may take time to appear and the process of adjust-
rnent may be hought about at the expense of slower output
growth fm a significant period of time. The easing of entry to
the permanent scctor of the labour market will improve the
speed of adjustment and particularly if pay differentials
widen in order to provide entry to permanent jobs for
younger worters
(6)
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Thblc 1: Recrultment under the employment promotlon progremmer (EPP) (thousands)
1984 1985 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 (1)
Total rocruitrnent in the
labour market
Total recruitilpnt un&r EPP
Recrruitment under EPP
as % of totalrecmitsnent
of which,
Te,nrporary contracts
Part-time
Training & Apprenticeships
Youth employment (2)
Agreements with govemment
agencies (3)
1830
500
n.4
235
48
4t
0
101
3020
t4t6
46.9
537
t79
28
1M
309
34/,9 3712
2,p5
54
t62
29r
434
92
293
$n
53.2
1104
356
554
2fi
1680
8.7
67
222
36
119
293
2300
5159 3039
2336 1343
45.3 4.2
1170
4r2
694
251
512 271
2D9 107
Notes:
(1) Only 7 months.
(2) Under 25 years old.
(3) Agreements between the National [nstitute of Employment (INEM) and government agencies, mainly local
authorities and autonomous regions, for employing (mainly in construction) registered unemployed persons.
Source: Boletin de Estad(sticas Laborales, Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social, and Sfntesis Mensual
de Indicadores Econ6micos, Ministerio de Economfa y Hacienda
Tbblc 2: Growth ln total and temporary employment (thousands) (f)
1988 1989 1990 IIQ 1991 1988 to trQ 1991
Total Te,rnp. Perm. Total Temp. Perm. Total Tenrp. Perm. Total Temp. Perm. Total Terrp. Perm.
Tot l
Agriorltuc
Indurtry
of which:
Encrgy
Pdmary
Metd
Manrfectlrcr
Ccrrtructim
Scnricer
of which:
t24t
6 lt -t2
2t u -24
-t2 u -s
-ll-31
3013t70
43 5t -15 -3
35 45 -r0 37
0l-9
14 -t4 -16
9 -12 -19
53 -16 -n
52515
37t 527 -149 510 &5 lO5 333 405 -73 t2 68 -fi 1232 1406 -1744 U -50 :t9 -fi -23 n 25 -t4 lt 15 4 -55 28 -E326 ul -t5 107 lll -10 35 76 -41 -70 -3 61 98 301 -?f/3
0-925-3
4 -r9 20 49 -2t| -N 42 n3 -70
-8 -19 ?3 t34 -l0l
n -13 265 289 -23l0l llt -r7 94 y2 2 57
Conmcrce&Huclr lVl l2l -14 ltl ll2 10 96
Tranrpon&Con- 30 13 17 43 3l 12 l4
municeriqu
Brnking&Inrunncc 43 30 13 26 30 -5Othcn 76 90 -15 I9t t0 ll8
Et6 254 2 3t9 E3 t36 230 252 -29 49 29 m y24 7t9 136
2
-m
96
l9
t9
99
4l
79
038-512t336-9
1 -15 -t2 -3 72 50 t2
23 8 l4 t32 r08 25
,t0 2l; 14 392 295 98
(l) IV quarter figures, but IIQ figures for 1991.
Source: Encuesta de Poblaci6n Activa (EPA), Instituto Nacional de Estadfstica (INE).
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Ilable 3: Ibmporary employment es a proportlon ol total wage-carncrs, total end by sector
Total andby rccim Bnd 1987 End 1988 Erd 1989 Errt 1990 rlQ.1991
Total
Agriculture
Indusry
of which:
Ercrgry
Pdmry
Metal
Manufactures
Construction
Serrrices
of which:
19.8
43.7
15.4
25.t
52.4
L9.7
8.5
16.1
15.8
25.1
28.2
49.1
23.4
9.4
18.0
21.9
28.2
31.5
53.3
26.0
32.2
54"4
26.6
6.1
11.6
10.6
2L.O
35.3
16.5
6.2 51.4
zt.o u.4
9.2
2r.3
23.0
31.7
53.7
28.1
38.5
2t.o
25.8
23.7
9.9
22.9
23.7
31.8
55.7
28.4
ConrmerccandHotels 22.6 29.6 y.6
Transpo,rt andCommunication 11.5 13.4 18.1
Banking and Insurance 10.9 15.8 20.6
Others 15.3 18.7 n.4
38.9
19.3
26.3
u.3
Source: Encuesta de Poblaci6n Activa (EPA), Instituto Nacionel de Estadfstica (INE).
Thble 4: Employmcnt growth
Tlpe of eurplo5mrent 1988 1989
Total ernployment L9 4.L
Total tull-tirc 3.3 4.7part-time -3.7 -7.4
Me,n full-tirrc 1.9 3.7part-time -11.1 -L9.7
Wonren full-titrp 6.9 7.2
part-time 4.7 -3.0
Source: OECD, Employment Outlook, July 1990.
Table 5: Employers' soclal securlty
contrlbutlons as e percentagc ol total
taxetlon
1980 1984 1988
Spain
Belgium
Demark
France
Germany
er€ece
helsnd
Luxembourg
Portugal
UnitedKingdom
Netherlands
Itdy
Iapan
Switrcrland
United States
37.8
t9.4
0.8
28.4
18.5
14.3
9.4
16.1
17.7
9.5
t7.t
28.4
31.1
18.4
2.0
n.7
19.1
15.3
9.2
14.0
t4.7
9.1
t7.6
u.3
27.2
N.6
0.2
n.2
19.1
14.9
8.4
t3.6
16.5
9.5
15.9
23.4
14.4
10.1
17.0
14.8 15.210.4 to.z15.5 t7.5
Source: OECD.
Tlablc 6: Unemployment rates by agc Sroupr
l9t9
Agegroups Spain Europcan 10
t4-24 34.3 15.5
2549 t4.6 7.1
50{4 9.0 5.8
65 and ovcr Lg
Total 17.3 8.3
Source: Community Labour Force Surven 19E9.
@urostat)
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Tbble 7: Changes ln partlclpetlon retes for men eged 55 and over.
Spaln, the Member States and lnternetlonal comperlsons
r975l8/J tngE5 198s/88
Spain
Belgium
Denmark
France
Germany
Grpece
heland
Italy
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Pqtugal
UnitedKingdom
Iapan
United States
4.27
4.32
-0.50
4.13
-0.15
0.02
-0.n
-0.14
4.84
4.35
-0.06
4.33
{.08
4.t2
{.09
0.39
1.08
0.86
0.50
1.05
1.50
t.2t
0.06
0.75
1.98
0.62
L2A
L7t
-0.37
4.2r;
-0.08
{.33
0.m
-0.19
-0.31
4.03
-0.11
-0.47
-0.03
-0.31
-0.05
4.17
0.75
0.11
1.2r
0.47
o.&
2.43
0.91
0.75
0.56
0.39
0.91
0.73
1.09
1.54
-0.47
4.41
-0.02
-o.24
-0.02
-0.34
0.02
-0.09
-0.01
-0.38
-0.05
{).10
1.88
0.11
0.56
0.25
0.92
0.58
0.65
t.4r
2.73
0.89
0.75
0.71
l.t2
1.76
-0.02
{.07
l. Contribution to change in total growth of labour force from changes in participation rates, men aged 55 and over.
2. Total growth in the labour force.
Source: OECD, Employment Outlook, July 1990.
Tbble 8: Prlnclpal characterlstlcs of actlvlty of those agcd 14-24, 19t9
Spain European 10
Males, activity rate
Employmentft opulation ratio
Unemployrentrate
Females, activityrate
Employmentft opulation ratio
Uneuployrnent rate
46.3
33.6
27.5
39.2
22.5
42.6
54.5
47.0
13.8
48.5
40.0
t7.4
Source: Community Labour Force Survey, 1989 (EUROSTAT)
T[ble 9: Unfllled Job vacancles and sklll shortages
Thousands Per cent of totd "onen" Percentage of firms for which
vacancies labour force is insufficiently
qualified
l98s 113
1986 t47
1987 161
1988 190
r9E9 201
19
23
25
zrt
26 65.6
Source: Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social (and OECD, Bconomic Surveyr of Spain, 1990/91)
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T[ble 10: Educaflon and trelnlng
Informetlon relates to educatlon and tralnlng cxperlences durlng the four wecks
prccedlng survcy (1)
Spain Ernopean l0
Aged14-?/l
No faining
Gercral education
Further education
On-jobtraming
Apprenticeship
Dud rysrcm
Other training
Part-time college
u.5
35.0
t9.7
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.7
4.1
u.8
19.8
0.9
4.8
0.4
2.9
1.2
Total 1m.0 100.0 (2)
ASed 2{4q
No training
Gereral educetion
Further education
On-jobtaining
Apprenticeship
Dual system
Othertraining
Part-time college
96.3
0.6
2.2
0.1
0.0
0.0
o.7
92.6
o.2
2.t
1.1
0.2
0.2
2.8
0.7
Total 100.0 100.0
@intageoftotal8gecstegoryinvolvedinspecifictypesoftrainingactivity.
(2) Figures round to almost 997o because of cases of "no reply".
Source: Community Labour Force Survey
Table 11: Pardclpatlon ratcs and lcvels ofeducatlon
1975 1980 1985 1989
Parflclpaflonrate - % ofpopulaflon ofworklng.age -
Total 62.4 59.6 55.0
Men 91.0 87.6 83.0
rrnmr 33.8 33.8 34.8
56.1
81.1
4t.3
Structure ollabour lorcr mrdlng to educatlon
level
- 
% oltotal labour lorcc 
-
Illiterate
Withorts$die
Primary&gtes
Sccondarydegrce
University degree
4.1
r2,g
6L6
17.6
2.7
3.2
11.4
59.2
2L9
3.3
2.3
to.2
8.4
34.8
4A
1.7
10.8
38.6
43.5
5.4
Source: Ministerio de Trobajo y Seguridad Sociel.
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T[blc 12: Part.tlmc cmployees as e proportlon
total employeesr l9t9
Spain European 10
(pencentages) (perccntages)
Disuibuting trades, hotels,
catering, repairs (*)
Ba.rking ard finance, insur-
ance, business serrrices, ren.
trng (*)
Other serrrices (*)
All sectors
3.8
1.6
4.1
10.5
14.9
t3.4
(.) Parhtime employees as a proportion of total
employees in the sector.
Source: Community Labour Force Survey,
1989 (Eurostat).
llrblc 13: Pcrcons ln cmployment by profes.
slonal stetus, 19t9
Spain European 10
(perccntages) (percentages)
Employer and self e,mployed 21.7 14.8
Eryloyee 7L3 82.6
Familyworker 6.0 L6
Source: Community Labour Force Survey,
1989 (Eurostat)
Table 14: concentratlon ol lamlly rorklng and scll cmployment, by sector, r9t9
Spain (perccntages) Euopeur 10 (percentages)
Sclt-oployssuttr)
Agriculture
Distihrtive trades, hotels, catering, repain
Transport and communication
Family working e)
Agriculture
Distibutive tsades, hotels, catering, rcpairs
Employees in employment by secton (3)
Agriculture
Distributive tredeg hotels, crtering, repairs
33.9
33.2
7.9
45.3
39.1
t3.2
2L0
24.1
29.7
3.7
50.6
31.9
5.9
18.5
(1) Percentage of total numbers of self employed in the respective labour markets.
(2) Percentage of total numbere of family workers in the respective labour markets.
(3) Percentage of total employees in cmployment in the chosen sectors.
Sourcc: Community Labour Force Surven 1989 @urostat)
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Tablc 15: Pcrsons ln cmployment, by prolcsslonal status an by age'group, l9t9 (l)
Spain (percentages) Ernopean l0 (percentages)
Self employed, t4-u
25 
-49
50-64
65 and over
t4-u
25 
-49
50 
-64
55 and over
5.4
16.5
28.9
55.7
11.0
4.5
5.8
12.3
3.7
10.4
15.9
39.6
2.4
2.1
4.0
to.2
Family work€r,
mtgrlres represent percentage of eech 88e grouP in self employment or family working.
Source: Community Labour Force Surven 19t9 @urostat)
Tbblc 16: Nomlnal and reel unlt labour costs (% average growth)
1980-19&4 19E5-1986 1987-1988 1989-1990 1991 (1)
frlemind se6pensetion per employee
Productivity
Nominal unit labour costs
GDPdeflatc
Real compensation per emploYee
Reol rmit labour cosb
14.0
3.1
10.6
12.5
1.3
-1.7
9.5
2.7
6.6
9.8
4.3
-3.0
6.4
1.4
5.0
5.7
0.7
-0.7
6.9
1.1
5.7
7.1
-0.2
-1.3
7.8
1.8
5.9
6.6
1.0
-0.7
Sourceg: Commiseion Services
( l) Commisoion Forecasts October-November 1991
Thblc l7: contrtbuflons to the changc of thc prlcc defletor ol total flnal uscs (%)
1980-1984 1985-1985 1987-1988 1989-1990 1991 (1)
U.LC. nom. (adj.)
G.o.s. (adj.)(2)
Net indirect tares
Iryortprices:
kryort priccs excluding nom. effecL
exchangerate
Nom. effecl exchaoge ratc
Total flnd useo
Domestic factcs estimstod (3)
6.4
3.2
0.8
3.5
2.0
1.5
14.0
11.0
0.5
7.0
8.6
L7
2.O
0.2
0.2
0.4
4.2
4.9
5.2
2.9
L4
0.5
0.1
0.8
4.7
5.8
6.2
3.0
2.1
0.4
-0.1
-0.1
0.0
5.2
5.6
3.6
L9
1.7
4.9
-1.4
(1) Commiseion Forecaste October-November 1991.
(2) Excluding imputed compeneation of eelf employcd.
igi po."rti" factors includi contsibutions of unit labour cortr, net indirect taxee, operating surplus and the exchange
rate change required to compensate for movements in domestic labour costr relativc to those of competitors.
Source: CommiesionServices
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1. Introduction
Since 1986, the external account of the Spanish economy has
been characterizdby:
1. a considerable deterioration in the trade balarrce;
2. a significant fall in the surplus on the senices balance;
3. a stabilization of thenet hansfers'positionat aroundthe
level achieved in 1988;
4. a deterioration in the current balance;
5. a favourable hend in the basic balance which has rc-
mained in suplus.
These develop,nr.ents have coincided with a strong recovery
in the economy. However, this expansionary phase resulted
it an overheating, as reflected in inllationary pressure and
the currently high level of the extemal def,rcil
Another factor which must be taken into account in explain-
ing extemal trade developments in Spain since 1986 is ac-
cession to the EC. With respect to trade, integration into the
Cornmunity has rreant that some of the bariers which were
protecting Spanish markets from import penetsation must be
progressively dismantled as well as barriers to Spanish ex-
ports to the rest of the EC. Similady, accession has led to the
disappearance of export subsidies anl to the imposition of
Community tariffs on imports from third countries.
Meanwhile, the Peseta las appreciated continuously since
1987, as & consequence of. large capital inflows financing the
curent deficit and inresponse to expectations ofhigh proflt-
tability and high interest rates. However, as predicted by tbe
s1sfiange rate paradox, this hardening of the currerry has
been translated into a significant loss of competitiveness,
whicb in tum, has acted as an obstacle to an improvernent in
the trade balance of goods and services. In this rcspect, the
entry of the peseta into the ERM in June 1989 has not elimi-
nated appreciation pressures but has imposed a ceiling on up-
ward movement in the value of the currency.
The aim of this chapter is to explore the factors which ue
behind the external eccount performance. The extept to
which the Spanish oconomy will be able to reduce ttris im-
balance in the near future and to arrive at a competitive situ-
ation to absorb the shock of free movements of goods, capital
and labour implied by the Single Mulret within the con-
straints that the way to the EMU implies will also be con-
sidered.
The structure of this chapter is as follows : Sections 2 and 3
analyse the tsade and invisible balances ralpectively together
with their explanatory variables. In Section 4 the current ac-
count is examined from the point of view of the gap between
saving and inveshenl Section 5 analyses the financing of
the current accounL In section 6 some theats and rcstraints
from the present current deficit are described Finally, con-
clusions and asseswnts are provi&d in the last Section
2. The trade balance
Ll. Thadepcrforrnanccslnce 1985
Between 1986 and 1991, the trade deficit, in nomind terms,
of tbe Spanish economyhas widened from -2A%of theGDP
to 4,Wo (see Table 1). This deterioration has been due to a
strong growth in imports and a more moderated performance
in expo,rts, both in nominal and real terms. In ftis period, the
volume of total imports has risen W 109,5% while total ex-
ports have risen by 5L,7%; excluding energlf, these data are
l24,1Eo and 54,896, respectively.
These rpsults arc not unnelated to the opening-up of the do-
mestic market after Spain joined the Community in 1986. To
be pnecise, th, d"Sr; of openrcss of the Spanish 
"conomyl
was to 43,596 in 1985, whereas the average of the rest of the
Community members - including Portugal - wts 6l,6%o.
Therefore,spain was the country with the lowest level of
goods and services trade relative to GDP within the Com-
munity. In 1991, this ratio has risen to 58,2Vo, still clearly
below the Community av€rage of 74%. However, oPening
process has been aocunpanied by a sharp increase in import
penetration (fuom 17,2% of the final demand in 1985 to
26,4% in 1991) while export activity of goods and services
has slightly been raised (see Table 2).
The geographical pottern of imports and exports ha,s
changed substantially, mainly due to the new structure of
bariers and tariffs imposed by the EC. Intra-Community
tsade has increased, alttrough EC imports into Spain have
grown more thut Spanistr exports to other Community coun-
tries. In 1985,36,6qo of imports came from the EC and
52,19o of expqts went to this area; in 1991, Community im-
ports and exports stand at 59,6% and7L3qo, respectively.
Trblc 1: The bdercc of, prymentr ln Speln (% of GDP)
1980- 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
1985 (r)
Tradebalencc -4.8
Servicc balance 2.7
Tnnrferbelancc O.7
Currentbalancc -1.3
Lnng-em capital 1.4
balanoe
Basicb.lrnc. 0.1
Short-term capitd 0.0
balencc
4.7 -6.4 -6.0 -6.0
2.7 2.3 1.8 l.t
l.l t.2 1.0 1.4
-0.9 -3.0 -3.2 -2.t
2.9 4.5 3.9 62
2.0 1.5 0.7 3.4
0.2 -0.1 0.0 0.4
-2-4 -3.9
4.1 35
0.4 0.8
2.1 0.5
-0.5 3.3
1.5 3.8
-0.1 0.3
(a) Ertimation.
Sorrcc : Bant of Spain - Carh rrgister
(?)
The degrec of openrcss is measured by the ratio of the volume of exports plue imports of goods and servic€s to GDP.
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Thble 2: Dcgrcc of openness , lmport penetratlon, and export acttvlty ln Spaln and ln the EC countrles
1985 1988 1991(a)
1. Goods and scrvlc€s
1985 1988 1991(a)
2. Gmds
SPAIN
Degee of openness
Inpo,rt penetration
Export activity
EUR11
Degree ofopenness 51.6 66.0
Importpenetration 23.2 25.3
Export activity 31,4 32,1
SPAIN
Degree ofopenness
Inrport penetration
Export activity
EI.JR11
74.0 Degee of openness
27.4 lnrportpenetration
36.2 Export activity
43.5
r7.2
22.7
58.2
26.4
23.1
33.7
15.3
15.2
41.0
20.4
14.9
56.0
22.1
26.4
48.9
u.2
16.7
62-6
u.o
29.6
51.1
22.4
22.5
51.7
20.t
25.5
(a) Commisoion Forecaste October-November 1991.
EuRll: PPS EUR11; EUR12 excl. Spain
Notes: - Degree of openness : ratio of exports pluo imports to GDR in real terms.
- Import penetration: ratio of imports to final demand, in real termg.
- Export activity: ratio of exports to GDR in real terms.
SOURCE : Commission Servicee.
This asynrmetrical response to accession has been accompa-
nid by fewer imports and exports from/to the United States
and OPEC counEies'and more from/to the newly indus-
trialized cormtries.
withia tlu mentber states of tlv Ec,the disribution of spen-
ish ma*et gains has not been uniforrn There are some coun-
tries which clearly have improved their penetration of the
Spanishmarkeg viz. Pornrgal,Italy, the Netherlands md Bel-
giun On the otber han4 the United Kingdom has suffer€d a
significant loss in exports to Spain l,osses in ttre Spanish
mar&et have besr less important for Germrny, France, he-
land and Gree,ce. Fin"lly, in Dennrart no change is apparcnl
At thc same timg Spain is now selliag more products to por-
tugal, Italy, Gennany, and Cireece than before 1986 wherers
it has lost share in the rest of the Corrmunity irnports, espe-
cially in the Netherlands and the Unitod Kingdom. Overall,
the Spanish intra+ommunity tsode balance have become
notsblymorenegative (4,3% of theGDPin 1gg6; -2,l7oof.
the GDP in 1991).
The pruduct breadowa of Spanish non-energy trade shds
some light on the nature of the undedying demand. Inter-
mediate goods continue to represmt the greatest part of non-
energy imports. However, their strare has decreased Sfurce
1990, consurner products have become more important than
capital goods. Nevertheless, as is cleady showed in Graph 1,
the main cause of the growth in non-enerry imports has been
the performance of intermediate goods, with the exception of
1987, 1990 urd 1991 3. Capitat goods were the most import-
ant component of imports only in 1987; since 1990, son-
sumer goods have been the main cause of the growth of
non-energy imports.
With regard to exports, 6,39o ot Spanish non-energy ex-
po,rts wq'e int€rnEdilte prod,rcts, 40,196 consumer products
Ltd 13,6% capital products in 1990; the change in weights -
of each category between 1985 and 1991 has be€n -5,4, 4,3
ald 1,2 points, respectively.
2.L Some explanatory lactors
As shown abovg the &terioration in the trade balrme has
been cused by a much sharper rise in imports than exports.
In this section the analpis will focts on the "nonrompeti-
tiyeness" factors which heve contributed to the trade dete-
rioration
The reduction of trade barriers since January 1986 has
allowed new goods to appar on the domestic nrartet, pro-
viding a wider choic€ to consum€rs. In some cases, these
products were cheaper than those produced domestically
2
3
These data are in nominal terms, eo they do not take 0re fall in oil prices into accounr
The reeirartable Srowth in the import of infermediate goods in 1989 could be explained by several factors: the continuation of
very strrong growth in domegtic demand during ttre fust half of thatyear; the prerrious low level of stocls; ard a double efrect
fiom ttre excfiange rate, initially as I oonsequenqe of 0re appreciation of the peseta and then the rcstaint of furlhcr
appreciation imposed by the ERM discipline since June 1989.
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Grrphl: Produc{ brcrkdwr of aor-orcrjr lnportr
Contrlb. ol nor cncr3Sl lnporlr 3rcrtl
Grrpl2: Prod.brcrtdovr of consumptlor lmportr
Cortrlb. of colrumptlm luporir grovti
naa ro
@ws
E[noh![gurbl9i.lEClof Chdr
mnDroml
Ecarlrcr Efrrrrrrlo Ww Erocsotrcooo f]ouotroocr
Hrildn6rlhlltlocct.llCldt
mn
while others ww not previously available or their prices
were substantially increased by tariffs. It may bc argud
however, that this factorhas had only an initial impact on im-
puts during the time when &mandpatt€rns were changing.
This conjunctural effect was p'robably mqe iryqtant with
regardto conzumergoods, especially wheq at thesametime,
disposable income was rising after a long period of low
growth in the Spanish oconomy.
According with Graph 2 the hieh growth in the import of
durable qonsumer gmds in 1986 ard 1987 sppmts this ar-
gumeDL Howwer, sinoe 1988 the contibution of duables !o
total consumer imports has fallen aDd in 1990 and 1991 non-
durable goods have emerged as the main compomt of con-
srmerimports
Economic activity in Spain has been growing much morp
than in its main commercial parturs rnd consequently it has
beenimportingmort as well. Empiricelevi&re Sows thet
theincomeelasticity of Spanish iryorts is higherthan that of
other industrialised countriesa. So, income trends hrve
played a positive and important role in tbe rise in imports,
while lower elasticities as well as lower demand growth in its
trade partrers prtly explains the poor rcsponse of expo,rts
Moreover, the incre elasticity of SpaniS imports ishigh€r
than that of exports, which is another element expleining the
worsening of the tradebalarce.
On the other hand, the catching-up prooess underway in
Spain since 1986 has bcen made possible mly by the evaila-
Ulity of foreign goods and capitil. During tttis perio( Spain
has made a great effut to modcmize its p,roductive stmcture
as clerly reflected 6 high investment rates. This structural
improvement has affected imports in two aspects. Fintly, a
country with a very low degree of R&D activities and having
a relatively outdated technology has to increese capital im-
pmts in order to increase its capital stock Secondly, con-
shaints from productivity capacity left indigenous supply
unable to re,spond to growing domestic demand and to its
rew requirc,ments which has cursed a switch to extemal mer-
kets. Tb Feserce of very strong domestic dernan4 among
otber factus, hes boosted the attsactiveness of the internal
ma*et relative exporting activity which, in tun, has had a
rrgetive influerrcie on the expct performanoe. The lower ex-
port activity of the Spanish cconomy is reflected in the
figrues presented in Table I Moreover, rccoding to thpse
dat, Spain has the lowe$ drre of exports of goods ard ser-
viccs in GDP within tbc rest of EC comtries.
Finally, researchs made by the Bank of Spain5 strow that, be-
tween 1985 and 1989, Spain's high donestic &mand growth
accounts for a lrger share of the deteriaation in the trade
bclance then the loss of cunpetitiveness. However, there is
also a third factordue basicdly to tbe unfavourable effects of
the dism8ntling of tariffs following entry into the Com-
4
5
Aocording b estimations madc by tlp IMF for lte volume of imports and exports of goodt md services.
See Ortega E €t al, "Spain'e current urd capitrl account bslancc within the EC", Bank of Spain Economic Bullain,
november 19t9.
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munity who, at least until 1989, was more important than
competitiveness in affecting the change in imports.
Nevertheless, it is useful to analyse the role of nominal and
real exchange rates in the tra& performance, as a means to
predict the likely short-term evolution in this regard.
23. Competltlvenesseffects
TL,e performance of the Spanish rade balance has mirrored
the development of competitiveness in the economy. Inde-
pendently of the price or cost deflators chosen to derive the
real effective exchurge rate, the conclusion is the sarne: the
Spanish economy has lost competitiveness relative to its
main ha& partrers
As can be seen in Table 3, the greatest loss of competitive-
ness has been against other major in&rstrial counhies with
appreciation ranging between l5,3Eo, if the real exchange
rate is calculated with producer prices of manufachring in-
dusty, and 32,3Eo, if relative prices are GDP &flators.
As can be seen in Graph 3, there has been a sipificant diver-
gence in exchange rote movemenir between the industsial
countries ard the EC or ERM members. To be precise, the
nominal effective exchange rate against all industrial coun-
tries appreciateAby lO,9% between 1985 and 1991. The
nominal appreciation of the Peseta against Ore US dollar has
been around 4096. Thus, the wealness of the dollar explains
the big differerrce when consi&ring some other sets of coun-
ties excluding the United States.
Moreover, the nominal effective exchange rate of the Peseta
against the ERM countries has &preciated W 1,8%. This re-
zult is not independent of Spain's incorporation into the Ex-
change Rate Mechanism in June 1989, which has acted as a
b,rake on the previous upward trend" Finally, the reason from
the appreciationby 3,1?o in relation to all the member statss
is the appreciation of the Peseta againsl currencies not in-
cluded in the ERlvI"
As regards relative prbes, Spanish costs and prices have
beenrising at a fasterrate than in others countries. However,
the size of the divergence is not the same fc all prices. There
are a widerange of inllation measures within domestic prices
depending on whether the product c the sector is tradeable
ornon-tradeable.
What is more, the main characteristic of present i$lalionory
process of the Spanish economy is the big gap between
prices of sen ices and that of industrial products, e.g. be-
tween non-tradeables and tradeables product prices. The
1991 growth rates of differents components of the consumer
prices index give an idea about that divergence: the whole of
Thble 3: Spanlsh competltlvlncss betwccn 1985 - 1991 (a)
Loss (+) or galns (-) (%)
krlustrial countries Conununity countries ERM countries (b)
Real effectlve exchange rates wlth:
1. Unit labour costs of total economy
2. Producer prices of manuf. industry (c)
3. Deflator of total exports
(goods and services)
4. GDPdeflator
5. Deflator of private consumption
Nominal effective exchange rates
R.elatlve prlces:
1. Unit labour costs of total economy
2. Producer p,rices of manuf. industry (c)
3. Deflator of totd exports(god and services)
4. GDPdeflator
5. Deflator of private consrunption
U,2
15,3
19,7
32,3
29,0
10,9
14,3
6,0
9,2
?.0,7
19,8
3,1
15,6
6,0
6,7
?n,6
l9,E
-1,8
12,o
3,6
7,9
19,2
16,3
10,9
2,7
5,9
17,L
16,3
17,8
4,3
8,6
22,8
22,0
(a) Commission Forecasts October-November l99l for 1991.
(b) ERM is narrow band except for: 2. Producer prices of manufacturing industrlr.(c) 1991 is three quarters average..
Source : Commission Services.
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Grrph 3: Nomlnel eflectlve erchenge retes
(+) epprccletlon of the Pegetr
rta rt m rn
Hffi.Ht-.. hdetrr.irrln
l$l.S
consumer prices grew 6,07o while services and industrial
prrces - excluding €rsgy - grew 10,37o urd 4,61o, rcsp€c-
tively (see Graph A).
This fact is not independent on the low &gree of external
competition of the service secto,r which is very close to the
non-tradeable sector definition which allows it to transnrit
excess deurand to prices. Therefore, the strong performance
of the domestic deman4 which, in turn, offered abig domes-
tic market, have pushed up services prices which have
become the hard core of inflation.
At the sanre time, industrial prices have followed a moder-
ated trend when they went to domestic martet and they have
had a negative growth rate to be sale in external markets.
That implies that in the last upswing of inflation, export€rs
have resisted the translation of inflationary pressures from
labour costs and non-tradeable sectors into higher export
Pnces.
On the other hand, Spain prices has perfornrcd better in com-
parison with industrial countries than with the Community
and ERM countries. Here, the core of ERM low-inllation
economies is the main factor behind tlrese rezults.
Combining exchange rate and relative price performance,
some conclusions on the competitiveness performance of
Spain between 1985 and 1991 may be drawn:
(1) Spain has lost much more competitiveness against 19
indusbial countries than against its European counter-
parts. This diff€rerce is mainly explained by the dollar
devaluation
(2) Although nominal effective exchange rate of the peseta
against ERM countries has not achieved at the level of
1985, showing a depreciation for the whole of the peri-
od, the continousupward trend of the Spanish cureney
since 1987 and ttp differerrces in prices and costs per-
formance have also provoked a loss of competitiveness
with those counhies.
(3) The loss of competitiveness against ECl2 has been
more important than with the ERM countries because
a higher appreciation of the nominal exchange rate.
Nevertheless, divergence ofcosts and prices are srnal-
ler.
Consequently, Spanish losses in exha{ommunity markets
have been due not only to a re-orientation of trade to the EC
after 1986 but also to a higher rise in prices.
3. The invisibles balance
While the trade balance was worsening, net income from ser-
vices rnd hansfers was also zuffering a sigrrificant &cline
(Iable 4). This balance has been a traditional mrplus item in
the Spanish curr€nt account but its weak performance since
1987 has failed to comp€nsate fm the rise in the trade deficif
which, in turn, explains the negative trend in the current bal-
anqe.
The underlying factor in the &clining services surplus is the
enarkable clwnge in the tourism balance. Since 1988 to
1990, tourism incomes have registered a clear downward
hen4 whereas expenditure by Spanish resi&nts abroad has
risen
The fall in income from towism has been mainly due to the
lms of competitiveness suffered by this sector : the implicit
deflator of expenditure by non-residents in Spain has risen
W 48% sincc 1985 to 1991whereas that of Spanish rpsidents
abroad tras grown only by 17,6%. In other wor&, the present
core of Spanish infl$ion is in the service soctor, which in-
Grrph rl: Inllrtlon by sector (% rvcrrgc ennuel rrle)
Iflo t9ta t9tr tcl rI' rs rt
n caemur 
- 
orrrmr 's cnrc{uru
* tillc{. + tltuntllt ffi!
ftol' lLdbhtmlullllGCIem!&lIA
fi Cmpeti3ivcness end External Performame
Trble {: Invlslblc behlcc (% ol GDP)
1985 1e86 1987 1988 1989 19q) 1991
(r)
Servrcc balancc 3.t 4.1 35 2.7 2.3 l.t t.t
Tounsm baLncc 4.3 45 1.4 4.1 35 2.9 2.9
Scrviccbdancc -0.5 -0.4 -0.9 -1.4 -1.2 -l.l -l.l
excluding tourirm
Tranrferbdencc 0.7 0.4 0.t l.l 1,2 1.0 1.4
Scrvicc rnd Tnndcr 4.4 4.5 4.3 3.t 3.4 2.t 12
balance
(r) - Estimationr.
Sourcc: Benk of Spria (Cuh Rcgirter)
cludes tourisrn activities whictU in turrU is one of the compo-
nents of services with higher prica* At the same tirne, the
nominal appreciation of the P€s€ta has dso bad a regative
influence on visitors from abroad Between 1985 and 1989,
7 1% of Spanish tourists w€rc from four Europcan corntsies :
the United King dom (22,49o),Crermany (21, I %), tbe Nether-
lads (10,1%) and kance (17,3%).In the same peno( the
cumulative real appneciuiono of lhe Peseta vislvis each of
these countries was 16,0%, 11,7%, 13,t% rnd l4,lgo. C-on-
sequently, tb ircreases in Spanifi prices have clerly dis-
couraged tourists. In particular, when we consider tbe re.st of
ihe Meditcrrarean rncmbcrs of EC, e.g. Italy rnd Greoce. as
cornpetitor counEies, the Spanish loss of price competitive-
ness between 1985 and 1989 relative to these two countries
(6J% withltaly andl4,6?owith Cireece) gives an idea of tbe
likely effect of pnce.s on the choice of tourists.
There heve dso been other facton - besi&s prices - which
are directly related to competitiveness in tourisrn such as
tsansport strikes, low sen ice quality, changes in the weather,
which have also had continuous and negative repercussions
on tourim demand Moreover, all of these elements explain-
ing the fell-off in tourism income in Spain have equally
deterrdned the incr€ase in tourisur pa,rments from Spain to
the rest of the world. It is clear that a country with high do-
mestic prices, a strong currerrcy, a rising level of disposable
incomg end low quality in tourism senices, will have less
tourist demrndnot only from abroad but also from the inter-
nd mrrtet Nwertheless, 1991 figur€.s $ow sme improve-
ment in thc tourism balance due to an stabilizetion of
incomes at the level achieved in 1990 and an slightly de-
crease in peyrents.
The worsening of tourisrn incom€s was not the mly caur of
the decre8se in the semice suplus. A defrcit in tbe balance of
services, excluding tourism, hrs been accentuatod by large
ps,rments fq incomes and royalties, amongst others. The
substantial increase in foreign investsnent, the possibility -
with some re.strictions - fr residents to borrow abroaq and
the need to irnport technology in mder to improve infrastruc-
tur€ arc some explanatmy factors.
Frn"lly, the increase in incomes from public transfers, pr-
ticularly from the EC, wrs the main reason for the initial and
current growth of tbe surplus in the transfer balance.
4. The current account balance
From the previous analysis, it is clear that the worsening of
th cunent account &ficit has been due not only to tbe dete-
rication of trade hlt dso to a less positive performance of
the services balanoe. In both calrcs, one of the main under-
lying reasom is the major loss of competitiveiress in the pro-
duction of tbe Spanish ocmomy. Howwer, in analysing 0re
cur€nt eccount we Sould also look 8t the gsp between sav-
ing and investurent, i.e. the net loans received or granted by
a country. What is more, it is interesting to analyse beds in
terms of compqrents within bottr the public and privaie sec-
tor&
Looking at the profilc ofnational savings rnd investnent, it
is cler that tbe perfamame of inves&nent did not follow a
similar path to sevi4gs. Mueover, since 1988, national sav-
ing as a percentage of GDP has strbilis€d wbereas invest-
ment bas mainteined anupward hend.
Ihc steUlizationby22%GDP of natiural saving cornbines r
fdl of private saving from 2\l% n 1 985 io round 2A,Uh n
1991 with m increase of thet of public scctor by 2,5 points of
the GDP in the same p€riod Within the privrte sector, both
Greph 5: Tourlrrn porformtrcc (h S of GDP)
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households and enterprises have redrced their savings. How-
ever, there&rction of households savings havebeen sbonger.
Therefore, the rise in domestic conzumption has been tsans-
lated into an increasing ne6d for burowing from ab,road. Ef_
futs made by Ore public sector have not been sufficient to
offset the fall in private savings.
5. The current account financing
5.1. Overylew
The growing current account deficits have been financed
until now by spontaneous capital inflows Howwer, it is very
important to consider the degroe of stability in capital in-
flows in order to appreciale potential tlreats to firJfavour-
able capital account position. Moreover, to the extent that
non-speculative flows are financing the current account
feficit, the availability of stable fturds an4 in somerespects,
investor confidence and expectations will determine the
tongmy's capacity to support the deficil Nevertheless, part
of p,rivate capital impo,rts have resulted from appropriate. in-
terest-rate differentials and/or exchange-rate expectations
and proved to be more volatile given its speculative charac_
ter, namely short-term capital and a part of portfolio invest-
ment (specially in money market instruments such as
Treasury Bills). Howw€r, I high sharercqponded to s&uctu-
1l factors, such as higher expectedreal retums and imp,roved
institutional framewolt, and had, subsequently, a more per-
manent character through the time.
The development of finarrcial merlcets and the specific char-
acteristics of some of the capital iterns cla$ified as long term
suggest that a mqe detailed breakdown is necessar5l to en-
sure a comect analysis. Table 5 prwides several balances ob-
tained by combining the current account balance with
different net capital flows. The most permanent capital flows
Current and capltal account balances (% of GDp)
Grepl 6: Sevlng rnd tnvcr0mcnt $p (% o, GDp)
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1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991(a)
(1) Currentaccount
(2) Current account+Direct investment
(3) Current account+Direct invesfinent+
+Reel estate inveshent
(4) Current account+Direct invesfn€nt+
+Real state invesfnent+Portfolio invesfrnent
(5) Current account+Total investment
(Q Current account+Toial long term capital
(7) Cunent account+Total capital account
(8) Centralreserveschange
lvlernorandum items :
Cenbal foreipreserrres
Foreign det*
2.1
2.8
3.4
4.0
4.0
1.5
1.4
1.1
6.0
9.8
0.5
1.1
t.7
3.1
3.t
3.8
4.0
4.9
10.0
9.1
{.9
0.1
0.7
1.4
1.5
2.0
2.2
L8
11.5
9.2
-3.0
-1.9
-1.3
0.9
0.9
1.5
1.4
1.2
11.0
8.5
-3.2
-1.6
- 1.1
0.0
0.2
0.7
0.7
t.7
10.6
8.7
2.2
2.3
3.4
3.8
2.4
12.2
10.4
-L8
-1.6
-1.3
(a) Estimations.
Source: Bank of Spain, cash register
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arc frstly, direct investments an4 then' real estate invest-
menL Therefore, as indicated inrows 2 and 3, since 1989 the
capital flows under these two headings have not been sufFr-
cient to cover the curent account deficit althoug[ until
1991, permarnnt capital flows have maintained a continuous
upward trend. 
,
Looking at Graph 7, the rped for additional capital flows can
be atfibuted to the fast de.terioration in the current account
and not to any mo&ration in net P€mlarent capital ffiows.
Consequently, as the current deficit has widene4 depend-
ency on non-p€rman€nt capital inflows has incr€ased" This
latter has not changed in 1991: cun€Nrt account deficit has
slightly been &creased but permanent investsnent has fdlen
as well. ;
Nevertheless, looking at the path of the basic balance (row
6), although it has be€n continously in surplus, it has been
declining in recent years urd the previous high overfinarrcing
of the current deficitclearly &creased in 1990. It has some-
times been aryued that lhe relatively reduced level of exter-
nal detlt (51.3 bn $ in September 1991) and tlre considerable
amount of official resenes (63.7 bn $ in the same date) pro'
vides, even apart from spontaneous capital inllowg zuffi-
cient room for manoeuvre for the present crlrrent account
deficit to be sustainable in the medium-terrn However, we
should look also to the net external financial position of a
country when assessing the current account balance sustaina-
bility.
Grrph 7: Currenl tccount't PcrDucrt llrencc
(% ofGDP)
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In fact, the spontaneous capital inflows, reflected in rising
"extemal debt" as offrcially defined ' (an irrrease of $27.3
bn between erd-1985 and September 191), were also asso-
ciated with a large increase in official reserves (by $47.7 bn
over the same period). However, the net external liabilitie's of
the banking sector (excluding the Burk of Spain) also in-
creased sigrificantly, by $24.3 bn over the same period' thus
leaving an increase of $23.4 bn in the net external assets of
the consolidated monetary system. Over the same penod' the
total net external liabilitie's of dl domestic sectors rose hom
$21.3 bn to $85.6 bn
Therefore, a furtlrer &terioration in the current account or a
switch in the financid markets could push the economy to an
underfmancing position.
5.2 The explanatorY factors
The financing of the growing curent account deficits by
long-term capital inflows was ma& possible by a combina-
tion of facton:
l) The Spanish commitment towards EEC ail ERlil :rhe
adhererrce of Spain to the EEC in 1985 reduced the au-
tonomy of some economic policies (namely trade ard
agriculture policies) and required the irnplementation
of Community regulations and directives, specially
those conceming thebanking and financial services ard
capital movernents liberalization The latter conributed
to reduce ttre uncertainty concerning the medium-ternt
qientation of economic Policies.
In addition to that, non-European companies, namely
from 0re United States and Japarl wene taking strategic
positions that would allow them to benefit from the
single market programme. The full exploitatim of both
a potential martet in an expansionary economic situ-
7 That is, foreign cunency and oonvertible pesetas indeb[ress of resi&nt units vis-]-vis non-resideots and irrcludes liabilities
materializ€d in credits and paper, usurlly negotiables, that implies the obligation of intercst payments and reimbursement of
the principle rcoording to an unortization plan.
T[blc 6: Net cxtcrnel flnlnclel poslllon
(Deccrnber l9t5 . Septcmbor 1991, bn.0)
l. Inccare in ccntral rcrerver 47.7
2. Incrcarc in encmd emets of lhe banhing 1 1.1
3. Toral incrcare in cxtemd assets 58.8
4. Irrcrerrc in cxternrl liabilitier of the 35.4
benkhg ryilcm
5. Ircrcarc in cx.tcmdarcets of cmsolidated 23.4
mqrctarY syrtre
(5=3-4)
of which
Increrrc in ret extcrnal esrc$ of banking 
-21.3(=24)
:{
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2)
ation and the comparative advantages of ttre Spanistr
economy, with relatively low labour costs ard labour-
intensive, everage how-how, and standard{echnology
productions also played a major role.
Finally, the enty of peseta into the ERM of rhe EMS in
June 1989 redrced the uncertainty on the global econ-
omicclimate an4 subsequently, tberiskpremium of in-
vestnent &nominated in pesetas sirce it put a floq to
the currency's depreciation and increased the credi-
bility of economy policies, especially the monetary
policies, and conbibtrted to moderate inflation expec-
tations.
Prospects of higher reol returns on capital and in-
creased returns on the Spanish$tock hchange : the im-
provement in profitability, the increase in capital
productivity, thp reduction of sorne labour-market rig-
idities and the removal of certain supply-side con-
straints resulted in an improved btrsiness climate that
pave the way for an investment-led r,ecovery of the
Spanish economy since the second half of 1985. The lat-
ter rcpresented a p€rmanent flow of direct investment
amounting to arange betw*n0.6?o ud l.6flo of GDP
during ttrc period 1986-90.
Portfolio investment, in contrast, was more volatile
since most of portfolio investnent in 1987 and 1989
was due in equities; in 19E9, however, a marked in-
crease in the acquisition of medium- and long-term
public debt seerns to have reduced its variability.
The important upsurge of pctfolio investrnent in 1987
(around a 857o increase from 1985) in acontext ofhigh
expected retums, was reversed in 1988 after the finan-
cial craslr of October 19t7. As aresult portfolio invest-
ment in 1988 fell back to around the same level
(246.2br,t Ptas) Oran it was in 1986 (235 bn Ptas). tr
1989, however, it rocovered again up to 733 bn Ptas al-
though this time it cannot be solely attributed to the ex-
pectedretums diffe,rential, but also to the improvement
in the institutional framework concerning the stock ex-
churge, public debt bookkeeping and capital liberaliza-
tion. The exemption from taxation provided to the
public debt interest ircome paid to non-residents since
January 191 has fostered I strong fueign dernand this
year, specially for the medium and long-term ma-
turities
New institutional framework : impmved narket fii-
ciency and capiul liberalization: since Spain joined
the European Community in 1986, the authorities have
implemented a series of measures to easeprogressively
the exchange controls. The pocess of capital liberali-
zationhasbeenputiculady intense as faras capital out-
flows of residents is concerned, and only a small
number of short-term operations are subject now to
authorization The current account bo'rrowing require-
ments and the need to comply with EC directives led the
authorities to lib€raliz€ portfolio investment by non-
residents. Sometimes the liberalization process was
ahead of tlrc compulsory calen&rs, but in other cases
the constraints imposed by the capital inflows on the
morrtary policy obliged the authorities to reinhoduce
capital ccrtrols previously lifted.E
Onthe otherhand" two structural rneasures p,roved to be
instrumental in increasing the transparency and effi-
cienry of the Spanistr capital markets and, thereforc, the
attractiveness of Spurish assets to non-residents: firsl
the electronic book entry settlernent s.vstern (Central de
Anotaciones en Cuenta) inhoduced in May 1987 urd by
means of which issuing and transmission costs wercre-
duced end a more secondar_v market was fostered Sec-
ond, the Spanish Securities Market Act put in fmce in
July 1989. The lafter dealt wi& the organisation of the
primaryand secondarymarkets, with the discipline and
inten entionrules imposed onfinancial instinutions, and
provided a fuee andmore efficient capital market whose
fansparency has alrcady increased sharply by the intro-
duction of the continuous computerized martet.
4\ Widening of interest rate dfurentials in o context of ex-
clange-rate strength.' the uncovercd 3-month intercst
rate of the peseta vis-I-vis the DM has been above 7 pcl
points from 1984 up to March 1990. Thereafter it was
somewhat reduced but still remains high (around
3.3 pct points in October 1991). The latter took place at
a time when domestic demand was booming and expec-
tations of exchange-rate stability, or even appreciation,
were building up. As a re,sult, the demand of credit by
both the pnvate and the public sector increased large
inflows of short-term foreign capital continued and the
long-term capital rose inducing, thereafter, a subBtantial
rise in liquidity. As the growth of money supply re-
mained strong the mon€t8ry authorities reacted by ris-
ing short-terrn int€rest rates from L2 to 22% in thlee
months during ttre spring of 1987. This reaction pro-
duced additional short-term capital inflows and pro-
voked an appneciating p,ressur,e on the peseta-
This "vicious circle" of the Spanish monetary policyre-
appeaed in arecursive way in 1988 ard 1989, and made
cleer the impossibility to flrx simultaneous and inde-
pendently two nomind targets for aa econmry: on lhe
one hand, a very strict target for money growth an4 on
the other han( the commitrnent to maintain a certain
exchange-rate stability. As a result the authorities rein-
troduced sorre capital controls erd implemented credit
ceilingsg
3)
I
9
For more &tails see Chspt€r V Regime applbable b capital movements.
Soe Chapter YII for the operation of monetary policy.
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6. Threats and constraints from the
external sector
In the developrnent of the Spanish extemal secto-r in the last
three years, tier,e is anotherworrying ele,lnent 10, 
"on*-ergoods have been increasing their share in the demand for
non-energy imports when the share of capital product has re-
mained at the same level. In 19n,26,9qo of total non<nergy
imports were consumer produ cts and22,77o capital prroducts.
Therefore, independently ofthe structure ofcapital which is
financing the deficit, we cannot say that this deficit is not
worrying when it is &re, partly, to a high level of consump-
tion. If the same deficit was reflecting an incrnease in capital
investrnen! the prognosis would be completely different A
country which increase.s capital imports to improve domestic
productive capacity and infrastructure will ultimately be able
to transform tlre current deficit into a zurplus.
The assumption that a current account deficit due to a Pro-
ductive investrnent process is zustainable is not always brue.
If new investrnent is located in the tradeable sectors, we can
exp€ct an improvement in export activity in the future. In
contrast, if investrnent is located in the non-tradeable sector'
greater efforts to raise the competitiveness of the tradeable
sector become the key to a cqrection in the ha& deficit
A sectoral b,reakdown of direct inwad investment in Spain
sheds sorne light in this respecL Until 1987, more the 50 %
of total foreign direct investment was located in mining ani
chemical, metal products and others murufachuing sectors
(see Table 7). Since then, finrncial seryices and other ser-
vices, hene the main part of non-tsadeable sector is includd
have inqeased their shares.
The misallocation of exte,mal resources, in the context of
correcting the balance of payrnent disequilitrium, has been
produced at the same time as the hard appreciation of the
peseta has begun. The later phenomenon joined with a very
strong domestic demand has increased ttre profitability of in-
vestrnent in sectors without external competition as com-
pared to the tadeables sector. Furthermore, the absence of
risks associated with exposure to external competition and
the high level of internal conzumption are some of the under-
lying explanatory factors of the persistence of the inflation-
ary core in the services sector; this insulation of thc
non-hadeable sector, in tum, has acted as an obstacle to the
improvement in the competitiveness of the more exposed
tradeable sectots.
Nevertheless, the presence of foneign investors in the serrrice
sector could increase the internal competition within that
sector and improve its efficiency, in terms of the market
structure, paving the way to the correction of the culTent
divergence within domestic prices.
Table 7: Sectorlal breakdown of dlrect forelgn lnvestment (% of total)
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 l99l(a)
(1) Aericultue
(2) Energy
(3) Mining and chemical
(4) Metalproducts
(5) Others manufacturing
(6) Building
(7) Financial services
(8) Others services
Total
Pro-memo:
(3)+(4){5) Manufacturing
1.3
0.4
17.3
28.2
t7.4
0.9
17.5
17.2
100.0
62.9
t.7
0.4
14.0
29.9
t7.5
0.1
19.3
t7.l
lm.0
61.4
1.5
0.3
28.4
11.3
t2.9
o.2
u.4
21.2
100.0
52.6
t.2
2.0
t0.7
9.1
t7.l
0.6
43.3
15.E
100.0
36.9
4.4
0.0
t2.3
to.2
16.9
0.9
.37.4
18.0
100.0
39.4
0.9 0.6
3.5 10.9
t2.7 6.2
LO.z 6.5
t2.t 13.5
2.2 1.2
6.5 N.7
11.9 ZO.4
100.0 100.0
35.0 26.2
(a) Only 6 months.
Source: Ministery of Economy.
10 See section 2.2.
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7. Summary and Conclusions
Since 1985, the Spanistr current account has been affected
by, firstly accession to the European Community an{ sec-
ondly, therecovery in economic activity.
Both elements have caused a considerable deterioration in
the trade balance; this combined with a poor perfmmance on
the invisibles balance explain the widening deficits on the
curent account since 1989.
The adoption of the Community common external tadtr -
which b'roke with the previous tradition of extensive protec-
tionism against extemal competition - at a time when domes-
tic demand was growing more rapidly than its main
competitor coun&ies, hasrczulted in a sipificant increase in
imports which has not been matched @ export growth.
Moreover, a very high dourcstic demand growth resulted in
the reappearurce of accelerating inflation in the second half
of 1988. The ircrease in the interest rate to contsol inflation
induced large capital inflows and a consequent appreciation
of thepeseta- The loss of external competitiveness as arcsult
of combining botb rising prices and appreciating exchange
rates, has negatively beea affecting goods and servicc.s ex-
ports.
The current account deficit alsoreflects the incapacity ofdo-
mestic saving to finance the investne,nt process.
Since 1986, the public sector has reduced its &ficit but this
reduction has been insufficient to compensate the gap be-
tween saving and investment in the private sectu.
In this regard, increases in disposable income have been
hanslated into a growth in conzumption which, in turn" has
provoked a higber share of corurumer goods in the total de-
mand for imports.
Foreigrr capital inflows are overfinancing the current account
deficit
The Spanish e,conomy has become increasingly dependent
on qpeculative capital inflows attacted basica[y by high in-
terest rates and a stsong curr€ncy. In this cmtext, the disci-
pline implied by membership of the Exchange Rate
Mechanisrn of the EMS since fure 1989 has enhanced the
attractiveness of Spanish intenest rate differentials as the risk
oflosses ttnough a depreciation has beenreduoed.
However, liberalization of capital movernent will imply a
progressive narrowing of inte,rest rate differentials among
EC countries. Thus, the present attractiveness ofthe Spanistt
economy to speculative investment will not continue in the
long tenn On the other han4 long-term investors re morp
sensitive to the structural conlitions of the economy which,
in turn, could be threatened by a persistent and growing cur-
rent deficit among other disequilibria.
Consequently, grest€r efforts to cqrcct pres€ot unbalucqs
wouldberequird if ttre Spanish urthorities wish to consoli-
date the economy in advarrce of the Single Market and to fol-
low the proc€ss towards Moretary Union.
. With regud to irnports , Woditlctive sectors have been more
sensitive to tbe resEictive rneasures than connrmers. Import
growth in 1990 was below that of previous years. This im-
port bend is in line with the moderation of domestic de-
mand eqpecially in the second half of 1990. The easing in
demand is a consequence of restrictive measures imple-
mented by the authorities one year before and of the addi-
tional deterioration of expectation due to the Gulf crisis.
Nevertlreless, import growth is still high and coffiumer pro.
ducts have increased tbeir *rare in non-energy imports
. From the export si& additional competitiveness improve-
ments will be needed to correct the external deflrcil The
I 990 and 1 99 1 export figures suggest stronger growth com-
pared with p,revious years. Domestic demand moderation,
efforts to improve price competitiveness in tsadeable sec-
tors rnd the ernergence of extemal markets - Spanish trade
has been positively affected by German rmification - could
be conhibuting to thisrecovery. However, thereallocation
of resoruoes towards non-tradeable sectors might to have
reduced export capacity.
. Inflation convergence with the low inflation European
countries is a key issue to restore external equilibrium.
Price and cost moderation is the only possibility for an eco-
nomy with guasi-fxed exchange rates and about to be in-
tegrated into a large free market, to improve
competitiveness. Arpduction in the inflation rate and costs
will help fte tradeable sectos to expand their share of ex-
t€rnal mar&ets.
Consequently, this implie the maintenance of a moderate
growth in domestic demarrl so as to avoid further pressure
on import demand and prices. Other measures to encourage
dmrestic saving would also help to narrow the gap between
saving and investrnent while simultaneously reducing de-
mand for imported conzumption goods.
. Impruvement of thc credibility of the anti-inflationary po-
Iicy within the ERM frrmework is also required to avoid
any reversal of both speculative and permanent capital
flows. Even if no financial constsaints in the extemal sector
have emerged until now the prograssive widening of the
current account deficits might be considered as unsustaina-
bleby themarkets andleadto areversd of capital inflows.
The stability of capital inflows has to be assued by apPro-
priate retums. Within the ERM fratpworlq both the change
in the pre.rent policy mix, allowing for a more stringent fis-
cal policy and a less tight monetary policy, and the mode-
ration of wage increase are required to preserrre domestic
price stability and exteinal competitiveness, otherwise, cur-
rent account deficits will widenraising tbe qpectre of a srb
sequent recession, expected retums on foreign investment
will beredrcod arrt foreip investrrent will be tempted to
withdraw.
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Changes in Spain and EC commercial protection
Industrlal products
1. Quantitative restrictions were completely dismantled in 1.1.1990.
2. Gradual tariff rale re&ction process from the base rate (aproximately 14 %) fo zero in the case of other EC countsies,
and from the base ra0e to the lower Common Extemal Tariffrate (aproximately +5 %) is as follows:
to%
125%
t5%
15 % (effectively in October 1988)
L2,5 EO
12.5 7o
19922
1993:
TOTAL: rN%
EC Commencial protection for Spanish industrid products was completely removed in jurp 1989.
Agrlcultural products
1. koducts originating in any EC country have prefe,rence to products originating in third countries in other EC countries.
2. Gradual tariffratereductionfc agricultural products tobe completedby 1-l-1993. The tinre-table forfruits, vegetables,
and vegetable fats extends to 1-1-1996.
March, lst
fanuary, lst
1986:
1987
1988:
1989:
1990:
1991:
fanuary, lst 12,5%
to.o%
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Introduction
In the fnst part of the 1980s the public frnances in Spain were
characterized by :
. a sharp expansion of expenditw€ and revenue expressed as
a propo,rtion of GDP (a trend which had dready become
perceptible in the 1970s);
. a growing public deficit which increased from 2.6% of
GDP in 1980 to 6,9% in 1985;
. an increase ingrosspublic debt fumltt7.6% ofGDPin 1980
ro 45 .2% in 1 985, as a result of which debt servicing cosb
rose from 0.7% of GDP in 1980 to 3.9% it 1986.
The political refum process, the economic rocession ard the
efforts ma& 1s 6rintain social cohesion were rpflected in a
sharp increase in expenditure until 1986. The public sectc
tried to meet a vrriety of social demands at the sare time as
it had to pay large uneinployment berefits and deal with the
restructuring of certain in&strial and financial sectors.
kom 1985 onwatds, rcrrenue increased sharply as arcsult of
economic gowth, the introduction of VAT and the fight
against tax errasion However, there were also an increase in
expenditure (budgetary ov€rruns were consi&rable) and the
strengthening of a public inveshent poliry geared to im-
proving infrastructrue. Consequently, the drive to ctt the
deficit slowed down since 1988.
On the other han4 in the abaence of an effective policy fr
moderating incomeg tbe peseta's entry into the EMS ex-
change rate mhenism in fure 1989 meant tbat fiscal policy
has to play 8 morc active role.
The stmcture of this chapter is as follows : Section 1 analyses
the main characteristics of fiscal policy in the second half of
the l9B0'$ In Sections 2 
^d 3, existing problems with thecontrol and the possible redrction of public expenditurcs arre
de,scribed" Section 4 analyses trx errasioL In Section 5, the
ples€nt structure of th tax rystern and the main elements of
the curr€ntrpfonn re examined. The financing of thepublic
deficit is described in Section 6. Finally, conclusions are
presented in the last Section
1. Fiscal policy in the years of economic
expamion
1\ro periods can be identified in the fiscal policy of recent
y€anr:
. tlre first, consisting of the years 1986 and 1987, during
which the general governrnent deficit fell by 3,7 points
(fuom6,99o of GDPin 1985);
. tbe secon4 covering since 1988 to 1991, duing which the
deficif adjusted fo the chenge in the timetaHe for iax rcim-
bursernents increased slightly (see table 8 in the Appendix).
1987 was the fint year in which there was no prirnary deficil
The public debt registered a stsong reduction in 1988 (frwr
46,6?o of GDP in 1987 to 42,9% n 1988), because c€rtifi-
cates of investment which werc cqridcred as stste liabilities
up io 1987 became tbe liabilities of Offrciel Cledit Instiur-
tions. After 1988, this ratio has ten&d to incr€ase slightly.
The evolution of generd goy€flrment net borrowing since
19S/ hides two different periods when adjushents for cycli-
cd effects and for changes to the schedule of tax repayments
arp made. Thereforg generel government &frcit grew hom
z,1Eo,iaterff of GDPin l%7 to4,7% in 1990. Afterrrards,
the net borrowing d€creased to 4,3Eo in 1991.
Tbble l: Govcrnment revenue and cxpendlture (as % of GDP) (1)
SPAIN
1985 1987 1989
SPAIN EUR(2)
1990 1991 1991
Currentrevenue
Current expenditure
Gross saving
Net capital &ansfers
G.F.C.F.
Net lending (+) c borrowing (-)
himary balance
34.7
36.1
-1.4
1.9
3.7
:'_''
37.4
35.8
1.6
1.3
3.5
39.0
(38.3)
35.1
3.0
(L3)
IA
4.3
-L7
G3.4)
0.7
(0.0)
38.5
(3e.0)
36.6
LO
(2-4)
1.1
5.0
4.0
c3.o
{.5
({.1)
39.6
(3e.8)
37.5
2.t
(L3\
0.8
5.2
-3.9
(-3.7)
{.3
(4.1)
47.3
6.5
0.8
0.9
L7
-28
1.10.3-3.8
(1) The figures in bracketc are corrected for changcs to the timing of trx repayments.
(2) Ercluding Portugal, Greece, Spain, Italy and United Kingdom
Source : Commission Services. Forecasts Oct-Nov 9l for 1991.
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Greph 1: Nct leldlo3 or rct borrcwlrg of gemnl
tovCrtrDetra cycllcrly edfoatod ()
nAnnrafrtct ,lr?I f !ttta5tatrLilr
Q:Il-crc|. f OoG. f f. [rll i E rFrrrlnt rtlDtltttrLlcccr.t bt rilc, hdo.Frrihrtt
tdeD
Principal fiscal policy meallures adopted in
19E9
May
. Reduction of cenbal goverrunent expenditne (O.3% ot
cDP)
. A&ance paJmetrt of an additional instalment of corpo_
ration tax (advance payments increased ftom 3O% to
ss%)
. Expenditure adjusted in o,rd€r to increase social welfare
expenditure (0.3% of GDp)
Juty
. Withholding taxes on interest income incrreased from
?fr%to?5%
. Certainfinancial assetsmade subject toregulationby an
increase in fiscal supervision
. Income tax law provisiona[y amended to conform with
the Constitutimal Court judgment
Dccembcr.
. Advance payments of corporation tax increased from
55%tofi%.
Fiscal policy seerns to have had a positive impact on the p,ro-
cess of reducing inflation in 1986 aDd l9g7. However, from
1988 fiscal policy has bee,n sorewhat accomodating and it
has not helped in the correrction of disequilibria in the econ-
omy : in tbe first half of 1989, domestic demand continued
on an expansionary herxl wittr an annual growth rate above
7%.
S/hat is more, urcstainty about the extent of overteating as
well as abreakdownin thesocial dialogue andthe apparcntly
confortable budgetary position achieved in lggg rcsulted in
a budget for 1989 that was clearly expansionary.
During the course of 1989, some restrictive metsurss werc
implemented in ord€r to reduce the expansionary effect of
theinitial budger.
At thesame time:
' deductions at source frm earaed ircomes did not very;
. tax allowances rnd ttnesholds waeraised (butby less than
inflation), and,
. crporate tax rernained unchurged.
Tberefore, one of therczults of these measur€s was e temptr_
ary iffi€sse in roceipts end a rise in future reimbursemens.
In addition, civil service pensions and wages were increased
$l less than inftatiorl this redrced social cohesion and gave
Ibble 2: rncreasc ln penslons, wages and lncome tax allowanccs and thresholds (% change)
Iuflation (in December) Public wages
Target Final Pensions
(average)
Budget Fiml
GenGov.
Income tax allowances
and thnesholds
1988
19re (2)
1990
1991
3.0
3.0
5.7
5.0
5.8
6.9
6.5
5.3
5.3
9.2
7.2
4.O
4.9
6.0
6.3
7.t
7.2
8.2
7.4
(1)
3.0
5.0
5.0
(1) The rtsucture of the tax *"s 
"t
t'L,*.T*t':.tffi-1iT:::1 t" 5?1yu subsequently abandoned. Pensions were finally increased by 7.6%.Source : Ministry for Economic Affairs and Finance.
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rise to the claim that a "social debt" existed which had to be
acknowledged in 1990.
Furthermore a Constitutional Court judgment in 1989 re-
pealed much of the law ptxting to personal income tax and
wealth tax. Theresult was a change in tbe dates on which tax
was payable for 1989 and delays of irrcore tax reimburse-
ments. As a result the general govefl[nent borrowing re-
quirement first fell by 0.7% of GDP in 1989 and then
incre.as€d again by 0,4% in 1990 arrd0,z% in 1991'
The bringing forward of the padiamentary elections to 29
October 1989 delayed the approval of the budget for 1990
until June of that year. Finally, the budget for 1991 which
was p,resented after ttre start of the Gulf crisis, was relatively
restrictive, concentrating to some extent on reducing infla-
tion The cenEal gov€,mment deficit was initially planned to
fall below 15% of GDP. Nevertheless, the lower economic
growth in 1991 has widened the gap between expenditure
and revenue, provoking that this figure will probably in-
creaseto 2,'l%of.GDP.
2. The control of Public finances
2.1. Budgetaryprocedure
A number of reforms to the general budget law have im-
proved the management and control of public expenditure
1p.rti*toty 
"fter 
the 1990 Budget)' butbudgetary p'rocedue
still allows a margin of freedom.
Firsl part of the total approprriations fo non-finarid oper-
ations is not used. However, in some cases, in particular for
capital expenditure, unused appropriations may be carried
forward to the rext financial year. In addition' some budge-
tary heads can automatically be increased in keeping with
circumstances.
Second, the existence of additional appropriations seems to
indicate that the forecasts are incomplete. Consequently Par-
lianrnt may sPProve extraordinary urd additional appropri-
ations.
These special featrnes redrce the effectiveness of the ex ante
political control of budget targets and actual expenditures
have regrrlerly overun initial approp'riations.
On average for 1987-89, reve,nue (non-financial operations)
was 11.?% higher than fsecast in the budget this is equival-
efi to 2.1% of GDB roughly double the figure for expendi-
ture overruns.
2.2. The scope for moderadng expendlture
From analysis of tlre composition of current expenditure it
can be seen that in general there is no great margin for reduc-
ing iL h 1991, the ratio of current expenditures to GDP was
thi lowest of all the Community countries :37,59o compared
with45,2%for EIJR 9 afr49,3% forltaly. Forinstance, cur-
rent transfers to households ate t5,l4o of GDP whereas in
Et R 9 they are 17,7% aurc,, taking account of the relatively
low protection level, a sipificant reduction of this iteur can-
not be anticipated.
Although tlr ratio of public consumption to GDP (15,4% n
1991) is lower than for EllR 9 (18.37o), its evolution could
certainly slow down Orrce the Focess of budgetary decen-
tralization is more advarrce4 at least a slowdown is to be ex-
pected for the heading comPensation of employees, because
public employment should increase more slowly. There
should also be sonte room for manoeuvre with regard to pur-
cbases of goods and services : once mure progre$s has be€n
made in modemizing general Sovqnflrent" a slowdown in
purchases could also be hoped for.
T[ble 3: Overruns on the state budget (non'flnanclal payments)
As % of initial approPrietions As % of GDP
aversge 1987-89 1990 average 1987-89 1990
Extraordinary and additional aPProprra-
tion(1)
Automatically increased appropriation(2)
Appropriations from earlier financial
years(2)
Others(3)
Total approprlatlons
p.m. Unused final approPriations
Overruns (of lnttlal approprladons)
1.4
6.4
3.9
o.7
t2.4
7.t
5.3
0.E 0.3
t.4
0.8
0.1
2.7
1.5
1.1
0.2
0.5
0.7
0.1
1.5
1.3
o.2
2.4
3.0
0.3
6.5
5.4
1.1
ropriations in the Budget Law of 1991'
(2) In fact, these appropriations have been limited since the Budget law of 1990'
(3) Financed by enticipated receipts.
Source : Ministry for Economic Affairs and Finance'
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Another heading under which savings could surely be ma&
is current transfers to enterprises. Such savings will in part be
helpul by the privatizations which have been completed.
!t is possible that interastpayme,trts will stabilise as apropor-
tion of GDP. On one hand, the reduction in the public deficit
and the forpseable convelgence in interest rates would have
favourable effects on this iterr" But, on the other hand, an in-
snease of the proportion of dett issued under market condi-
tions, due to the removal of the investnent coeffrcient and of
the fiscal advantages of Treasury Notes, will tend to counter-
balance somewhal
Capital expenditure could fall as a p€rc€ntage of GDP. In
1991, gross capi0al formation stood at 5,2Vo of GDP (?-7%
for EUR 9). The structural Funds also helped to achieve this.
Starting in 1993, public investment could stabilise some-
whal Net capital hansfers (0,87o of GDP in 1991) are at tbe
sarne level ttun tbe av€rage for EUR 9, after decreasing in
the last years.
In fact, total trursfers to public enterprises have fallen less in
the last few years than might have been expected in a period
of sharp expansion Moreover, such transfers could delay the
requisite stsuctural adjustrnents A more rapid reduction of
transfers together with the abandonment of certain non-
viable activities would increase the competitiveness of the
indrstrial sector.
3. Impact of budgetary decentralization on
the general government deficit.
One of the consequences of the process ofbudgetary decen-
tralization has be.en the emelgerrce of a sizeable bonowing
requirement for tbe territorid authorities. In 1991, this is pro-
jected to incr€ase above 1.0% of GDP.
In the budger for l99L , 32% of the non-financial resources of
local authorities come from central govemment transfers; for
regional gov€rnment this figure is ovq7O7o.
h 1989, a large irrrease in the financial liabilities of the ter-
ritorial entities was recorde4 and the ircrease virtually mat-
ches the expansion of the financial assets ofthe entities over
the sanr period This suggests that a part of bonowed funds
has been used for financial placements. This problem has
been allerriated by an agroenrnt between central and territor-
ial authorities.
Greph 2: Nct lcndlng or oet bomowlng of generel
govcrnment
tst I[a n tt lst lts rll
-I(ilrGlO +Ia,.raLsllr Ef.3rnr{cd
C..rl-h.c-0.H, tI ItiLc3C-drbtrrL.
o d€D!,
Table 4: Breakdown of general government net lendlng or net borrowlng (as Vo ol GDP) (1)
1986 t987 1988 1989 1990 1991
Cantralgovemment
- State
- Social security
Local and regional government
- Regional gov€rnment
- Local authorities
General government
-5.3
-5.2
".t
-0.8
-0.5
-0.3
-6.0
-3.3
-3.5
0.,
0.1
i,
-L9
-3.0
0.1
-0.4
4.3
{.1
t'
-2-L
Gz8)
-2-l
(-2.8)
0.1
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
-L7
G3.4)
-3.0
e.q
-L7
(-2.3)
-0.3
-1.0
-0.8
-0.2
4.0
G3.O
-27
G2.s)
-L7
(-2.s)
0.0
-t.2
-1.0
4.2
-3.9
(-3.7)
(1) The figures in brackets are correctcd for changes to the schedule of tax repayments.
Source : Ministry of Economy and Commission forecasts for 1991.
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Trblc 5: Flmncld .rs.as .rd lleblllalcc (rr % ol GDP)
1985 1988 1989 1990
T€rritorid authcities
- assets L3 2.6 4.3 3.5
- liabilities 3.6 4.4 6.4 6.4
General government
- assets 18.1 11.9 13.9 12.9
- liabilities 45.2 4L9 4.2 45
Source : Bank of Spain
4. Taxevasion
Although in the last few years impotant progr€ss has been
made to roduce the level of tax wasion, the scale of evasion
still leaves significant scope for frfiher incrpases inreceipts.
In rcce,nt years, real estate, especially in lrge cities, has in-
cressed sh.rply in value but tbese inqeases arc not as yet rc-
flertd in the rateeble value. As a resull the value for tax
purposes declarpd in transactions or fuming the basis for the
wealth tax is zubstantially lower rhen the martet value l. The
Ministy fq Economic Atrain and Finance has updated the
land register, but the application of tbe new values has been
posQored for one yeu. Thae is also lrge-scale evasion of
VAf,; this is said 0o have brrlo,Z8% n 1985 and to have fdlen
to?,6% in 198&89 2.
From the direct tax side, daspite the p,rogrese rcalize4 tax
evasion is still very high" particulady with respect to capitd
and other non-labou ircorres. In 1985, trx evasion (in rela-
tion to the theoretical tax base) was about 25% of the GDP.
5. Tbx reform and harmonization
5.1. Shuctureolthctaxsystem
The present tax s]rst€m has its origin in the reform made in
9n-78 which implemented thee key direct taxes : income
tax" wealth tax and corporation tax. Since then, serreral modi-
fications have been implementd tbe more important beiag
that of June 1991 affecting personal income and wealth
tiaxes.
Indirect taxes were subetantially modified in 1985 and 1986.
The en&y into the European Community implied tbe intro-
duction of Vr{T, replacing more than twenty indirect taxe.s
which distorted relative prices Tlr customs'legislation was
elso adepted to conform with the common extemal tariff.
As may be observed in the following trble the sEucture of
taxes have not changed significantly since 1985. Within di-
rect tlxes, the main sourpe of rpceipts in social secruity cm-
tributions, mainly paid by employers. Although between
1985 and 1988 tbe share of this item in total revenues had
fallen a little, it remains substantially above of thp EUR 12
average. On the other han( at least until 1988, Spain relied
less heavily on income and profit taxes than in the Com-
munity on avemge.
At the same time, despite a notable and continous increase in
the fiscal pressurc, the overall tax bunden in Spain remains
below tbat of the main European countries. Therefme, there
Tlblc 6: Compllercc rlll trr lrvr
@lgurcl dcclmd rr e pcrccrtr3c ol
6corctlcel tu berc)
Average
1979-83 19E4 1985 1986
Retums 55.1 58.7 61.0 g.l
Total income 48.0 50.5 52.0 55.1
Earned income 62.2 66.7 68.9 71.3
Otherincome 24.O U.6 26.2 30,4
Source : Lagares, M., "Fraude fiecal y aceptaci6n so-
cial del sistema tsibutorio", 1990.
Gnpl 3: Flecd prccmo
EUX.9 
= 
100
IlrOrrtaoroti
m+m{rlOlrr.Hoc|lriIlri,!-G..fbIrE
1
2
A 1989 law increased the values declared in transfers ofproperty.
The evasion index is calculated on 0re b$is of rctrrd receipts and thoce whidr in theory should have been paid. See Diaa C.
et al, 'Evalurci6n del frau& en el IVA", Instituto deBsnrdios Fiscales, 1990.
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Thble 7: Structure of taxes (%)
1985 1988
Spain EEC (1) Spein EEc(1)
Income andprofits
- Incomeof hourholds
Social security conts.
- Employers
Wealth
Goods and serrricec
Other
Total
P.m.:
Total as % of GDP
2i5.2
19.?
41.3
31.1
3.5
28.7
1m.0
31.2
33.4
2ti.3
29.7
17.3
4t
31.5
100.0
39.8
29.6
21.5
35.7
n.2
4.1
30.5
0.2
100.0
32.8
33.3
26.6
28.8
t7.o
4.5
32.5
0.9
100.0
4.1
(1) Non-weighted average of 12 countries.
Source: OECD
is still smeroom fcmanoeuvre toraisereveoues. However,
a higher global tex burden could be achieved without a rise
in the individual hrden by reducing fiscal fraud. Moreover,
an increase in the tex burden oneamedincmes could act rs
a disincentive !o hous€hold savings.
5.2. Harmonization of indirect taxation
At presenf tbere ue thee VAf, nrtts (6%,12% crlrd-33%).
The nqmal rate of 12% will be increased ta L3%infanuary
1992, and to 15% in January 1993. The SpaniS aurborities
envisage a zuperre&rced tax fc sone specific products.
As consns io the excise duties, the tobscco Foducts lnd oil
prices will be rtised in Ianuary 1992 This shorld prodrce a
similr ircrease in revelrue to that deriviug from the increas
inVAL
Although harmonization originally had been planned for
l99O-92 ', it has been postponed to t992-93, aprt from cer-
tain alterations to excise dutiq:, because of difficulties in
bringing down inflation. Hamronization should have a fa-
vourable effect in redrcing tbe deficit, even though this ef-
fect may be at least putly ofrset by a reduction of incore
tax. Nevefihelesg some upwmd pressure m the inflation rate
is likely to rcsull
h any evenl hannonization should be grefual and a tight
economic policy strould be mlintained. Tbis would rcduce
the impact on prices. Tbe effect on the population's purchas-
ing power will be atteiruated by ttr cut in direct taxes.
5.3. The reform of direct taxation
h flrc period 1981 to 1988, dir€ct trxation of personal in-
coure wes r€duced fm taxable amounts of less than PTA 3
million whereas for larger amounts, in particular amounb in
excess of PTA5 million" it was increased The tax has there-
fce become more progressive.
This has chiefly affected persons in receipt of lebour income
(offrcially monitored) and particululy those who, because of
tbeir high€r incornes heve a greater capacity for saving. The
problem is further exacerbated by the lack of horizontal
quity; tlp same levels of ircorne are in fact taxed differen0y
dependhg on their origin
Inlune 1991, e npw law on personal taxation (effective from
rhe 1992 fiscal year) and other complernentar5r mcasurr.s
were inhoduced. Under this refcm, tax rates will be re-
arcod. WitUregmd to incomefromsectrities, the law intro-
6rces a tax relief on loqg term savingp ard increases fiscal
advantages for pension funds. Simplification, technical im-
provement ard enhanced transpar€ncy in the heatnent of
capital gains and losscs are qrvisag@ a time limit on lie-
bility for c€rtein specific long term capital gains is intro-
drc€d"
3
4
Ministsy fu Eoonomic Affairs md Finmoe: lrdacroeorrcmic andbudgetary sc€nrio, 1989-lW2,Madri4 19EE.
The top marginal rate is reduced frorn 55% in 1991 b 53% n lWz afr *% in 1993, while the lowest falls ftrom 25 % ro 2A%
in 1992 and 18% iD 1993.
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The main aim of these measures are to provide a tax incen-
tive for household saving and to introduce a more neutral
treatment of the diffe,rent income sources. Although therela-
tionship between personal saving and the tax burden is un-
c€rtain in the Spanistr ca!p, one must at least examine fiscal
considerations as one of the factors explaining the weakness
of the personal saving ratio.
In the run-up to the Single Ma*et, an additional problem is
harmonization of the heahent of interest incomg at present
subject to t 259o witbholding tax : this rate should come
dorn. A decree-law of 21 December 1990 provides an
exernption from taxation on capital gains and interest incorne
deriving from govemment securities and paid to non-resi-
dents. This teatrrent is extended to anykind of securities fq
residents in anotber Comrnunity country.
The reform of income tax also prcsuposes a refmm of co-
poration tax, not only in order to achierre better technical
structure and to avoid double taxation, but also to reduce
evasion and incr€as€ neutrality when investn€ot &cisions
are taken. In addition, the difference between the tax rate
which applies to companies (35%) and the top marginal rate
which applies to household incores (55%) has carned dis-
tortions, with companies being formed to avoid the need to
pay progressive personal taxation Ther€ erc two solutions to
this: either to increase the rate of corporation tar, or to re-
duce the &ductions now allowed against it mainly on the
grounds of investnent arxtjob creation Spain is at the lower
end of the corporation tax range, so that tlrcre is some room
for increasing ir
6. Deficit funding and public debt
management
6.1. Deftclttundlng
During 1983-1987, the Gove,mment diversified the source of
finarrcing the public &ficit ard issued short-term Treasury
Notes @agar6s del Tesoro) and medium- and long-term gov-
errunent bonds @onoc &l Estado and Obligaciones del Esta-
do). However, a high percentage of the financing schernes
was held though compulsory coefricients by the banking
system. In 1985 the Govemment rcdefind the cmrpulsory
inveshent coefficient (p,revailittg tt23% at that tirne) and a
part of it (L0% at that time) had to be fulfrlled with Treasury
Notes (Pagar6s del Tesoro) at a price rrnilaterally lixed by the
Treasury. This weakened the impact of tbe budget &ficit on
the liquidity of the banking syst€m but did not change the
coruiequenocs of a privileged financing of the &frcit
Since 1987 a progressive change in tbe system of deficit
funding based onthecoefficients and ttrcTreasuryNotes has
been inroduced
(i) The Treasury started to issue in lune 1987 a new instm-
ment, Treasury Bills, a one-year public asset that, in
contrast with the fornrrTreasury Notes, were issued at
market conditions, had no fiscal opacity and did not
have to be heldby thebanking rystem in order to reet
any investsnent coefficientrequirementc Since Decem-
b€r 1991, the Treasury issues three-months Treasury
Bills too.
(ii) The authorities introduced in May 1987 the Electronic
Bookkeeping Sptern (Central de Anotaciones en Cuen-
ta) of pnblic &bt in ttre Bank of Spain which improved
the material basis anl the efficiency of the public debt
mrrtefs and paved the way for a more orthodox financ-
ing of public deficits.
(iii) The compulsory coefficients started to be gradually re-
drced. The Govemment approvd (13.1.1989) a Royal
Decree setting up a timetable for a gradual phasing out
of the investment coefficient, to be completed by
3l December 1992.
(iv) km January 1992, the Treasury Notes held by thepub-'
lic will not have fiscal opacity. Until this date, it is
possible to change these assets with other ones, namely
"DeudaEspecial", which are iszued at six-yeartenn, at
2% ntsestrute and offer opacity advantages at theirre-
&mption
A further source of privileged funding for the authorities has
been via the Bmk of Spain system of reserve requircrnents,
which has generated substantial profit transferred to the
Treasury. The reserrre requirement coefficient was signifi-
cantly changed in Feb,nrary 1984 to 18% fucn\ 7.75% in Au-
gust 1983. The non-rernuneratod tranche of the coeffrcie,nt
was rpduced to 5% from 7.75Vo earher, and a new nemun-
erated (at t 13.5% interest ratQ hanche of 13% was estab-
lished.
In early March 1990, tlrere was a cash coefricient with two
tranches, one of 9.5% with an average remuneration of
7.75% afr a non-renrunerated we of 7 .5%; under this old
systenL tbe present market value of bank reserves with the
Bank of Spain (a nominal amount of about 3.3 billion Ptas)
would have begr around 1.4 billion Ptas, (the reserrre tsanche
was in effect a perpetual loan to the Bank of Spaur; applyurg
the 5 to 10 year bond rate, in the absence of a perpetual bord
rate, the present value can be calculated). On 23 March 1990,
the Bank of Spain implemented a majorreform in the rystenr
of reserrre requirements, which:
(i) intsoduced a non-rernunerated minimum reserve coef-
ficient of 5%;
(ii) hom 2 May 1990 the new remunerated trarrche (12%
out of the total of l79o cefficiqrt) was zubstituted by
Certificates of Deposit (CD) issued by the Bank of
Spain at a 6% interestrate. Thebanks havetohold these
CD's in their pordolio as non-negotiable assets but ale
able to bansmit them with certain limits between credit
institutions. The CD's will be progressively redeemed
every six months starting March 1993 and ending Sep-
t€mbcr 2m0.
(ii| The stock of CD issued on 23 March and 3 April 1990
amounted to 3.316 bn Ptas and was eguivalent to the
average of the liabilities included in thereserve require-
rents during Octob€r, November andDecember 1989
andJrnury 1990.
Again taking the average of the 5 to 10 yerrs'public
&bt issues afterMarch lW (13,75%) as the discount
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rate, and assuming that there is an extrs coupon in order
to assimilate the CD issued on 3 April 1990 with those
on 23 March, the net present value of 3.3 16 bn Ptas can
be calculated * 2.023 bn Ptas (cf. Table 9). In other
words, the change in the system of reserve requirernents
has increased the implicit market value of publio sector
debtby aroud ()0 billionPtas (this compares withex-
plicit outstanding public sector &bt of 16.93 bn Ptas
by end 1990) or about3.7%o of GDP.
(iv) The Treasury decided to intensify in 1989, but espe-
cially in 1990, the issues of medium- and long-terrn
governmentbords (namely Bonos del Estado) in an at-
tempt both !o cmpensate the smaller financing sternm-
ing from the reduction of the coefficients and to
implernent a more orthodox deficit funding. Actually,
the share of outstarding balances of government debt
iszued under market conditions has increased from 67%
in 1986 togL6% in 1990 (cf. Table 10). Although the
bulk of public debt is still corpenhated on Sort-term
paper, that is, Treaury Notes @aga#s del Tesoro) and
Treasury Bills (Letras del Tesoro). (cf. Table ll), in
1991 the issue of medium and long-term debt has been
very large, so thet it has ircreased its share in total debt
in nearly ten points.
6.2. Publlc debt managcment
The issue of medium- and long-term public debt by the
Treasury has been low since 1978 when the fiscal deficit
started to grow rapidly. The authorities wtre rcluctant to ac-
cept the increase in intercst ntes requircd by the marftet As
arezult, they used the dk€ct access to the Bank of Spain and
relied heavily on Sort-teino finarcing (namely in Treasury
Notes and Treasury Bills). In 1986, the expectations of a fall
in interest rates created by the relatively accommodating
monetary policy, indrced the Treasury to implement an ac-
tive public debt policy. The autho,rities iszued a zubstantial
amount of medium- and long-term government bonds
@onos &l Estado and Obligaciones del Estado) that were
predominantly taken up by the linucial institutions. Never-
theless, the share of shct-term debt (0-2 years of residual
manuity) in the total rcmained very high in 1986. Dwing the
period 1988-90 this rctive policy was reinforced but the
share continued to rise (84.5% in 1990) far beyond the levels
of other EC countries. The average residral life to manrity
of iszues and outstanding balances of public &bt in Spain
hrs been reduced re.lpectively from 2.6 yean ant 2.6 in 1986
to 1.6 years and 1.4 in 1990 (cf. Table 12). As noticed before,
in 1991 there has been a halt in this process, recording an in-
crease in the maturity of the total debL
On thp other han( theprocess by means of which tbe public
debt is ma*eted (namely sales of public sector paper und€r
repurchase agreements by tbe banking syst€Nn to thc public)
implies tlre transformatisn sf thigh shre of liabilities issued
by the Treasury, irrexpective of their matrnity, into liabilities
of the banking rystem which re mainly stut-term" In fact
the financial institutions canbuypublic debt eith€r in thepri-
mary mar&et m though the sales of these inshrments by tbe
Bank of Spain in its rcpurchase aSrecm€nt operations"
The financial institutions might hold these assets in their
portfolio, sell them to the public, r hand thsm ov€r tempo-
rarily to non-banks under a repurchsse agreertenl The latter
case would constitute a liability for the bank concenrd and
would rrpresent (abstracting from eny possible offsetting ex-
ternal flows) additional mon€y creation resulting from the
urargements for financing of public debg in fact the tempor-
ary rcpo trursfer by the financial institutions to the public of
any public asset, even long-temr issues, is included in the
ALP definition. As a result, the major role played by the hand
over of repo by the buks to the public has not favoured con-
trol over donrcstic money cleation sirrce the public debt mar-
ket does not directly relate the public wi0r the Treasury but
with the banking systenL
The 1990 budget adopted a new rule limiting strictly non-fin-
ancial appropriation to the amount approved by ttre Parlia-
ment and also introduced an end-yetr zeto limit for the
incrcases in the balarrces of the Treasry borrowing from the
Bank of Spain. The previous regulation, the progressive de-
cline of the investnent coefficient and the reduction of the
reserve requireurents will lead the Treasury to have a higher
necounle to the public debt markets and probably to a ration-
alization of the public dett managernent policy.
7. Conclusions
. In 1986 and 1987, fiscal policy, assisted by a favourable
economic situation" redrced the general govemment &Iicit
fuom6,9?o of GDP in 1985 to3,2% in 1987. However, it
could be said that, in the context of the strong economic
growth, it was not taken advantage enough of two years
(1988 and 1989) fqestablistring a combination ofmoreba-
lanced policies which would have improved the pace of
conv€,Igence. During these years, fiscal policy made vir-
tually no contribution to the process ofreducing inflation,
with monetar5r policy bearing the brunL Fiscal policy star-
ted to be tightered in the second half of 1989, in keeping
with whet was ne€dd as a result of the peseta joining the
EMS exchange rate mechanism in the middle of 1989.
. The fiscal policy which was followed from 1985 onwards
was base4 at least partly, on stpply-side policies.
On the public expenditure side, a grcat effort was made in
the field of public inve.stment to make the economy more
efficienl Apolicy ofprivatizing public enterprises was also
implemented.
On there.venue side, the introduction of VAf, simplified and
removed many distqtions in the old systern of indirect taxa-
tion Rates of income tax aud corporation tax dedrctions
werc also rcduced. Certain rcasures limiting overqpending
by the State and the Treasury's direct acoess to the Bank of
Spain we,ne also approvod.
. Tlre elimination of tbe public &ficit continues to be me of
the most important challenges for economic policy. How-
ever this objective, that was prrcviously targetod for being
achierred in 1992, has now been postponed
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With regad to budgetary procedure, it can be see,n that the
initial budgets, voted by Padiarcnt, are not a very effective
inshrment from the point of view of limiting expenditure.
Inreceirt years, actual expenditur€s hsye ov€rrun initial ap-
propriations. The procedure should therefore be refomrcd
in o,rd€r to evoid this and to ensure that the budget is im-
plemented on figures cloe€r to those of the initial budgets.
It is also impctant to monitr effrciency withregard to ope-
rating costs and the performanoe or usefulness of serrrices
and inveshent in ord€r to mod€nrize the management of
expeirditue and to impove contol.
The fact that the qment account is in deficit also indicates
the need to increase ilre ssyings ratio of the economy. In
view of the fall in the personal, and possibly the co,rporate,
savings ratio, the only valid option, at least in the short term
is to inclease public saving. This imflies that the central go-
vemment will have to make an additional effort (the ac-
counts of autonomous bodies of State and the social
security funds are generally more m less bolanced).
It is not proving easy to redrce, or even moderate, public
expenditure, given that tb ratio of currcnt public experdi-
ture to GDP is the lowest of the Community countries.
However, ttrere is some room for manoeuvre, particularly
in public consumption" transfers to enterprises and capital
expenditure (especially from 1993 onwards). This should
make it po*rible, in the medirm te,m, to increase social ex-
penditure.
In view of tbe impact on thc territorial authorities'deficit,
and since the prresent system of financing regional gov€rn-
mentis aboutto cmr€ to anetr( anattempt shouldbemede
to extend the prirciple of 'fiscal co-resporuibility", which
would enable regional govemmant to have direct control
over morp taxes than it does at presenL
Tax evasion is a problem which must be urgently solved"
because it makes fiscel policy less effective, stands in the
way of reducing the public deficit and erodcs social cohe-
sion
. A comp,reheruive rpform of the system of tax collection is
proving nqce$ery (the budget law for 1991 establishes a
"Tax Agerry", that will begin to wqk in 1992, in order to
hing abort an improvanen$. Therpduction of the tax bur-
den on households, could help to reduce income t&x eva-
siort.
. Limiting tax fraud and indirect tax harmonization should
help to redrce tlp deficit, even if income tax rates and em-
ployers' social security contributions ale cut. Harmoniza-
tion sbuld tate place gradually to prevent e surge in prices"
. To fully exploit tbe current opportunities it would be appro-
priate fm the Treasury to keep on with th'e issues of public
deh et looger term. The success of a public management
policy aiming at lengthening the average maturity of the
outsterding &bt and avoiding the high de$€e of monetary
policy rcpercussions of public debt held by the non-banks
(by means of repos) will depend on the willingness of the
eutborities to offer the rchrns sought $l the markets, This
implies after-trx yields that conp€nsate investors for ex-
pected inflation and future interest rates. Another possibi-
lity world be that investqs become more used to holding
medium- and long-term &bt in their portfolioe. That could
contribute to irnprove the interest of the Spanish investor
for medium- rnd long-term assets ard, in any case, would
foster foreign capital inflows.
. Only tighter conbol ofpublic expendih,ue, the reform of the
trx systern ard more orthodox financing of the delicit will
pave the way to a morc balanced combination of policies.
Budgetrrypolicy shouldbemuchmore active thanrccently
in squeezing inflation out of the economy an{ in general,
in stabilizing demard These reforms, and moderation of
the regional gov€rnrnont deficit wottld not only contribute
to nominal conveqgerce - redrcing the public deficit and the
inllatimrate - but also to moe balarced growth, withpu-
blic saving then being able to inq€ase. Any disadvantagas
- withregardto real conveqgerrce - whichmiglrtresultfrom
a moe restrictive budgetry policy would be amply offset
by a reduction in the inflation rate and more balanced
growth. Nminal stability is roquircd so as to avoid the risks
of rn irrcgrlar "stop-go" path ineconomic growttr.
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1980 1981 1982 1983 t98/. 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991(a)
Table t: Rccelpts and cxpendlture ol general governmcnt (es perccntage ol GDP)
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2.0 25
14.1 r4.00.1 0.10.t 1.0
132 13.4
10.3 10.2
2.4 2.6
31.6 32.40.1 -0.5
1.7 2.0
2.3 3.1
35.6 315
-3.9 -5.6
21.6 26.t
t .7 l3.l3.9 3.1
34.0 33.8
18.8 lt.t
2.6 2.8
14.5 14.50.1 0.1
t3 2.O
13.9 13.7
10.6 r05
2:t 2J
34.0 t4.60.1 4.7
l9.l 17.6
2.6 2.0
14.7 13.90.1 0.13.1 3.9
13.9 t4.7
10.5 r03
2.7 3.3
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-1.4 4.5
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'1.0 4.1 4239.0 38.6 39.63t.3 39.0 39.8
t?s 1t.0 185
1.8 1.8 l.t
14.0 14.6 15.10.1 0.1 0.1
3.4 35 3.6l5.l t5.l t5.4
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3.6 3.4 3.4
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3.0 2.0 2.t
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42 45 455,
10.4 10.3
10.3 roj8.5 9.07.9 t3 95 1058.4 8.2
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Nalcndigr(+)anctbonowiag(-) -L6
Na lcndign(+) c nct bonowing(-)
Adiurtcd (b)
Grurprblicdch 17.6 33.1 ,9.9 452 &2 6.6 429
(a) Cmmirion forccarlr October-Novcmbcr 1991.
O) Adjurted fc dchying tex rcimbunement for Gcncrel Government in 1989, 190 end 1991.
Sourcc: CmmiuiooScrviccr.
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Sourcc: Cmmirrion rcrviccr.
Thblc l0: Ccntral Government Debt
(Dlstrtbutlon of outstendlng debt accordlng to the condltlons of the lssue)
t982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 19m
1. TOTAL(a) (2+3) 3381.4
2- Issuedurder 2n9.9
4984.0 ?053.3 9193.7
234.3 3153.9 087.2
12536.4 t4L2&1 lil(i7.t 16993.4
34t6.6 3410.0 3581.8 3134.4
10853.9
35E6.9
7267.0
spocial conditions (b)
3. Is$edundsrms*et 1171.5 2il3.7
conditions (1-2)
4. (3/1) x 100 34.6 53.0
3189.4 5106.5 9099.8 1071&1 11885.3 13859.0
Source: Direccion General del Tesoro Notes:
(a) Equal to Domestic Public Debt, to External Public Debt snd to Bank of Spain financing.
(b) Equol to Trereury Notes submitted to the investment coefficient, to medium- and long-term central government
debt previous to 1977, to debt of RUMASA and to financing by the Bank of Spain
45.2 55.5 67.0 7L6 75.9 76.8 81.6
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1980 l9El
?o ovq
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Tlble ll: Central Governmcnt Dcbt (Outstandlng dcbt et thc cnd of the perlod)
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Thble 12: Publlc Debt ol Ccntrel Government:
Averagc resldual llle meturlty of outstandlng balances on 31 December (1)
Source: Direccion General del Tesoro
Notes: (1) Neither perpetual debt, both domestic and external, nor the credits of the Bank of Spain are included.
In the issues where the anticipated reimbursement is foreseeing, redemption in the first possible option
for the holders has been considered.
(2) tt includes also the assumed debts in foreign currency.
(3) In the column ofTreasury Bills, the Treasury Bonds are included until 19E2.
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L General assessment
Since its accession to theEuropean Community m 1 January
1986, Spain has ma& zubstantial paogless towards the en-
ding of existing exchange conEols, even acting well in ad-
vance of the time limits laid down, and thus complying with
its undertakings.
Despite this fact, some problerns still rernain : it is possiUe
that some mles do not comply with Community law in force
regarding tbp freemoveme,nt of capital. Thenrles concerned
are those relating to the admission to the domestic capital
market of foreign seorities where ttry are dealt in on a stock
exchange and the admission to a foreing capital market of
fixed interest domestic securities where they are dealt in on a
stock exchrnge.
2. List of the provisions in the Spanish
exchange control regulations which may
be incompatible with Community law
. trn Spain, the movement of capital is not governed by com-
prehensive enacting terms, but by a number of different
texts; sometirnes the rasponsibility for drafting erd imple-
menting these texts lies with several govemment depart-
ments.
. Some of these texts, in particular those rclating to direct in-
vestments, investments in real estate and portfolio inves-
tments, have been supplemented and amended to render
them compatible with Community rules. Nevertheless, a
provision still remains which contravenes Council Direc-
tive 88/361/EEC of ?A \tre 1988 for tbe irnplenrntation
of Article 67 of the Treaty. The provision requires the sub-
mission for prior authorizaton of Spanish direct inves-
tments abroad (Royal Decree 2374186 of 7 November,
Article 5(3)) which, because of their size, their nature or
their financial chracteristics, may have &trimental conse-
quenoes for the national economy.
Directive 88/361/EEC establishes the obligation that
all direct investments abroad by Spanish residents
shall be unconditionally liberalized (tB of the Nomen-
clature).
. Most personal capital move,ments and oper,atims such as
transfers in performance of insurance contracts, author'
roydties, damages, etc., arereferred to in a specific text li-
Ueratizing current invisible transfers (Ministerial Order of
14 September 1989, s@uently developed by ttre DGTE
Resolution of 25 March 1985). Nevertbeless, the cur€nt
sihrationposes the following problern : the list of operations
liberalized by the said DGTE Resolution, isnote;rhaustive
and those which are not explicitly mentionedremain sub
ject to prior authorization. In particular, this is the case for
certian invisible tsansfers, which are considered to be capi-
tal movements that are unconditionally liberalized under
community law (headings X, XI and XItr of the Nomencla-
ture of Directive 88/36l/EEC).
. Under Spanidr rules, authorization is roquired for the isme
and placing on the domestic capital market of foreign se-
curities where they are dealt in or in the process of intro-
duction to a stock exchange in a Member State.
Authorizetion is also rcquired for tb issue ard placing of
domestic fixed interest securities on a foreign capital mar-
ket where they rre dedt in or in the process of introduction
to a stock of exchange in a Member State.
In all the cases mentioned above, Directive 8V361/EEC es-
tablishes ur obligation for the unconditional liberalization of
the capital moveme,lrts concerned (Annex IV, List tr, heading
Itr B of the Nomenclature).
3. Approaching time limits
Corurcil Directive 88/361/EEC for the full liberalization of
movements of capital, which entcred into force on I July
1990, sets a transitional period for Spain which will end on
31 December 1992. At ttris date, all rcmaining resbictions
will have to be lifted" The restictions in question apply to the
following capital movernents :
. admission to the domestic (foreign) capital martet of fo-
reigrr (domestic) securities not &alt in or in the process of
introduction to a stockexchange in a Menrber State (Annex
IV, List ltr, heading Itr B of the Nornenclature);
. a&nission to the domestic capital nrartet of the units of fo-
rcigrr collective invesnrent rurdertakings not subject to Di-
rpctive 85/61I/EEC (Annex IV, List IIL heading IV B I of
the Nomenclature);
. medium-terur and long-term financial loans and credits
(Annex IV, List Itr, heading VItr A and B 2 and 3 of the No.
menclature);
. the operations referrcd to in Annex IV, List IV; these arp
grrinly operations in securities dealt in on the money mar-
ke( operations in current and deposit rccounts with finan-
cial institutions and strort-term finarcial loans ard cr€dits.
The Minister of the Economy d€clarrcd in September 1991
that the Spanistr Govemrnent will eliminate, by the erd of
1991, all remaining restrictions on the free movement of
capital, well ahead of the deadline established in the Coucil
Directive 88/361/EEC of 31 Decembcr 1992
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1. The Credit Institutions
1.1. The Spanlsh banklng system
Spanish banking had be€n haditionally a closed and heavily
regulated system protected from extemal competition, con-
seryative in terms of innovations and controlled by the large
banks which also ownpd large portions of Spanish industry
(at presenl the relative importance of banks' ownership in
Spurish industry is still large though declining). Because of
the fact that the Spanish financial system and private econ-
omic agents were v€ry unsophisticatd banks got their main
inpu! deposits, at a very low cost and were required to fin-
ance cheaply public expenditure tbrough rather high invest-
ment requirements. In exchange, large banks were allowed to
coordinate their market strategies in a context of complete
regulation of intenest rates.
The oil price increases of the 190s and tb€ resulting indus-
trial crisis imposed I severe shock to the banking system
which led as a result to many bank failures and rescues dur-
ing the 80's. The banking sector crisis caused a rpduction in
the number of irdependent banksand slowed down the &-
regulation process which had begun in the mid 1970s.
In the last fifteen years banking in Spain has undergone a
process of liberalization" the rezult being a banking syst€m
with a higher degree of correntration and a profitability level
(net profit/total resources) roughly similar to European
standards. At the same time, it doesn't seem to be very efft-
cient (because of its comparatively high intermediation mar-
gins) though well capitalised in terrrs of solvency ratio, and
a system *hi"h looks, maybe paradoxically, overbankedl
and basically oriented towards the Spain domestic market
and, thus, not very involved in foreign tra& and international
operations
Removal of bariers, with the completion of the European
single martel and the inboducfrcn of new financial pro&cts
and services in the Spanish banking indusEy, are likely to put
somecompetitive pressre on tbe industry ard to compel fin-
ancial institutions to sfireamlfup their operations.
12. Recent trends ln the banklng system
The banking business not only in Spain but all over the
worl4 has been going through a period ofrapid and pro-
found changes. Some of those changes stem from the hend to
eliminate regulations and rules that limit the capability, and
the commercial and operational activities that can be per-
formed by each entity (deregulatbn). The objective is to get
the economic freedom and a common level playing field for
all agents wqking in the frnancial system. In this context the
importance of. tfu disintermediation process ttnough which
savers and investors are put in contact directly in order to re-
drce intermediation margins, thus, making the financial sp-
temmore efticient should be shessed.
The more active international market and the inlluence of a
countr5l's financial system on other counhies'financial sys-
tems highlights the importance of the procect of. interration-
alisation. The large scale involvement of banks in
internationd business has added new dimensions to the mac-
roeconomic aspects of banking, partly reflecting a change in
the intemational role of banks in response to, and 8s a cause
of, profound modifications in the financial environmenL As
a consequerrce of the deregulation process, the financial sp-
tem needs higher solvency levels of the different mar*et
agents; the trerd is to inctease the requirernents of own re-
sources inrelation to rislsy assets both on investo protection
grounds and to prevent and reduce ttre risks of a systemic
c;risis (capitalisation).In line with this, there is also a trend
that could seem contradictory to ttre liberalisation process
rpferred to above but which is not irrcompatible, that is the
enhancing of the control and zupervisory activities on banks
in order to make them comply with the prudential rules
(superrision). Finally, we should point to the consolifution
trend which emphasizes the fact that nowadays, the banks
are not exclusively confined to their traditional banking
operations and engage in different activities to beconre finan-
cial holdings. This situation emphasizes the need for a con-
solidated supervision so as to avoid that a solvency problem
generated in a part of the holding could ttneaten the financial
stability of the whole group.
13. Opcratlonal costs and profttablllty of crcdlt
lnstltutlons
Apart from these general trends in banking, the hend to-
wards despecialisation and liberalisation is occurring in
Spain in ways similar to that iu many European countries.
This fact is very important in order to assess the relative
profitability ard the degree of competition between various
financial intermediades.
Comparing Spanish financial institutions with those in other
countries, they seem less efficient because of higher than
average intermediation margins (rnainly due to the lack of
sophistication of Spanish savers and to certain cartel prac-
tices which impeded competition between bonks2; mor€ov€r,
operating expe,nses are also at the top of the range pointing to
excessive production costs, in part due to the overstaffing
and overbranchiag of banks.
Intermediation margins are large in Spain in comparison
with other countries; those margins ale partly distorted be-
cause of the existerrce of compulsory liquidity, solvency and
investment ratios. These ratios represent I cost to firuncial
In the sense that the importance of the Spanish banking system compared to other financial md non-financid sectors is
relatively higher thm in otherWestern economies. Itrowever, in general, big Spanidt banks are substantially smaller than their
European, American and Japanese couterparts.
Howeryer, over the last months the first signs of change in this sihration have taken place through an increase in competition
on the liability side of financial instihrtions with the inboduction of highly-remunerated rc@unts.
70 Thc Financiel System
instihrtions that is passcd on to tb customer in the "free-
fuitds" operations.
. Liquidig ratia. Spanish pivate and savings bonks were re-
quired to kerp l7% of their liabilities as deposits in the
Bank of Spain. A share of these deposits (95*) received
wasremunerated Nt7:75%.Thelevel of theratio aswell as
its rctum have been changed by the Bank of Spain quite fre-
quently. This requircrnent played an important role in tb
firuncing of the Spani$ prblic &ficit since a high ratio al-
lowod a high rate of growth of the monetary base (and hi-
gher seignorage) for the same rate of growth of a broader
monetary aggregate. InMarch 1990, tbe government lowe-
red the liEridityratio to 5%, assentiallyby suppressing the
11,5% put with yield which wasreplaced by tbe introduc-
tion of Bank of Spain certificatet (a Frnancial instsument
that will be progrcssively redeemed by the year 20(n), in
order to maintain the competitive position of Spanish
badrs.
. Solvency ralio. Sirce May 1985, Spain regulates the sol-
vency of financial intermediuies though the "coeficiente
de garantia" ratio which requires a certain level of capital
&pending on theri*-weightedreasure of totd assets The
Spanish bankfurg system does not seem to be suffering frqn
tbe same solvency problems lecently observed in some ma-jc world banking systems (the US, Japao etc..). The Spa-
nish banks ue well capitalise4 the Spani$ so-lvency ratio
being one of the highest in the West€rn wqld'.
The Cook Report @asle) proposed a solvency ratio of
8% to make homogeneous throughout the world the
different solvency ratios of b&nks and financial insti-
tutions; on this line, an EC directive on the solvency
ratio of credit institutions wes adopted at the end of
1989. In 1987, Spain started to implement these re-
commendations by requiring that no single risk could
exceed 4O% of. the capital of e credit institution. Mo-
reover, loans to group firms (or board members) are
risk-weighted penalized. The very high level of the
solvency ratio of Spanish credit institutions stems
from the fact that the Spanish regulations in this field
ere, at present, stricter than both the EEC directive and
the Cook Committee recommendations.
. Investtwnt ralio. Sirce 1987, this ratio applies almost ex-
clusively to public debt holdingsl In Octoba 198t tbe in-
veshrent ratio was l1% (10% devoted to public &bt). The
Govemment committed itself (Ienury 1989) to a grrdud
phasing out of this ratio, which will disappear completely
by January lst 1993. At present it is fixed at 5,2%.
Another important point is the degree of profitability of
Spanish cr€dit institutions. Both measur€q the lerrel of net
profits on total assets and the retum m own nesouroes, ere
above EEC ev€reges. Rather high intermediation margins are
partly compensatod by excessive operating cosB. Thus, the
remlt is I quite healthy level of profrtability, though it is not
remarkably above their European count€rpefis.
1.4 The dlllerent typcs ofcredlt lnsdtuflons and
thelr relrflve posltlons
The brsic instihrtions of the Spanish finarciel system can be
classifiod in the following categories: regulatory institutions,
banking institutions, official credit institutions and other fin-
arrcial institutions.
The Bank of Spain is tbe sole regrlatory body of the credit
system. The C.entral Bank is the banker of the state and pcr-
forms all the functiors usuallv entsusted to a central bank
(superrrision and control of banks5, implernentation of mm-
etary policy and lemder of last resort). Since the early 1980s,
legal changes have been made to ins,eese the indcpendence
of the Cenbal Bank from tb Treasury Nowadays, the Cen-
tral Bank is not yet formally independent of the Treasry but
the implerrentation of the monetar5r policy has bec(me morp
flexible and a change in operational procedures has taken
placa
The credit sySem includes :
o f,enlring instiUtions
i) commercial lnnks @1ags privada) with 60% of the
lotal assets of tbe oedit systern
Asof l.l.l90,thesolvencyratiocalculatedonthebasisestablishedinlheEECdiloctiveswas ll!%tortrewholeburking
system.
The government had previously finanoed itr deficits mainly, thmugh the cental bonk untit the late 190's and early l9t0's;
then, in order b rvoid inflationary pressures, it found itself obliged to offset this monehry financing tfuough fie sale of its
own liabilities (CD's and monetary regulation certificates) b the public. Thp lact of a market in long mahrity debt called for
thc creation of several monay market instsuments such os promisory notec, Treanry bills, commerci"l prp"r, Treasury savings
deposits, etc. Thus morry martet instsunrenb have srryported rmtil now tlre main burden of public &ficil financhg.
As rcgards this sublxt it is worlhwhile mentioning tlrot the supervisory powers of tlre Bank of Spain on financiat credit
institutionc were mtably enhmcod by the lsw 261L9t8.
Trblc 1: Sprkl bertr'prolllrblllSy rrtlor (96)
Comarcrcial Benks Savings Banks
1986 1987 1988 1 1987 1988 1989
Naprof,rtd
Total errctr
Napmfitr/
Osn rcrorrccr
0.83 l.(n 1.38 r54
142 16.9 19.5 2l.l
0.!6 1.34 0.7t l.to
I 2l.t r2.7 r8.9
Sourcc : Bank of Spain - Boletfn Ecoo6mico - Abril 1990
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ii) Saviugs banks (Cajas & Ahorro) with less tlun 1/3 of
the total assets.
iii) Cooperative savings banks (cooperativas ds Gr6dito),
with 3% of the totd asset$
. Official cr€dit institutions: are entities that were sreated to
provide cheap financing fc qpecific nceds (housing, indus-
try, local authorities ...), but now they are mote market
oriented They hold 8% of the total assets.
. Other financial institutions: money market houses
(SMMD), investnent funds, stock exchange brokers ...
. Banking fustitutions :
- Commercial Banks
There are about 75 domestic comrnercial banks, 2I)
merchant banks and more than 50 foreign banks with
a total of 16.500 b,ranches. Business has, however,
tended to concentrate in a small number of banks (the
six big benks control about 50% of the total assets of
commercial banks). With the exception of industrial
banks and small commercial banks, commercial banks
af,e net borrowers in the interbank markel An impor-
tant element is the fact that banks are usually of the
universal type, hence they control large sections of
the industrial bese.
The far-reaching changes in the financial environment
in Spain - liberalisation, changing customer attitudes,
etc... - have had a substantial effect on the banks'
assets and liabilities structure. The deposits of the
private sector, which accounted for one-half of total
liabilities in 1982-83, had dropped to nearly one-third
by the end of 1988.
The non-financial private sector has replaced those
low-yielding deposits with instnrments paying inter-
est closer to market rates, mainly in the form of repur-
chase agreements and current accounts with high
interest. On the asset side, public sector finence has
increased. This reflects the increased financing of the
public sector on financial markets (short and long-
term, but mainly through money market instruments).
Trblc 2: Comperetlvc luportucc of Speelel credlt
lnslltutlonc
(ncerured by totrl eerctr)
December 1989
BSPbn %
Cornmercial Banks
Savings Banks
Cooperative Savings Banks
Offrcial C!,edit institutions
38.756 56.3%
22.W 33.3%
1.804 L6%
5.235 7.6%
TOTAL 68.739 1m
Source : Bank of Spain, Bole(n Estadfstico.
llablc 3: Structure of balancc shccts of banllng lnstltutlons
(ESP, bn, crd cf 19t9)
comencialbanks savings banks cooperative banks
Assets ESPbn % ESPbn % ESPbn %
Burk of Spain
Financial sector
Public sector
Private sectu
Non-residents
Others
3005
6287
5899
t7715
2823
3028
7.7
16.2
15.2
45.7
7.2
7.E
no7
2868
5332
9817
196
?n2ri
11.5
tL2
22.6
41.7
0.E
E.6
253
439
185
807
I
119
14.3
24.3
10.2
u.7
0.1
6.6
Liabilities
Bank of Spain
Financial secto
Public sectm
hivate sector
Non-residents
Others
1554
5935
1657
193il
4377
5872
4.0
15.3
4.2
49.9
Lt.2
15.1
559
739
1133
15811
450
3?53
2.3
3.1
4.8
71.5
1.9
13.8
100
0
87
69
1380
6
zfi
1802
0
4.8
3.8
76.5
0.3
14.4
1mT(]rAr- 38759 lm 2350/.
Share in total ofthe banking secto ffi.4 36.5 2.t
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- Savings banks
There are about 80 savings banks in Spain and the
sector as a whole holds about 30 % of the assets
controlled by all credit institutions. This sector is
made up of the Post Office Savings Banks (Caja Post-
al) and savings banks. Its market share has increased
continuously during the 1980s, due mainly to the re-
laxation of the limitations on savings banks' expan-
sion. As a result, the distiuction between savings
birnks and commercial banks has become more blurred
and they now compete in many areas for the same
business. Nevertheless, this trend towards uniformity
among commercial banks and savings banks is not yet
completed because, for instance, savings banks have
nearly no relationship with the foreign sector and they
have a different fund base linked more to small hou-
sehold depositors; they are the main providers of
funds on the interbank market and they also hold a
relatively larger share of their assets in public sector
securities. Savings banks are on average much more
orientated towards the retail banking market than the
commercial banks (providing 6O7o of credits to the
private sector) and they are less active in financing
industrial enterprises.
Moreover, an important concentration process has
been taking place in this sector since the beginning of
1990. This fact will undoubtedly introduce a new
element of rationalization and increase the competi-
tive edge, both at the national and international levels,
of the Spanish savings banks.
- Cooperative Savings Banks
These include two sorts of institutions :
- the rural banks (whose members are agricultural co-
operatives)
- general cooperatives.
fireir importance, as we can see in Table 2, within the Span-
ish banking sector is very small (3% of total assets). More
than three-quarters of their liabilities take the form of de-
posits from the private sector, mainly in savings and term de-
posits. On the asset side, they are traditionally net zuppliers
to the interbank rurkel
- Official Credit Institutions
They are state owned limited liability companies that
act on behalf of monetary authorities trying to com-
plement private initiatives. They represent less than
l0% of. the assets of the financial system.
lnstituto de Cr6dito Oficial (ICO) coordinates and
directs the official credit institutions and also provides
most of their funds (the rest of the frrnds come from
loans from the state and borrowing from the capital
and interbank money markets).
The institutions are Banco de Crddito Agricola, Banco
Hipotecario de Espaffa, Banco de Cr6dito Industrial
and Banco de Cr6dito Local. Each of these institutions
act in their own field: agriculture, housing, manufac-
turing industry and local authorities, respectively.
The offrcial Credit Institutions have been recently integrated
within a financial holding company: The Corpuaci6n Ban-
caria Espafiola.
- Other Financial Institutions
In view of the development and sophistication of the money
market the authmities permitted in 1981 the establishment
of money market intermediary companies - Sociedades Me-
diadoras en el Mercado de Dinero (SMMD). These share-
holding companies are permitted to operate (on their own
account or on behalf of third parties) in all money market in-
struments as well as government debl
Supervised by the Bank of Spain, they are obliged to hold at
least N% of their essets in short-term public debt securities
while their investment in certificates of deposit issued by
banks participating in the company, may not excerl lOVo.
Their operatiors involve a wide range of activities, but they
are mainly active in arrurging securities'repurchase agree-
m€nts. Contrary to the brokers who are only intermediaries
between banks, the SMMDs take positions on their own ac-
counl
2. The Stock Exchange
The Spanistr Stock Exchange is relatively small in compari-
son to its main European counterparts and the size of the
Spanish economy. Thus, its role in channeling p,rivate sector
savrngs towards pnvate sector invesknent projects is a mod-
est one. Aware of the fact that this will put it at a disadvant-
age in the single financial market which is due to be
completed n 1992" the Spanish authorities have embarked
on an ambitious modemisation programme to make it more
effrcient and capable of coping with the challenge of foreigr
competition.
Trble 4: Structuret dttr lor thc stocl exchrngc ln 1989
Shares Bords
Number of Qmoted Secwities
Market Capitalisation:
- inbilllionPTS
-in% of GDP
- in % of EllR 12
Volurne of trrnsactions:
- in billion PTS
- in % of market capitalisation
417
13.457
30,0
6,3
3.8r7
28.4
1.351
7.U7
l7,l
2,0
206
2.7
Source: Committee of EEC Stock Exchanges
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2.1, Prlnclpal characterlstlcs
- Market capitalisation
t he Madrid stock exchange represents 6,3% of total
EEC stock market capitalisation of shares. It ranks in
6th place just behind the Amsterdam stock exchange
and very far away from London, German and French
stock exchanges (which represent 35%, 18% and l7%,
respectively). As regards its relative importance to the
whole economy, it is better placed than some of its
main European counterparts with a stock market capi-
talisation of shares ofjust 307o (against 787o forLor.-
don,267o for Germany and 18% for Paris).
As it can be seen in Table 4, the development and
relative importance of the Spanish bond market,
which includes basically non-government securities,
is even smaller than that of the share market. However,
it is worthwhile mentioning the vigorous growth that
the off-exchange market for public debt (supervised
by the Bank of Spain and based on a extremely effi-
cient book entry system) has experienced since its
creation in 1987.
Its market capitalisation represents avery meagre 2%
of the whole EEC market and a mere l7,l% rclative
to GDB very far behind some other EEC countries (4%
and 58Vo for Amsterdrm, l47o utd' 295% for Milan,
2LVo ud 55% for Germany, etc...).
- Volume of transactions
In terms of capitalisation, the volume of hansactions
is28,4%o for shares rnd2,7% forbonds. Again, despite
being relatively smaller, the Spanish share market can
be compared to other EEC markets (25,1% for Milan,
32,8% for Paris, 43,9% for London, etc...). On the
contrary, the bond market is well behind its European
counterparts (31,3?o for Amsterdam,76,6?o for Ger-
many, 150% for Paris, L7,59o for London, etc ...).
In both cases, the low level of market capitalisation
(primary market) and the very reduced volume of
transactions (secondary market) denote a clear lack of
development of the Spanish bond market. This loo-
phole should be adequately filled in the future if a
harmonious and well-balanced development of the
whole financial system is to be achieved.
2.2. The stock-exchange end the flnanclng of the
prlvate sec'tor
The stock sachnnge's role in finarcing the private sector in-
ve.stnent needs is a modest orr. During the last few years a
declining hend has been clearly observed whioh has led to a
significant reduction in the relative importance of shses and
bonds in financing the private sector (from 32,8% of tlrc totsl
in 1985 to a m€rp l\7 n 1989) in favoru of credit financing
(tuom43,99" to 63p%) (see Table 5). This can be explained
by two main reasons: Finf an impodant increase in house-
hold borrowing from cr€dit institutions to finame a high€r
level of durable goods consumpion and housing investrnent
because of the wealth effect associated with economic ex-
pansion. Second, a much higher use of non-distributed
profits (auto-financing) in the investrnent financing mix of
non-financial enterprises because of ttr imp,rovement in in-
dustial margins tlnoughout the business expansion cycle
and the relatively high level ofreal interest rates.
Thp role of the stock market in financing the private sector
has been clearly declining since 1986 (see Table 6) to reach
an dmost non-existent one in 1989. The October 1987 mar-
ket crash and the subsequent instability of the stock martet
imposed a severe shock on investor confidence which has
grven few opportunities for enterprises to issue new shares.
Moreover, the high level of real interest rates and, to a certain
exte,n! the conversion into shares of important amounts of
convertible bonds issued before 1986 has led to the practical
disappearance of the bond market as a financial channel for
the private sector.
L3. The modernlzatlon of the stock exchange
13.1. The general framework
For the stock exchange to be able to meet the needs of the
Spanish economy and in order to make it capable of coping
with the challenge and competitive pressures that other EEC
financial centses will put on it after the creation of a single
financial area throughout the EEC, the Spanish authorities
have begun a process of modernising the stock exchange.
This process is inserted within a vast transformation pro-
gramme of the whole financial rystem which ranges from the
Ilblc 5: Ncw lhbllltleg of loo-fhenchl entcrprlscr
rnd houscholds
BillionPTS 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Shares 67 799 El7 803 1.043
Bods 233 291 -ll0 7 -*
Bonoring l.2OS 1505 3830 4.699 4.727
Ccnmercialpaper 36 265 -394 150 229
Othcr ffi ffi 861 126 1.591
TOTAL 2.747 3.526 5.m4 5.785 7.500
Sourcc: Bank of Spein, Annual Report 19t9.
Teblc 6: New llebllltles of noe-llnenclel cnlcrprlscs
Publlc l$ues through thc stock mrrkets
BillionPTS 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Shares 152 219 282 U2 102
Bords 216 270 -94 -n -119
TOftAL 368 489 188 215 -17
Source: Bank of Spain, Statistical bulletin
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functioning of the public dcbt martet, thecreetion of pension
funds, andso oo.
Law2tlll988of 2S.7.198d costitutes the comerstore of the
stockexchangereform, whichhas as a ge,neral objective the
promotion ard modernization of the Spanish stock mutets.
In concrete terms, it aims eE
a) impoving theefriciency and secruity ofthe oper:ational
aspects of the martef by the introduction of a continu-
ous market where tsansactions are handled through
CAIS (Computer Assisted Trading System), an elec-
tsonic systcm replacing the physicel presense ofbre'
kers on the trading floa.
b) promotingahigherdegreeofcompetitionbetweenmar-
ket participants by liberalizing the access to mrrket
membership, thms abolishing the stocktrokers' monop
oly and liberalizing int€rmediation fees and coumis-
sions.
c) increasing the financial capactty and capital reguirre-
ments of intermdiaries so as to allow them to develop
their own cmmercid networks, as well as to takerisks
on theh own belalf.
d) establishing adequate channels to diffirse information
and imp,rove transparercy of the stockmartet by imple-
menting tighterrules in this field.
e) upgrading the supervision of martet tradfuU ad int€r-
mediaries by sefiing up a new public zupervisory and
regulato,ry body: the Stock Exchange National Com-
mission
232. Thc lnsdtudonal structurc
The law 2411988 modified the institutional structure of
Spanish stock martets. In Graph I the new institutimal ar-
rangeme,nts can be seen:
a) The Slock Exchange National Commissiot: This is tbe
body incharge of thercgulationandcontrol of both the
primary and secondary stock markets as well as the
supervision of all stock martet intermediaries.
b) Securitie.s agencies and companies8: Tlrey constitute
the only market intermediaries. They are subject to a
minimum strpital requirement (750 millions pesetas fc
companies and 150 millions for agercies), solvencyra-
tios and liquidity ratios. Securities companies can deal
m their owa belalf, &al on qedit with their clients ard
engage in underwriting operations. Both companies
and agencies cen op€n branches thoughout Spain and
abroa4 have acoess to int€rrnediaries on thepublic debt
mart€t, deal in foreign curr€.rrcy operations, €ngage es
portrolio manegers and become depositaries of invest-
rent funds. They are zubject to the zupervision of the
Stock Exchange Netional Commission in their stock
martet operations and of the Bank of Spain in their pub'
lic debt ma*et and fmeign currency o,perations.
c) Govenring bodies of the Stock Exchrngesg : One gov-
eming body exisb for eech of the four Spanish Stock
Exchanges (Madri{ Barcelong Bilbao and Valerria).
They are legal public companies whose shares are
owned by those securities companies and agencies
which uerrembers of the StockBxchangelo. Thegov-
eming body of a Stock Exchange is in clrarge of the or-
ganisation 
"n6 
luaslisning of the Stock Exchange,
authorising the admission to the official guotation of
any security and diffirsing any piece of news relatod to
martet treding and financial balarce sheets of issuers
and menrbers of the Stock Exchanga
d) StockExchange Companyll: This Company is ownod
(25%) by eachof the govenring bodies of the four Stock
Exchanges It is in chalge of the functioning of Ore tr-
terconnected Systemlz (or Continuous Market) by
which the p,reviously isolated and independent Stock
Exchanges of Barcelona, Bilbao, Madrid and Valencia
become integrated in a singlemarter Though this sys-
tem, a direct connction on a real timc basis is estab-
Iished between the four Stock Exchanges so that a
single pdse is settled for the same security at each mo-
rcnL As aresult, the liquidity of themartet fc any s€-
curity dealt with through the system is clearly
enhance4 sirrce all trading is concentrated in a single
msrtet
e) ClearingandSettlementServicel3:Allactivitiesrelated
to ttr Clearing and Settlernent of trading canied out in
any StockMar&et ue corcentrated in this service.
23.3. TGchnlcal Changes
Alurg with the new institutional stnrcturc, some irnpctant
technical changes are undertry since thereform look place:
6
7
8
I
10
11
12
13
It entued fully into force on 29.7.19t9.
Comisi6n Nrional del Mercado de Valores (CNMV).
Agercias y Sociedades & Valores.
Sociedadee Rectoras de las Bolsas de Valores.
The roess to a stock exchange merrbership is recerved to Securities Companies ard agencies. Flom 1993 onwards able to
either buy existing securities companics ard agencies or eetablish rcw ones, ard thus, will have frec rccess b sbclc martel
memberehip. Until 193 a transitbnal perbd is foreeeen during which limitatbns to buy already eetablished ompanies urd
agencies re progreseively phascd ouL
La Sociedad de Bolsas.
Sistema de InErconexi6n Burs&il (SE).
Servicio & C;ompensaci6n y Lfiuidrci6n de Valorres (SCLV).
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a) Intsoduction of CATS (C-omprter Assistod Treding Sys-
tem), which has replaced on-the-floor stockb,rokers
trading. It $arted on 24.41989 with frve securities and
it is foneseen ttrat by the cnd of 1990 it will reach &i%
of the wholevolume of tsansactions and 85% ofmar&et
capitalisation, leaving the rest !o be quotod though tbe
old system ("1 la cti6e"). The continuous mertet has
largeropening hours thanthe traditimal martet (10.00
to 17.00 instead of 10.00 to 12.00) and trading on a
single seonity canbe canied out druing a much longer
period (7 hours instead of 10 minute.s). The CATS
ma&es the process of "orrder chamelization - execution
- matching" ersi€r and sefer, thus increasing tbe effr-
ciency of the whole marteL
introduction of different mochanisrns which improve
information difrrsion on areal-timebasis 0o martet in-
terrmediuies (sihration of tsading, prices, positions, etc
...) andto theprblic.
improvement in the clearing and seltlement syster! in
particular in those tsadcs whereregistered securities ue
dealt with"
2"3.4 Other developments
In order to improve the attraction of the Spanistr Stock Mar-
kel ad make it more competitive_intemationally, two im-
portant steps have been recently taken :
a) The admission to offrcial quotation of foreign shares:
During the second half of 1990 two foreign shares
began to be trad€d for the first tim in the continuous
market (Volkswagen and Commerzbank) and a few
others are fqeseen to follow in the near future.
b) The opudng of a futrres market in Barcelona (IVGFF-
SA) and an options mar*et in Madrid (OM ib&ica)I4 in
March 1990 andinNovernber l989,respectively. These
two separated markets have recently constituted I
single holding company (MOFFEX) to improve the ef-
ficiency rndreduce the costs attached io both martets,
reqganizing its activities so that in the future the quo-
tation and dealing onfuturs and options m fixed interest
rate instruments will be mede in Barceloua and on
equity inMa&id.
b)
c)
Grrph l: Irctltualoorl Strrcarrc d Oc Spubl Stocl Mertetr
Srqrltbr Agpncloo Sloultlo Gompenlo
Oonmlng
body ol tho
BrroolonrSbct
Edrngr
Oourrnlng
body ol thr
Bllb0
8bd(
Echugo
€onrnlne
body ol tho
Yrlcnclr
Stoat
F*hrngp
14 Meffsa'e 34 sharehol&rs, including the main commercid and savings banks, tsadc conbacb at a national bvel wi0r a mminal
value of l0 millbn PIAs and a three-yerr manrity. The average &ily tsading volume has doubted b 1.250 since the marlret
stste4 which is still very bw by intematbnal sturdards. In October 1990, it began tsading contsacts baoed on a 9Orday l0
millbn PIAs deposit linked to 0re Madrid int€rbsnk offerpd rate (MIBOR). The options martet tsades similar contacts as the
fuire markel It is foreeen 0r* index-linked oontsacte could be on the screne by the middle of 191.
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3. Conclusions
The Spanish banking system had been naditionally a closed
and heavily regulated s,,stem protected from extemal com-
petition In the last fifteen yean it has undergore a process of
liberalisation, the result being a banking system with a
higher degree of concentration and a profitability level
roughly similar to European standards. Removal of borriers,
with the completion of the European single muke( and the
introduction of new frnrncial products and services atre ex-
pected to inq€ase cornpetitive Pressures in the sector (not
only from foreigrr banks but also between domestic financial
instihrtions). This is already taking place, although it will
probably be felt only in a moderate and progressive way in
some segm€nts of the banking systqn (i.e. in ttre retailing
sector, since the cost of either establishing a new, or buying
an already existing commercial branch network, could prove
so important a deterrent for the enEy of newcomers as a
legally binding limitation).
On the other han4 the Spanish stock exchuge is relatively
small by comparison with its main European count€rParts
and 0re size of the Spanish economy. Thus its role in chan-
nelling pnvate sectc savings towards pnvate sector invest-
ment projects is a modest one. Aware of the fact that this will
put it at a disadvantage in the future single financial marke(
the Spani$ urthorities have embarked on an anrbitiousmod-
e,nrization programme to make the stock martets mqp efri-
cient and capable of coping with the challenge of foreigt
competition It is expected that this Proce$s of reform will
harrrest high rewards in the coming years. Nevertheless, this
does not mean that the Spanish stock martet will necessarily
inmease its weight inErnope to any substantid extenL
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7t The Conduct of Monetary Policy in Spain
l. Monetary targeting in Spain
l.l. Targets
The Bank of Spain began in 1971 to establish quantitative
targets for the rate of growth of the money supply, abandon-
ing the system of quantitative cr€dit controls appliod until
then; the poliry of monetar5r control did not start to be p,n-
sued in an effective manner until l!i[.ay 1973.
For several years, the target fr monetary growth has been
fixed in the form of a range of t1.5 to 12 percentage points
around the cenhal ratel. Tte target is evaluated at the end of
the year, on the basis of monthly averages of daily figures.
These are normally values observed for December (vari-
ations over 12 months); however, when exceptional factors
are involvd the moving average for the last thee months of
the year is considered
From 1973 to 1983, the intermediate target for nanelary
policy was a growth rotc for M3 ur t standard definitionz. In
the early 1980's there was a significant shift of frrnds away
from financial instnrments subject to res€rve requirements
and towards instuments which were not zubject to such re-
quirements and could consequently offer higher retums. At
the same time, increased taxation in&rced a shift from finan-
cial assets subject to withholding tax towards assets free of
withholding tax. Finally, a large number of financial innova-
tions were also introdrced from 1983 onwards and a series of
non-monetary but very liquid assets and with high return,
representing a substitute for money, developed. In particular,
the short-term non-monetar5/ liabilities of the banking sys-
tem grew rapidly.
All these factors affected the stability, predictability and con-
trollability of lv[}. The Spanish monetary authorities were
thus led in 1984 to select, ul a new intermediate quantitative
lurget" a broder aggregate, namely ALF q liquid assets in
the hands of the public, although M3 remained a closely-
walched monetary indicatod. The new target variable was
selected on the basis of econqnetric evidcrce showing that
its relationship with nominal income was more stable and
therefore mre predictable than that of ltfi) - I prop€rq/ con-
firmed b,y more recent ernpirical work The rew target how-
ey€tr, has the particularity of being composed of liabilities of
both the banking system and the Treasury (on particular
Treasury Notes and repos and, since 1987, Treasury Bills);
this has direct implications for the conduct of monelary pol-
icy. Finally, the authorities announced in 1991 0re targeting
of ALP and the close monitoring of a wider ALP that in-
cludes comme,rcial paper (credit ceilings - see pages E and 9
below - had led to a disinterrnediation process ttrough the
issue of comnrercial papers by companies; the lifting of ceil-
ings in January l99l is producing reintermediation and a
swelling of traditional ALP). The authorities consider moni-
toring of an ag8legate even wider than ALP as a transitory
step before adopting a less b,road aggregate like M3, more in
line with the curent process of harmonization of monetary
aggr€gates within EEC me,mber States.
1.2. Instruments for monetary control
Since 1973, monetary control has relied upon the existence
of reserve rcquirements applied to a majority of the instru-
ments included in M3/ALP. The Bank also influences the
evolution of the free reserves of the bu*ing systern by lend-
ing and borrowing operations, and open market operations.
Since October 1978, therehasbeno single required reserve
ralro, common to all institutions4 and to all categories of
eligible liabilities. The dehnition of eligible liabilities is very
close to the definition of M3/ALP. The Treasury Notes and
Bills holdings of the public and the temporal transfer of pub-
lic assets (repos) by tlrc banking system to the public are now
the main instuments not subject to the reserve requirement
but included in the monetary aggxegate ALP. The required
reserves consist of deposits with the Bank of Spain and
notes.
The reserrre ratio was not changed betwee,n l97E and 1982,
but has since been changed several times. The most import-
ant changes were made in 1984 and 1990. In 1984, required
reseryes x,ere increased very substantially and a remunerated
tranche was cr€st€d within thert" This replaced the systern of
special deposits previously used. When making this deci-
sioru the urthorities took account of the consequerrces of the
reserve requirement on bank profitability and aligned the
rate of remureration on the money market rate, whereas pre-
viously special deposits had beeir remunerated at a distinctly
lowerrate.
On March 23, l9DO the Bank of Spains introdrced a major
reform of the reserve requirements system according to
which the coeffrcient was divided into two tsanches: (i) a
non-remunerated miniumum reserve tranche of 5%; nd
(ii) a remunerated Eanche (increased tp to L2%) in force
until 2 May 1990, and substituted the,reafter by Certificare of
Deposits (CD) issued by the Bank of Spain at r6% interest
rate. Tbe banks have to hold these CD's in their portfolio as
1
2
3
In 1988, however, the centsal point was abandoned.
That is, notes ard coins in the hands of the public plus sight, savings and tenn &posits.
ALP is composed of M3 plus a series of liquid financial assets such as deposits linked with insurance operations, promissory
notes, mortgage bonds, endorsements of commercid paper, guaranteed corporate bonds, private md public paper for
repurchase agreements md Central Buk paper (certificates of monetary regulation) as well as Treasury Notes and Treasury
Bills sold to the public.
The entire bank sector (including 0re savings banks) i8 subjoct to reserve requirements. They also apply to other finarrcial
institutions, such as credit cooperatives; howev€r, thie docs not corn€ within the frarnewort of monetary contsol but is the
result of the authorities' &termination not to give oomprative advmtages to certain institutions within the financial system.
See circular no Al9X) of Tl February 199O.
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non-negotiable assets but are able to transmit tbem, within
certain limits, betwe€n credit iostitutions. The CD's will be
progressively redeemed every six months starting
23 March 1993 and eding Septernber 2000.
The control of money martet conditions has been tadition-
ally exated through action on the liquidity of banks and the
level of the minimum leserve requirements. More recently,
however, the morptay strategy has shifted from the contsol
of quantities to that of prices and the Iiquid assets of the
banking system has progressively lost its nature of in-
strumental variable to be contsolled in ttre short-terrn NoEa-
days any overshooting or undershooting of this variable does
not trigger an authomatic reaction on behalf of the auth-
oritie.s.
Since 19EE the monetrqr authorities have aimed at stabiliz-
ing the ovemight interburk deposits rate around a fluctuation
band previously established by them. To achieve the latter
the Bank of Spain has used two different instsuments:
(i) First, the haditional Iending instmnrents to the banking
system, that is, the daily auctions of Monetary Regula-
tions Loans (in force from September 1977 until
14 May, 1990) substituted since May 1990 (at I time
when the reserye requirements was redefined urd re-
duced) by the ten-day auctions of Certificates of De-
posir of fire Bank of Spaiq and
(ii) Second the open-market operations with public assets
of the portfolio of the Bank of Spain, namely under re-
purchase agreqnents, for both to inject and to mop up
liquidity, that are called to become the main instrument
to regulate the liquidity of the financial interrrediaries
in the futune.
2. Difficulties of monetary control
In spite of the imp,rovem€nts in the monetary instruments
held by the Banlc of Spain and the almost immediate availa-
bility of information of some monetary aggregates (namely
ALF), the way in which the Spanish monetary policy has
been implenrented in the last years has changed due to both
financial and macroeconomic factors. Moreover, tbe mon-
etary financing of the deficits and the constraints imposed by
the exchange-rate policy have hindered the efficiency of
monetary policy and money stock targets have been overshot
since 1987 (cfr. Table 1).
The traditional approach to monetary policy by means of in-
direct control of the monetar5r aggregates has been increas-
ingly affected by financial innovations and frnarrcial marftct
integration ard by changes in the financial behaviour of tbe
public and the banks. In view of the uncertain ard complex
financial environment the authorities have had increasing
trecounre to flexibility, discretionality and judgement in im-
plementing monetar5r policy. They have progressively aban-
doned an approach to monetary contsol based on a two level
quantitative target and on a normative behaviour for the in-
terventions of the authorities in the money and exchange
ma*ets.
2.1. Flnanclal lnnovatlon and monetary agregates
(i) A first elerrrcnt of uncertainty arises from the reduced
capacity of ALP (the b,road monetary aggregate, which
includes holdings of liquid money-market instsuments
as well as the tsaditional cornponents of M3) to give in-
formation about the evolution of nominal income and
prices. Since 1987 it has become more difficult to dis-
tinguish between two alternative interp,retations of an
overshooting in ALP: an undesired evolution of nomi-
nal expenditure - ttrat stroul4 therefore, be conected -
* shnnges in the relative yields of AI-P and non-ALP
assets, which should be accommodated
The development of ALP has been increasingly in-
fluenced by changes in financial martets, namely from
1987 onwards. Firsl the share of AlPcomposed of very
liquid and profitable non-money assets has increased.
Secon4 the distinction between means of settlernents
and assets held for financial investrnent purposes has
become bluned as a result of financial innovation and
a growing &gree of substitutability among a large num-
ber of financial assets.
(ii) Moreover, credit conbols indrced a disinterrnediation
prwess in 1989 and 1990 as companies have bee.n is-
zuing commercial papers in large quuttities. As arezult,
the authorities have been compelled to look closer the
evolution of a wider ALP aggregate which, includes
those comnprcial papers, urd to set a tentative target for
ALP ard commercial paper for 1991.
iii) The stability of the rclation between the intermediate
target (ALP) and the instrumental variable (bank
liquidity) has also weakened Instability of the money
multiplier has rezulted from the more frequent shifts in
the portfolio of the public in reaction to changes in the
yield urd fiscal attributes of certain assets and also from
the increasing capacity ofbank op€rators to hansform
liabilities which are subject to the minimum reserve re-
quirernent into thosewhich are excluded from that coef-
frcient.
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Thble l: Monetary and credlt lndlcators (annual % change)
Source: Bank of Spain.
M3 ALP M1 M2 Domestic Credit
Expansion
Target Outcome Target Outcome
1980
1981
t982
1983
1984
1985
19E6
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
rc-2n 16.1
14.5-185 t5.7
13.5-175 r5.2
t2.7
t2.9
6.3
4.1
6.3
tt.2
10.5
14.8
15.4
15-19 17.7
14-18 15.8
10.5-145 14.4
11.5-145 13.3
9.5-12.5 t2^1
6.5-9.5 14.6
8-11 tz.t
6.5-9.5 10.4
6.5-9.5 11.3
7-tr t2.t
12.2
12.5
6.9
6.7
7.7
t2.o
13.0
15.2
17.8
14.9
n.o
t6.4
LL.4
11.6
8.0
8.7
7.1
11.5
t2.9
tt.7
15.6
11.5
t7.9
14.0
19.8
19.8
20.1
16.1
11.6
14.8
13.3
t4.3
15.4
14.8
t0.2
12.5
2.2. Deflclt fundlng and the efrlclency of rmnetary
pollcy
The fact that the deficit has been directly financed for long
perids by the Bank of Spain and/or by the buking system
at zubsidized conditions, has hinde,red the efficiency of the
monetary policy, since the Bank of Spain was forced to ste-
rilize, not always zuccessfully, the implicit irrrease of base
liquidity.5
Moreove,r, the short-temr structure of public debt and the
specific commercialization schemes have made monetary
policy heavily dependent on the requirements of the de,bt
management policy and has creat€d additional problems for
the former. Actually, the fact that Treasury Notes, Treasury
Bills and repos of the financial institutions are not liabilities
of the banking system but of the Treasury while tbey are in-
cluded in the definitions of hoadmoney (ALP) creates thee
problems for the accurate implernentation of monefary pol-
icy:
(i) its effectiveness as instruments of contrul of the fumcs-
lic counterpart of noaey creation is redrced since the
sale of Treasury Notes, Bills and/qrepos from the port-
folio of the Bank of Spain to the Frnancial institutions,
with the aim of mopping up the bank liquidity will be
ineffective if these instruments are resold by ttrc bank-
ing system to the public. If this were the case, ttrcre is
only a change in the structrne of AlJwhile total amount
remains unchanged.
tlp Bank of Spain has to sterilize the excess of banlc
liquidity uising from the sales to thepublic ofTreasury
Notes, Bills and/orrepos hold in the portfolio of the fin-
ancial institutions. Such an operation does not imply
any increase of ALPbut givqs way to ur increase in the
bankliquidity. Actually, those banks reselling to the
public those instnurents can free reserves sirrce the lat-
ter is not apart of the liabilitie.s subinittedto therreserves
requirernents;
The scheme of commercialization of public debt de-
veloped in recent years has resulted in holdings in the
public portfolios at a very short-terrn maturity. At a time
when the demand for credit was strong (since 198Q the
financial irutitutions irrcentivated the process of turs-
ferring repos to their custom€rs sirrce these operations
allowed 1fus lankilg system to free reseryes because
they were not part of the liabilities of the reserye re-
Erirernents coefticient but were included in the ALP de-
finition Moreover, the latter made the public's portfolio
less stablemaking the assessment of themonetaryvari-
ables more difficult and the influence of Cenhal Bank
operations in bank liquidity less pedictable.
(ii)
(iii)
6 The imprct of domestic money creation on the monetary aggregates has of oourse been reduced since ERM entsyi gven the
state of confi&rrce in the cunency, grealer or lesser sterilization of defrcit financing is likely to be largely offset by indw€d
movements in the external counterpail
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23. The ERM conshalnt and capltal flows
From mid-1988 onwards the Spanish economy started to
show signs of overheating that became motre obvious in
1989-1990. At that time, domestic &mand was growing fast
(6.99o n 1988) arxf in excess of output (5.2%) leaking into
price increases and trade balance deterioration
However, the absence of a wagecorrcertationpolicy for 1989
and the procyclical stance of fiscal poliry made monetary
policy the sole instnrment then potentially available for
fighting inflation. That policy mix imposed some conshaints
on the efficiency of monetary policy through the well-known
dilemma in the face of shong external confidence in the
peseta:
(i) eitherto appreciatethepeseta, attheexpense ofadete-
rioration of the foreign sector, while the trade deficit
was already largg
(ii) or to rpduce short-terrn interest rates, producing in con-
sequence an undesired domestic demand expansion that
would contribute to the overheating of tbe economy.
The rcstictive starpe of rnmetry poliry indnd sbort-term capi-
tal movenrrfs tnt benefi t frorn interestrafe ditrerentials (cf gtaph
1) in a tanrwck of favorraHe expectaliqs of the $ability, a
w€n apprreciatiorL of ttrc pesda dning 1989. On tlE oth€r 1un4 a
snbstitutim ftom intemal to foreigr crodits tookplae in urder to
cope witr tre high€r than opected grolvth of 1rivate sectr de
rnardfacredit (15.4%m 1988 against a 11% trgetod). As aresrlt
6egrowth of ttre tagetodmorEtry eggregate (AtP) derated
and, sr@wntly, moved above (outconrc of 10.4%) from fte
ryperlimit of lhe tagetrange amourrced ta l%9 (65Vo -95%\
To respond to that situation, the Burk of Spain applied the
following restrictive monetary policy measures:
(i) the compulsory reserve coeffrcient was raised by 1.5
pencentage points on 1 Feb,nrary ftom L6.5% to lB%.
This rise affected only the non-intenest beuing part of
the coefficient (arise from S%to 6.57o);
(iD the intervention rate was raised by l% pontto 13.4%.
The monetary authorities simultaneously introduced
additional measunBs to discouage capital inflows:
(i) banks were required to make special non-interest bear-
ing deposits with the Bank of Spain oquivaleiltoZi%
of the registered increase in ttreir strort cunency posi-
tions over the amurnts of suchpositions outstanding on
31 January 1989;
(iD thesetting of amrndatory ardnon-renrunerateddeposit
at the Bank of Spain equivalent to30% of:
(a) the amount of new financial credits and loans (in
foreigr curency and convertible pesetas) from ab,road
(ttrc Spanish Treasury is exempt from such a deposit);
O) the amount of new credits and loans (in foreigp cur-
renry and convertible pesetas) granted by a resident fin-
ancial interrrediary to a rcsident exporter to finance his
contractual trade claims on non-lesident importers until
the final Pa,,ment is se$led" Nwertheless, the Spanistr
exportermay freely obtain credits for the same purposes
from anon-residenl
The decision to enter the peseta into the ERM, on 19 hme
1989, emphasized the ne€d to conhol inflation. As aresult, in
eady July 1989 the Govemment and the Bank of Spain ap-
poved additional restrictive fiscal and monetary mea$ues.
The Bank of Spain increased its intervention rate to 14.5%,
raised the minimum reserve requirements by I potntto lgEo,
and introduced new and more shingent banking regulations
on the transfer of loans by burks to customers. However, the
main measure, on the monetary side, was the inhoduction of
a systern of credit ceilings for each individual bank These
conhols set a limit of l7?o for the growth of the credit to the
pnvate sector in 1989. orl the fiscal side, the authorities in-
creased the withholding tax on capital interest and dividend
irrcome from 20 to25%.
As the above-mentioned measures proved to be effective in
decelerating domestic dernand in the second half of 1989 and
through Dn (4.3%), the authorities relaxed some regula-
tions and controls. The2O4o special non-interest bearing de-
posit with the Bank of Spain on new foreign borrowing by
Banks - which was introduced on 1 Feb,ruary 1989 - was zup-
pressed on 25 November 1989. h addition, the30% non-re-
munerated deposit of the amount of new financial credits
and loans was abolished on March 1991.
The Spanish experience has again proved that in a context
whene capital movernents have become more intense and in-
t€nest rate sensitive arrt within an adjustable-peg regime as
zuch the EMS, domestic morrctary policy reduces its margin
of manoeunre since it is impossible to fix simultaneously and
independently two nominal anchors, that is, a specific target
for money stock growth and an exchange-rate commitmenl
Arestrictive monetary policy engineered in order to face an
overfieating of the economy led to high interest-rate differen-
tials, generated strong capital inflows and put an apprecia-
ting pressure on the exchange rate. The latter obliged the
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authorities to inte.rvene in the exchange markets with the
subsequent impact on the extemal counterpart of the mon-
etary base and make the restrictive stance of monetary policy
in jeopardy.
On the otlrer han( the entry into the ERM rpduced imnedi-
ately after the short-term capital movements of a speculative
nahrre since the expectations of further appreciation of the
peseta were frustrate4 but upgraded the status of the cur-
rency vis-l-vis the intemational investors and athactedmore
permanent capital flows given the prevailing high interest-
rate differential. Interventions in the exchange market by the
authorities have been less frequent than in tlre pre-ERM poi-
od and the volatility of the exchange rate decreased"
However, the participation in the ERM has increased the
credibility of monetary policy, conribtrted to moderate infla-
tion expectations, influenced domestic costs and led to a re-
assessment by the authorities of the previous strategy for
monetary control. As a result, the monetary authorities have
enlarged its discretionary character and widened therange of
indicators to control, that is, money and credit aggregates,
exchange rate, yield curves urd interest-rate differentials.
3. Monetary targets and indicators in a
changing environment
The monetary authorities have currently faced some difficul-
ties - and are likely to face some more in the perspective of a
free market for financial serrrices - in relying exclusively on
monetary aggregates as indicators of the monetary stance.
These problems are potentidly serious for a monetary policy
based on rules, but are also relevant wherever monetary ag-
gregates are used as irdicators.
Problems of two kinds have emerged. First, there is the tech-
nical problem of the specification of the variables thought to
determine money demand. But a more fundamental diffi-
culty is stnrctural in nature. The process of financial innova-
tion seems to be causing a weakening of the conventional
relationships between monetary aggregates on the one hand
and economic activity and prices on the other. In Spain, the
problem of instability of money demand seems to be more
severe for narrow definitions of the money stock (namely
M2 and M3) than for bnoader ones (AI-P) and as a result
authorities have tumed to a broader concept of money (ALP
or the new ALP and commercial paper). This downward shift
of narrow money demand is mainly attributed to more fre-
quent transfers from non-interest bearing assets to higher
yielding dtematives. In tur.lr' this is the result of the inhoduc-
tion of new technologies (new means of payments), in-
oeased sophistication in the banking sector, and reactions to
new monetary control methods.
Over the last few years, however, fundamental changes in the
competitive structure of the Spanish banking industry have
occured. As a result competition between finarpial interme-
diaries on the money market has very much increased and
the breakdown of the previous "gentlemen agreement" be-
tween the major Spanish banks on competition to inoease
the banks' liabilities has induced transfers from non-mon-
etary to monetary assets, now also offering attractive yields
It couldbe argued that this still-ongoing process ofderegula-
tion and hcreased competition will become more and more
important as a result of the liberalization of finarrcial services
n a 1992 framework Spanistr companies would look for
cheaper financing on foreign. banks while foreign savings
will be attracted by the opportunity to be hansformed by the
Spanish bar*s into high yield deposits disturbing the relation
between domestic liquidity and expenditure.
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Hgwever, drning Stage one of EMU, a new rank of priorities
within the current range of monetary indicato,rs and the tar_
Sets might prove to be recessary. Even if the approach still
reinains flexible, pnori$ miSht be given to the estaHishing
of the exchange rate as tbe intennediate vadable of mmetary
policy. As a resul! tbe urthorities should be ready to allow
for tempo,rary overshooting of the monetry aggregate if a
conflict betweeir domestic needs (ALpconbol) and external
requirement (external rrte stability) emerges. ALp should
play a minm role compared with the past since the assess-
ment of the monetary policy will have to be bssed in a wide
ruge of monetar5r indicatms (other money or credit aggre-
gates, interest rates, yield curve movemenls) and real (com_
modity priceq exchange rate behaviour).
In qdcr to pave tbe way fm a sccessful narrowing of the
bsnds and to avoid prcssur€ fq a downward realignnrent of
the peseta before the inception of Stage two, tbe reduction in
int€rnal imbalances should continue by nrans of enhanced
zupply-side mea!rutres, increased competition and by a me-
dium-term frnarcial strategy aiming et budgetary consolida-
tion.
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1. Introduction
Wittr a population of 38.8 million and a teritory of 504,8(X)
I(m2, Spain is among the EC's largest Member States, and
Sows a considerable degree of differentiation and qpecializ-
ation among its regions.
The most common level of regional analysis in Ore EC is that
of NUTS II regions, which in Spain correspond to the 17
"Comunidades Aut6nomas" (see Figue l) plus the cities of
Ceuta and Melilla. The Comunidades Aut6nomas play an
important role in the design and implementation of domestic
and EC shuctural policies and statistical infomration is in-
creasr4gly presented at that level. The definition of the Co-
munidades Aut6nomas, during the regionalization process of
the last decade, did not in general follow homogeneity or
other economic criteria which should ideally be used in the
definition of planning regions of a counEy. They are more
the outconp ofpolitical agreqnents and cultural and histori-
cal links between theregions. Hencg while theregion of An-
dalucia consists of 8 provinces with 98,616 square
kilomeres and a population of 7.9 million, Curtabria is only
one povince with 5,03IGn2 and 0.3 million population
With that proviso in minda fint picture can be drawn by
looking at the dis&ibution of GDP per head among NUTS tr
regions of Spain, as in Table 1. The following main charac-
teristics eme{ge:
. The distribution of GDP per head is less asymmetric in
Spain than in other EC Memb€r States, as inticated by the
uzual measures of dispersion. However, gven the overall
lowerlevel of dwelopment Spain contains a largernumber
of 'problenr'regions from Ore EC point of view.
. A clear rcgional dualisur is not presenl with ttre borderline
between the prosperous and the less developed regions not
being as well defined as, for example, in Italy. There is,
however, a general North-East / South-West gradienL
. The spatial stucture of the Spanistr economy does not Sow
a clear unipolar or cenhre-to-periphery pattem as, for exam-
ple, in France. Instea4 there are at least three 'poles' - Ma-
dri4 Catalufla and the Pais Vasco @asque Country), while
the geographic cenhe contains some of the countsy's poo-
rest areas.
2. Income disparities and economic growth
in the Spanish regions
As happened in most EC meurbers, the high growth period of
the Spanish cconomy before 1973 was characterizrAby t
convergence of income levels between its regions. At the
sarc tire, the catching-up process with respect to the rest of
Europe showed &n even mme marked advance; meazured in
terms of GDP per head in purchasing power standards, Spain
as a whole progressed fuom 59Vo of EuR 12 in 1960 to 809o
in 1975 (see Table l).
The years between 1973 and 1985 were a generally de-
pressed period for the Spanish economy, with an average
growthrate of 2.39o. The manufacturing and building sectors
had a particularly bad performance. The crisis had a very un-
equal inciderrce over the various regions of the country, dre
to the diversity of their economic structures at the outsel The
industrial North and North-East were particularly hit
In the recent upswing in economic activity from 1985 on-
wards, a convergent hend inregional output levels, similar to
what happened in the 1960s, is so far not discemible. This is
the same trend observed in other EC regionsl, and it cannot
be said with certainty that growth has been generally
stronger in the more backward regions or in the prosperous
ones. On the other hand, the regional disparities of the levels
of disposable incomes of households have h:en significantly
reduced since 1975, and are still decreasing2.
All the above-mentioned developments had important impli-
cations, still to be fully realized, for the regional outlook and
the spatial distribution of economic activities in the country,
which are now examined inmore detail.
Ll. The Medlterranean reglons
The main axis of growth which has emerged in recent years
is the coastal stsip between Gerona arrC Murcia an4 to some
extent, its p,rolongations towards Almeria and Malaga, and
along the Eb,ro valley. The economy of these regions was
mainly booste4 in recent years, by the growth of the mass
tourism industry, which had a strong multipli€r effect on the
rest of the economy; this multiplier effect was favoured by
tbe hish degree of integration, or interdependence, between
the economic activities of the Medite.rranean axis. The exist-
ence of a good communications infrastruchne (motorway)
dso plays a role here. The location pattern alongside this axis
(especially in tte Catalufla, Valerrcia and Murcia regions) is
also a rather balanced one, with a multipolar structure of
large and int€rrnediate urban centres, favouring the creation
of new economic activities without excessive pressure on the
ffiastucture and environnrental p,roblems.
Productive activities in the Mediterranean regions are more
export-oriented than in the average of Spurish regions. That
applies not only to touism but also to its indrstrial sectors
with a consi&rable endogenous growth potential, ard the in-
tensive and efficient segments of the agricultural sector.
Therefore, this region is poised to benefit most from the
opening of the Spanish economy and European integration.
This seerns to be conftrmed by its recent performance, al-
though the diffrcultie.s in the tourism sector may well have
rrgative repe, cussions in some areas.
See e.g. EC Commission (1991) The rc8ions in the I QQOs: fourth lreriodic report on the social and economic situation and lhe
development of the reions of the Community
See for instarrce Quintana et al. (1991) "El daarrollo econ6mico espafiol y la Espaffa desigual de las autonomias", Papeles de
Economia Espafiol a, 45 :2-6t.
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2.2. The decllnlng lndustrld reglons
The stagnation years were particularly felt in the traditional
northem in&rstrial regions, which experienced an even molE
sluggish growth than the rest of the economy Qess than 1%
per year in tlre Basque CorurEy, about 1% in Astruias). Tbese
regions we,re heavily specialized in some basic industsial
sectors like steel, coal, chernicals etc. Such patterns of spe-
cializationreinainedunchanged fr a long time, and theirim-
print on the economic structure of these regions
(infrastructure, *ills, services) limits theircapacity to adsptl
to thercquircments of modern activities.
As a result, there were strong emplolmnt losses until 1985,
and in some cas€s an absolute decrease of orpul The low
investment rates and lack of creation of new ervrFloyment
denote the failure of these regions to cornpensate fm tbe de-
cline of the traditional industrial s€ctors by the creation of
tertiary or otber activities More rcce,ntly, there are signs of
lecov€ry in some of these regions (e.g. Cantabria) but it is
too early to assess its long-t€rm significance.
23. The brkward reglons
Tbe taditimally lagging rcgrms (Casti[a-la-Mar]a, CaSilla-
Le6n, Exterradra, eralcia ad Andahria) experkaped shrggiS
gowthunlil 1985 in lirc wih bercst of 6e cortry md srfr€ro4
inmdcasesr largearploynmtlm. Inthefqnyeusryto 1989
fuirgocft ratq 6oughoqsiderabb(above4%peryer) was Sill
below tlp nalimal averagg whichcasb s@ do$S m ttrir pnoe-
pS of cahfrfutg rp m lhe nne devel@ rqim.
In gffial, tbbadrwadrqim exhitit alowpoprlalimdensity
(exoqpt fa Galicia), poor curmunicalim and o6er infrastrmlrq
and arelaively stmg dcpqdre mlowgodrdivity agrknttrE
However, within tds gtup of nryiqs, tse is cmsideralCe d[v€r-
sity of irconr levels anddynmic perfcmare, mt always dis
EniHe at 6e NUIS tr kvel. Smr pr,wim within ealicia (Ir
Catfis), Casilla{,e6n (Valladoli4 Brqgc) and Adalwia (Sevil-
la) ae ideod in a better po.dtim lban hercst
2.4. Other reglons
Madrid constitutes a relatively small region, served by a
good infrastnrcture and benefiting from its position as home
to the central governmenL Its irdustry rnd service sectors
underwent an extensive restnrcturing process in the yers up
to 1985, and it has since resumed a high growth rate which
allows it to remain near the top of the regional income
leagua
The Baleares and Cansry tslands have both a large weight of
the se,rrices sector (mainly related to tourism) and have
shown the highest growth rates in the 1985-1988 p€riod" In
1989, howwer, they were strongly hit by tlre contraction of
the tourist markel
3. Investment trends
The p,revious analysis in terms of GDP growth can be use-
frrlly complemented by some more forward-looking irdica-
tors of investrrent activities in the different regions. A hiSh
investmentratg though not suffrcient to ensure economic de-
velopment is the main motor of regional growth and reflects
the potential competitiveress of rcgions and their capacity to
attsact new economic activities. Unfortunately, the,re are no
complete data on gross fixed capital fomration by regiorq
only partial information concerning manufacnuing, foreip
arrt public investnenl
Table 2 shows aregional b,neakdown of investnent in manu-
facturing, eitlrer in new plants or expansion ofexisting onesl
This bneakdown is then compared with the regional shues of
industrial value added The regions which stand orlt as par-
ticularly dynamic in terms of manufacturing investnent ale:
. The Rioja, Navarra, Cataluf,a and Valencia regions, which
belong to the already mentioned Ebro-Mediterranean
strong growth axis.
. Tbe "re-conve,rsion" regions of Cantabria and Pais Vasco.
This confirrns the beginning of recovery of these regions,
checking what could otherwise be a widening of diver-
gerrc6.
. The "backwrd" rcgions of Galicia and Andalucia, espe-
cially in terms of new investnenl This is a positive deve-
lopment as far as regiond convergence is concerned
On the negative side, the,re seems to be no surge of inve$-
ment in the declining industsial region of Asturias, nor in the
backward Castillas and Extnemadura" This observation is
corrobcated by the fact that the pattcrn of Mustsial special-
ization in the lagging rcgions (with a few exceptions) is
dominated by sectors of medium and low demand growth.
Foreigll dhect invesEpnt in Spain has boomed since 19M,
especially after the liberalization introduced in 1985. A
rather unbalanced picture enrerges from the regional dis-
tribution of that inveshrent (columns 1 anC 5 of Table 3).
Cataluia, and to a lesser extent Arag6n, La Rioja ard Ma&id
absut very large slrares, while the lagging regions perform
rather badly. In general, the eastem rcgions (closer to Eu-
rope) seem to have been favourod by foreign investors. The
figures presented do not include foreigners' acquisition of
real estatg which is strongly concentrated in the coast of fui-
dalucia and other Mediterranesn regions. Its value is about
50% of that of foreigr direct investment but, unlike the latter,
it does not lead to an insnease inregional growth except per-
haps through a dernand multiplier effecL
Public investnent, on the other hand (columns 2 td 6 of
Table 3) has a strong "equalizing" bias which attempts to
compensate the regions for their lack of competitiveness and
3 Ministerio & Economia y Hrcienda (190) El Crecimienio Re8ional Fspainol ante le Int Or"iott F*o** Chapter YII
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economic capacity. The regions affected by indushial de-
cline and the backward regions are rclatively favoured; this
is theresult of two factrs:
. Some 30% of public inveshent is allocated through the
Fundo de Compensacion Interterritorial @CI). The nrles of
allocation for the FCI rre based on the ircome per hea4 mi-
gration flows, une,mplolment and surface area of eachrc-
gion
. The EC stmctural fimds (columns 3 and ? of Table 3) rep-
resent a significant part ofpublic investnent and develop-
ment expenditure in Spain. Their allocation criteria
(namely objectives 1, 2 and 5b) have a dominant regional
componenl
4. Labour market
The situation of global imbalance in the Spanish labourmar-
ket can be surnrnarizcd by the national unernplo5nnent rate of
L6.L% n 1990 and by the fact tha! of the 17 regions, all but
one have a level of unerrplolment well above the EC aver-
age (see Table 4). This overall high level ofunernployurenf
can be athibuted to structural rigidities in the labour martef
and its distribution among the regions is very unev€n, rang-
ngfuom7.3% in Rioja !o 25.4% in Andalucia It is in general
the lagging regrons which experience the highest urcmploy-
mentrates: the averagerate for objective I regions (see sec-
tion 5.3.2) is 18.7 % and for other rcgions 13.3%.
These figrnes zuggest that tbere are stuctural features of the
lagging regions which further impair their adjushent to
Socks afrecting the whole economy and which are a cause
for corcem about the possibility of achieving a reduction in
regional disprities Indee4 high regional unanployment is
associated with both the level and growth of regional GDp,
through its negative effects upon local &murd and invest-
menL
Regional unemploynent could be checked basically ttnough
the reduction of labour costs or labow mobility. High unern-
ployment rates should bring about a moderation in real
wages in theregiur" That would enoourage the expansion of
employment both though the attraction of new investnent
and tbrough a change in the processes of local industry in fa-
vour of a greater use of the available labour. Migration of
worters towards high-activity regions would contribute to
reducing unemployment. At the same time, their income
transfers back to the regions of origin stimulate demand
tbere.
Reduction of relative labour costs has been hindered by a
number of rigidities which affect the labour market in the
county as a whole. Their impact upon the problemregions is
made worse by a rystem of national bargaining which was
reinfqced *tq 1977, resulting in a lower dispersion of rc-
gional wages in recent years, as confirmed by empirical
studies. It is also known that in lagging regions there is a
shong tendency toresqt to informal wort, given thebarriers
that exist in the formal and permanent sectors and rural hadi-
tions of family work and family support - favoure4 morp-
ov€r, by better social benefits and early retirement sche,lnes
Barriers to formal emploSrment have a particularly serious
impact on the registered uremplo5rment rates among young
people, which reach over 40% in some regions. IndusEial de-
clining regions such as Asturias, Cantabria and the pais
Vasco srffer from relatively high youttr ruremplo5rrent retes
Clable4).
The other mechanisrr which should respond to localized un-
enployment and promote regional convergence is labour mi-
gratioo Many Spanish regions, with high birttr rates, have in
the past supplied large numbers of worters bottr abroad and
to other regions. These flows have however been on a declin-
ing uend since around 1960. The decline was s&ongest in the
1970s, mostly due to high unemployment in the receiving
countries and regions, which dissouraged potential emi-
grants. At the begiDning of the 1 980s, the pace of adjusrnent
and industrial re-conversion meant that a number of older
workers lost their jobs, with little incentive to migrate to
mor€ prosp€rous regions, where employment prospects were
not much better anyway. Furthermore, rigidities in the hous-
ing market in Spain, especially in urban aneas, pose fulher
obstacles to the mobility of workers. Migration flows have
since remained mod€rate, as Table 5 suggests and in line
with what has been obs€rved in other EC countries6 ud are
not expected to rcsume the prominent role they had in past
decades. The continuing demographic Fpssur€ in some of
the lagging regions (though not in all, as Table 5 also shows)
and the still very low activity rates in European teiurs, thus
imply tlnt jobc will have to be created in ttrose regions at a
faster pace Oran in the resL
The failure of regional unerrployment to induce either an ad-
justnent in local wages and labour demand, or equilibnating
out-migration flows is largely explained, mor€ov€r, by mis-
match of skills of the labour force. Tbese reflect l) different
sectoral and professional sEuctures in low-activity and hiSh-
activity regions and 2) the failure of the local education and
Eaining rystern to provide the types of labour required by ex-
panding sectors.
5
6
The figures refer to fixed investment by 0re general government sector plus capital tsansfers to enterprises. To relate them to
GDP drares (column 6) is rrct aperfect way of expressing the relation between the "supply and demand" of infrastructure.
Infrastruc[ue needs of the regions depend on many factors, like for instance surfrce area and population.
See Chapter 1 to this s[rdy.
See EC Commission op. cit, page 29.
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The fust aspect is illustratedby Table 5, whene it canbe seen
that agriculture still repnesents a large part of enrplolment in
most lagging regions. On the other han4 the service sectc
and administrative and liberal professions are under-rep,re-
sented. Since it is known that the majority of the unernployed
in those regions come from agriculture, constnrction, or have
never worke4 the key to solving regional unemployment
seems to lie in an improvernent of *ills of the local labour
force.
A study canied out for the EC Commissio/ shows that the
participation rates of tbe corresponding age groups in educa-
tion or vocational training is much lower in lagging regions,
and estimated the number of additional aaining places rc-
quired (Iable 7). These figures show a wi& variation in the
degree ofpreparedness oflocal training and e&rcation struc-
tures, especially in the case of objective I regions. In those
regions, a considerable effort is required to reach parity with
the national average, and even more if a target of two years
training were agreed.
5. Regional policies
5.1. Motlvatlon
ln recent yearq regional problems and policies have came
back high on the policy agenda of Spain, due to the consoli-
dation of the decentralization Process' tlre importarrce of the
Comunidadss Autonomas, EC membership and the rpform
of the Community Structural Funds. Also, tbe rccent favour-
able economic environrnent and the persistence, in spite of il
of important regional disparities provide both more head-
room and motivation for these issues to be tackled" These
disparities are seerL not only as unacceptable from the politi-
cal point of view, but a proble,rr that must be answered if the
present economic lccov€ry is to be zustained in a balanced
and durable way.
Puuing aside, for the present purpose, the questions of equity
and political cohesion between tbe regions of a country, the
link betrreen spatial agnnrretries and global economic per-
formance, as a guide forregional policy is not simple. Clear-
ly, space is not homogeneous and one cannot aim at a
uniform distribution of economic activities. There are, how-
ever, some strictly economic argumeuts which plead in fa-
vour of active regional policies to Promote a more evenly
distributed growth among the regions:
. The external effects of location decisions. Ofteq the bene-
fits of conglomeration are internalized by frms while its
costs are noL
. Regional unemployment. Without laboru mobility, effr-
cient use of resources will also call for investment and
growth to be channelled to the regions where there is (hi-
ghest) unemployrenL
. The growth ugumenl Even with high overall growttt' ttrc
continuous restmcturing of the economy's sectot! (which
has inpractice aregional dimension) calls forpolicies to fa-
cilitate adjustrrenl The existence of &pressed or backward
regions also represents a fiscd brnden, and limits the po-
tential marka of fte growing regions.
. The stabilizrtion rgtunenL This is based upon obeerved ri-
gidities in the laboru markel The tendency for the unifor-
mization of wages would bring demand-pull inflation in
concentration areas, and cost-push inflation in depressed
areas.
5.2. Natlonallnstruments
The modem instnrmenrc of regional policy in Spain origin-
ated in the principles of local finance set by the 1977 Cm-
stitution (establishing ttre FCI) and in the severe adjustment
problems faced by sonrc regions in the early 1980s (ttrc so-
called Zonas de Urgente Reindustrializacion). The ProsPect
of EC membership brought the need to review and ration-
alize theregional aid system inherited from the 1960s, lead-
ing to the 1985 I-ey de Incentivos Regionales.
Atpesent themain instruments of regional policy atnational
level are:
. The 3- or 5-year Plans which are now elaborated in accord-
ance with the scope and objectives of the EC structural
funds. They follow a first generation of plans issued in
1985, and encompass all the instruments, with domestic
and Community lesourtes, under medium-tersr sectoral or
regional stsategies. The most imPortant are the 1988-1993
Regional Developme,lrt Plan (corresponding to objective 1
of the Stmcnral Funds) and the Social and Regiond Re-
conversion Plan (objective 2).
. The investmentplan of thepublic sector, especially theFCI'
which has just been reforrnedu. The new rules specify thet
ttre FCI applies now only to objective 1 Qagging) regions'
and the correspording investments are to be exclusively di-
rected to regional developmenL Table 8 shows the shares
of the regions in FCI outlays, the total of which (around
30% of public investnent) is henceforth related to indica-
tors of the relative situation of these regiorx. In conrpction
with the introduction in Spain of theEC structural frmds and
their zubsequent reinforcenrenL public investrnent has ac-
celerated shongly after 1985, from 3.0% of GDP in 1984
to an estimated 5.2%tnl9Y2.
. The regional incentives systenL This is far more selective
and geographically concentrated than the previous (up to
1985) regime. Government regional aids to private mves-
tment in 1990 amounted to 7 I 3 MECU, or about 25% of the
total investment in the 1575 projects supported. This
amount does not include the expenditure of theregional go-
v€rnrnents or the EC.
R. Derenbach (190) "Human capital and related ffiashrcture endownrnents: investnent required in problem regions"' s0ldy
for the EC Commission.
Law n 29 I L99O of 26.12.1990.
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5.3. Regional development strategy and
EC support
53.1. The reglonal plans
The 1989-1993 Regional Development Plan was elaborated
in arelatively short timg in orderto comply with therequire-
ments of the reform of the EC stuctural furds. It is neverthe-
less zupportedby a substantial preparatory wck, arrlreflects
a national consensus, both technical and political, on the
p,riorities and strategies of development for the lagging re-
gions.
The plan explicitly sets the final objective that the GDp gap
between ttre richer and poorer regions be progressively re-
duced, and the two s&ategic priorites of boosting local em-
ployrrent and improving the infrastructure erdowment of the
Iegging regions. Four types ofregions are distinguished of
which two are relevant fm the objectives of the Plan :
. The lagging regions of the Centse-West, North-West and
South. Forthe firsttwq thedevelopment of theborderwith
Portugal (Galicia, Castilla-I-eon, Exhemadura) is a priority,
as well as the development of the small and medium urbnn
c€ntnes and the articulation of the Douro ard Ebro valleys
(CastillaJa-Mancha). As for the South (Murcia and Arrta-
lusia) the main opportunity lies in the connexion with the
developed Mediteiranean axis, the development ardratio-
nalisation of agriculture ard tourisrq and the creation of a
few indrstrial poles
. The regions of intermediate level of development : Canta-
bria and Valencia The fust needs to improve its transport
links (namely towards France), while the second seeks a
betterbalancebetweenits coastal and inland areas. Fqboth
regions, support to prodrctive investsnent in in&rstry and
serrrices is stresse4 as well as environmental conshaints.
Another group ofregions are those undergoing a process of
industrial re-conversion (Basque Country and Asturias).
These arc the marq though not exclusive, object of another
Plan : the Regional and Social Re-conversion Plan. The
priorities here are somewhat different from the previous :
private investment in new activities, or modernization of
existing ones, conrs fust with an emphasis on srnall and np-
dium enterprise. Vocational training and other manpower
measures also figure prominently.
The final group of regions are those with an autonomous
growth capacity (Ma&i4 Rioja, Navarra" Aragort Catalufia
and Baleares). Structural problems in these regions are,
naturally, much more limited ard localized.
53.2. The Communltystructural funds ln Spaln
After the 1988 reform of the EC stuctural funds Spain be-
came the largest beneficiary of Community suppor! having
been allocated in 1990 a total of 2,826 million ECU. Most of
the Spanish territory, a}nvt&z% of tbe populatioq fall wift-
in the scope of me of the objectives of the Sbuctural Funds
with a regional scope, as follows :
. Objective 1 (agging legions) : the regions of Andaluci4
Asturias, Castilla-Le6,n" Castilla-la-Mancha, Ceuta y Me-
lilla, Comunidad Valenciana, Exhemadura, Galicia, Cana-
rias and Murcia, correspording to 57.8% of the county's
population"
. Objective 2 (industrial decline) : most of Pais Vasco and
Cantab,ria and parts of Arag6n, Catalufr4 Madrid, Navara
and La Rioja, amounting to 2L.8% of the population.
. Objective 5b (rural areas) : parts of Arag6n, Baleares, Can-
tabria, Catalufi& Madrid, Navarra, La Rioja and Pais Vasco,
ot 2.5% of the national population.
Table 9 sumnarizes, by Furd and Objective, the ECresour-
ces allocated to Spain through the Community Support
Frameworks (CSF), which came into effect in 1989 and
1990. Spain also benefits from Community initiative pro-
grunmes (such as ENVIREG, INTERREG, STRIDE etc.)
and the Community loan instuments (EIB, MC).
533. The obJectlve I CSF
Resource transfers under Objective I are by far the most im-
portalxt, reaching 9,8 billion ECU (1989 pnces) for the 5-
year period 1989 - 1993. In the Objective I regions, ttre CSF
can be regarded as having a macroeconomic impact, and will
rcach about L4% of rcgonal GDPby 1992.lf one include-
sthe Community initiatives and loan instnrments, this per-
centage rises to som€ 2%.The*'wrpacts are obviously more
funportant in t€rms of investrnenf urd particularly public in-
veshnent, of which 35.40,%, in objective I regions, are co-
financedby ttreEC. If,moreover, one looks attheFCI, which
is the main finarcial instrument of domestic regional policy,
its interventions on a per capita basis reach only half the im-
portance of those of the combined EC funds.
The CSF for the objective 1 regions of Spain was adopted on
the 31.10.1989 on the basis of the Regional Development
Plaq mentioned above"
The analysis of ttris Plan by the Commission services, within
the spirit ofpartnership and taking into consideration the
overall financial constraints on the Community funds, led to
the &finition of 6 main axes of intervention in the CSF:
1. Improvingcommunications
2- Industry, crafts s€ctor arrC business services
3. Toruism
4. Agricultureandnraldevelopment
5. Infrastucture to support economic activity
6. Humanresources
Table 10 shows the b,reakdown of the objective I CSF by
these 6 axes" Axis 1, which consists of transport and com-
munications infrastructure, cleady received a high priority
and gets the largest share of financing, followed by Axis 5.
The CSF has been hoken down into 11 regional sub-CSFs
plus a multiregional one. The latter absorbs 60% of total fin-
ancial resourpes, which may be as an emphasis
on the global and international articulation of the territory in
line with Communit5r objectives, relative to purely local pro-
jects The regional distribution of Commrurity finarrcing in
the CSF also shows a stronger "bias" in favou of regions
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with the lowest income than thepattern of total public invest-
ments befqe the CSF, es can deasily seen from Table 3.9
6. Conclusions
In the 1950s and 1960s there was an overall high level of
growth and convergence of income levels of the Spanish re-
gions However, neither in tbe p€riod of stagration between
1973 and 1985 nor in the more dynamic post-accession peri-
o4 has there been a clear tnend of convergence or diver-
gerrca There is instead a diversity of situations within both
backward and prosperous regions, and Spain's economic
geography shows a rather complex arxl changing pattern Al-
though the ecommic centre of gravity of the country seems
to be changing to the South and to the East, this evolution
cannot be simply characterized in terms of two groups of de-
veloped and lagging regions, or even in terms of whole Co-
munidades Autonomas.
A bdanoed distribution of regional growth towards a more
decisive convetgencc of regional income levels would prob
ably contibute to the achievement of the overall macroecon-
omic objectives of the Spanish authorities: to sustain the
present high levels of rcal GDP growth, without incuning
excessive int€mal and extemal imbalarrce.s that would jeop
ardize Spain's participation in ttre EMS and EMU.
In the post-1985 peno4 the failure to achieve greater real
conv€,lg€nce within Spanish regions cannot be put down to a
poor performance of tlre laggrng regions (which have been
catching up with respect to the rest of the EC), but to an even
better perfomrance of the most &veloped ones.
Tlvo dominant hends have been: the emerge,lroe of the Me'
diterranean axis of growt[ and the decline of the industrial
Norttr. More recently, lxlme of the latt€r arcas have started to
recover. The whole East of the Peninsula seems set to
becorne economically dominant in the future.
The regimal distsibution of private investrnent in manufac-
turing, and in particular foreip direct investnent, docs not
se€,rr to be conuibuting as much as &sired to the rcdrction
of regional inequalitiess within the country, although the,rc
are no cmrprehensive data
The severity of unemplo5mnent problems in lagging regiory
which can impair their catching-up prospects, is dte to pr-
ticular rigidities of the labour marftet. Ttrere is evidence of a
considerable role played by labour skills mismalch. Migra-
tion flows frqn low to high activity regions are not likely to
r€sume at the same scale as in the pasL This points to the
need for specific policies directed to irnprove the flexibility
and quality of labour in ttre.se regions, some of which con-
tinue to be affected by a higher than average irprease of the
labour fqce"
The prospects for the inlan4 Atlantic and border regions
(with Pornrgal) deperd m their ability to diversify towards
new economic activities, generate new growth poles and im-
prove communications with therest of the Peninsula. In this
r€spect, the EC with its Community Support Frameworts'
and the Spanish instruments of ttre FCI and regional irrce,n-
tives policy point the right direction
See also CADMOS llggly Evaluation macro-&onomique du CCA loSa-1Q93 relative aux r68ions & I'objectif 1 en FsPaSne-
shrdy frnanced by the European Commission.
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Table 1 : GDP pcr head wlth respect to ECr ln pps
1960 1975 1985 1989
Andalucia
Arag6n
Asturias
Baleares
Canarias
Cantabria
Castilla-la-M
Castilla-Le6n
Cataluffa
C. Valenciana
Extremadua
Galicia
Madrid
Murcia
Navarra
Pais Vssco
Rioja
41.8
53.3
69.7
66.5
45.4
80.6
39.4
47.3
86.4
70.3
36.8
41.0
81.4
45.4
69.2
99.3
68.2
58.7
80.8
u.4
95.2
53.2
83.4
62.6
69.0
t02.7
81.7
47.2
60.1
t0/..4
68.3
90.3
109.9
82.5
50.9
79.8
68.9
107.4
66.2
70.6
55.2
il.4
88.9
76.5
47.2
57.1
94.6
fi.2
78.8
81.1
78.6
54.0
85.1
72.4
107.5
73.9
72.5
60.0
68.3
94.7
81.8
49.3
50.9
96.3
64.8
86.0
83.7
82.8
ESPANA s9.2 80.4 7t.8 76.0
EUR 12
Glnl lndex
100.0
0.195
100.0
0.150
1m.0
0.134
100.0
0.135
Sources: Quintana et al. (1991) "El desarrollo econ6mico espafiol y la Espaf,a desigual de las autonomfas",
Papeles de Economia Espafiola, 4522-61.
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Table 2: Investment ln manufacturlng, 1985-19E7 %
(7\(o(s)(4)(3)(2)(1)
Andalucia
Arag6n
Asturias
Baleares
Canarias
Cantabria
Castilla-la-M
Castilla-I-e6n
Catalufia
C. Valenciana
Extremadura
Galicia
Madrid
Murcia
Navarra
Pais Vasco
Rioja
ESPANA
10.9
2.6
0.6
0.8
2.8
0.7
6.6
3.7
19.1
10.5
0.5
21.8
8.7
1.6
2.5
5.7
0.7
t00
8.0
2.3
0.4
0.1
1.6
5.2
3.1
1.6
2t.o
10.6
0.5
7.1
9.7
0.7
6.9
20.2
1.2
1m
9.4
2.4
0.5
0.5
2.2
3.0
4.8
2.7
20.1
10.5
0.5
14.3
9.2
1.2
4.7
13.1
1.0
100
tt.2
4.0
3.9
1.3
2.4
1.4
6.9
3.7
2t.6
to.2
1.5
5.9
tL.7
2.0
1.9
9.4
1.0
100
97
66
L6
60
LL7
52
95
100
88
103
32
372
75
78
r29
61
74
100
7t
58
10
8
67
3U
45
43
97
104
32
t2l
83
34
357
215
126
100
u
6t
13
38
92
221
69
73
93
104
32
24
79
59
243
IN
105
100
(1) 
=
(2) 
=
(3) 
=
(4) 
=
(5) 
=
(5) 
=
(7) 
=
Sources:
Vo shue of region in new investment 1985-1987
9o sharc of region in expansion investments 1985-1987
7o share of region in total investment 19E5-19E7
Vo share of region in industrial value added 1987
Eo (L)t(4)
Eo (2)t(4)
qo Q)l@)
Ministerio de Economia y Hacienda (1990) FI Crecimiento ReSional Fspafrol ante la Tnte8racion Furopea.
Instituto Nacional de Estadistica Espafia en Cifras, 1989
Own calculations.
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Thble 3: Forelgn and publlc lnvestment %
(7)(o(5)(4)(3)(2)(l)
Andalucia
Arag6o
Asturias
Baleares
Canarias
Cantabria
CastillaJa-M
Crstilla-Le6n
Catalufla
C. Valenciana
Extresradra
Galicia
Madrid
Mrncia
Navarra
Pais Vasco
Rioja
ESPAITA
4.7
7.2
0.3
0.0
0.5
0.5
1.3
3.0
52^L
3.3
0.2
1.5
17.0
0.1
0.9
4.8
2.6
100
18.6
4.4
2.8
0.0
3.5
1.7
6.4
8.8
9.1
5.6
4.4
8.1
11.1
2.7
2.2
9.5
1.0
100
26.4
0.5
3.9
7.O
0.4
9.3
12.8
3.3
8.6
7.7
13.5
0.7
3.4
0.3
2.t
0.1
100
13.6
3.4
3.0
2.7
3.6
1.3
3.6
6.7
t7.9
9.9
1.9
6.2
t4.7
2.3
1.6
6.7
0.8
100
35
2r2
10
2
13
4t
t9
35
45
33
10
u
116
3
53
7t
327
100
137
130
94
0
98
131
177
132
51
56
233
130
75
tl7
t43
t42
t2t
100
194
16
131
193
?s
260
191
18
87
M
217
5
t47
18
3l
16
1m
(l) 
=
(2) =
(3) 
=
(4) 
=
(5) 
=(6) 
=
(7) 
=
Sources:
% share ofregion in foreign direct investment 1985-1988
96 share ofregion in public investment 19E9-1993
{o share ofregion in the EC Structurol Funds l9E9-1993
7o shte of region in total value added 1987
Eo (t)l(4)
% (z)t(d)
Eo (3)t(4)
Ministerio de Economia y Hacienda (1990) El Crecimiento Re8ional Fspafiol ante la [nteSracion Furopea
Zaragozr Rameau, J. A. (1990) "El resurgimiento de la politica regional: la nueva politica comunitaria
y la politica regional espanola", Informacion Comercial Fspanola - Revista de Fconomia, 679:27-37
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Thble 4: Levcl and structurc of unemployment (1990)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Andalucia
Ara86n
Asturias
Baleare.s
Canarias
Cantabria
Castilla-la-M
Castilla-Le6n
Cataluf,a
C. Valenciana
Extremadra
Galicia
Madrid
Mwcia
Navara
Pais Vasco
Rioja
ESPANA
EUR. 12
25.4
9.2
17.0
10.0
22.7
16.6
13.1
15.3
r2.5
13.9
u.8
11.8
tL4
15.5
10.8
19.0
7.3
15.1
8.4
6.4
2.2
7.0
2.0
6.4
5.9
2.8
5.4
3.0
L7
6.0
3.2
3.3
3.8
2.6
7.7
2.7
41.6
19.9
39.9
19.3
36.7
36.4
22.6
34.4
23.5
22.7
42.6
u.t
23.0
28.9
24.9
4.7
tt.2
30.3
15.5
20.3
6.9
12.5
7.9
18.5
t2.9
10.4
11.3
9.7
11.6
19.8
9.8
9.9
11.0
8.0
13.8
6.5
t2.5
6.8
4.4
(l) 
=
(2) 
=
(3) 
=
(4) =
Source:
1990 total unemployment rate
in search of first employment
< 25years old
> 25 years old
EITROSTAT, Regions - Statistiques Rapides
Instituto Nacional de Estadfstica - Encuesta de Poblaci6n Activa, 1990.
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Thblc 5: Populatbn movcmcntr rnd ectlvlty retcr
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Andalucia
Areg6n
As0rias
Baleares
Canarias
Cantabria
Castille-la-M
Castilla-Ledn
Catsluia
C. Valenciana
Extemadra
Galicia
Ma&id
Mrncie
Nrvarra
Pais Vasco
Rioja
ESPANA
Et R.12
13.6
8.7
8.3
rL'
13.1
9.7
11.3
t.9
9.7
10.9
tL4
8.7
10.9
14.2
9.3
t.6
9.3
10.8
11.8
7.8
9.2
9.4
10.0
6.8
8.4
t.8
t.5
7.9
E.6
8.9
9.0
6.4
7.6
8.2
6.8
8.8
8.0
9.9
1.5
1.2
1.1
0.6
0.8
t.7
0.8
1.2
1.5
1.7
0.4
1.3
1.9
1.5
1.1
0.5
t.4
1.3
0.E
45.1
45.1
6.2
49.3
48.5
4.1
43.8
4.9
50.3
48.9
43.4
50.9
46.0
47.3
45.8
47.3
46.5
47.2
54.1
(l) 
= /oo birth rate (19t7)
(2) = o/oo mortality rate (1987)
(3) = o/oo net migration rate (1987)
(4) = o/o activity rate (1988)
Source: EITROSTAI
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l]sblc 6: Structure of reglonel cmployncnt
tn5 1989
(l) (2' (3) (4) (1) (2\ (3) (4)
Andalucia
Arag6n
Asturias
Bdeares
Canarias
Crntabria
Castille-le-M
Crstilla-I*6n
Cataluia
C. Valenciana
Extserradra
Galicie
Mr&id
Murcia
Navarra
Peis Vasco
Rioja
ESPANA
n.7
25.6
3l.l
16.t
23.0
31.5
37.t
37.r
E.2
t7.9
6.7
fi.7
1.9
25.t
m.9
t3
:n.9
It7
2t.2
30.4
l7.t
tL3
4.9
l&6
lt6
40.t
33.1
ll.4
ldt
25.1
u.4
36.E
45.9
305
9.t
t.3
7.3
t2,t
1l.t
7.1
10.9
7.7
ll.3
10.0
7.6
7.2
lz5
9.4
t.t
8.7
7.7
40.t
37.9
31.2
53.1
5L9
|Lt
32.7
36.6
39.7
39.0
y.3
n.3
59.5
0.4
33.5
37.1
30.9
39.8
16.3
14.0
t7.6
4.E
9.6
t7.2
2t.o
22.5
4.4
t0.7
n.4
36.7
1.0
15.5
to.2
4.4
14.t
tlt
14.E
26.6
25.6
17.8
10.9
23.1
21.9
16.7
35.7
28.5
9.8
14.9
tlg
22.1
3t.3
3t.7
31.3
xt.2
11.3 57.6
E.l 51.3
E.5 48.3
t2.2 65.2
11.6 67,9
9.4 50.3
t2.3 4.8
9.5 4t.3
E.4 51.4
8.3 sLS
12.5 50.3
E.9 39.s
7.6 68.6
10.0 5L4
8.2 4t.3
7.2 54.7
7.7 6.2
23.4 n.2 9.5 8.9 56.8
(l) = % employed in agriculture rnd firhcrier
(2) = % employed in indurtsy
(3) = % employed in construction
(4) = % employed in rcrviccr
Source: EUROSTAI
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frblc 7: fncrcosG ln trelnlng plrccs roqulrod for edolerconb rgcd 15-19(5 olplaces rvallablc h f985)
(t)(4)(3)(2\(1)
Andelucie
Astudrs
Crstillr-Lcm
Crcilh-lr-Mrmbr
CantryMelillr
Com. Vcl€ocienr
Exbcmr&re
Gelhie
Cmarirg
Mucia
Total ObJcctlve I
Aregm
Belerres
Cantehie
Cst lufir
Rioje
Ma&id
Navarre
Pric Vrsco
Total Espofre
t7.3
26.0
23.9
t6.4
13.9
19.1
tt.4
19.5
19.1
25.9
19.2
26.t
19.5
2t.8
2t.8
3t.2
2L3
n.4
28.9
30.t
6.4
42.4
D.0
v.3
35.3
30.0
35.5
33.9
v.3
v.2
4L6
y.9
39.6
38.0
39.9
51.7
41.4
u.3
4tl
72.4
6.3
45.4
8A
y.4
41.4
55.0
53.0
o.2
53.4
68.7
54.5
58.3
66.9
7t.l
74.0
68.8
73.1
3s.l
59.4
15.8
65.0
15.3
-14.8
13.3
-23.2
-23.2
-33.2
4.5
-t9.2
-22.9
68.4
tll
2L3
78.0
110.1
52.7
lfi.5
49.5
5L4
tz.o
51.9
rL3
49.3
1.2
r.2
-t2.o
31.1
6.5
1.5
27.7
-14.5
:7.2
tlA
15.5
-15.0
22.1 38.0 ().0 0.0 31.8
Participation rates:(l) = initial training(2)= general educetion
(3) = iotrl
lncrersc in places reguirod to reach
(4) = nrtional overlgc initial training(5) = Community trrget of 2 yeare treining
Sourcc: R. Derenbrch (190) "Humm capital and related infrrrbucturc cndovnmente: investment required
in problem regionsn, study for the EC Commisrion.
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Table 8: Dlstrlbutlon of the Fondo dc Compcnsacl6n Intorterrltorlal ln ObJcctlvo I reglons
(1) (2> (3) (4)
Andalucia
Asturias
Canarias
Castilla-la-M.
Castilla-Le6n
C. Valenciana
Extrerna&ra
Galicia
Murcia
Total obJ. I
26.8
2.3
6.7
6.6
8.9
5.9
7.5
to.7
2.O
78.0
23.3
2.2
5.5
7.0
7.5
6.3
5.9
10.7
2^t
7t.2
100.0
39.6
0.9
t.3
9.6
6.7
6.0
t.8
t6.2
3.9
100.0
100.0
1.3
o.2
1.3
1.3
0.6
0.4
1.8
1.3
0.9
1.0
1.0Total Spaln 100.0
(l) = share of region in the FCI, 1983
(2) = share of region in the FCI, 19t9
(3) = share ofregion in the FCI, 1989 according to the ncw ryetem (simuletion)
(4) = idem, expressed as FCI per capita relative to svcsatc
Source: CADMOS (1991) Evaluation mecro-eeonomiquc du CCA lQSQ-IQQ3 reletivc elrr r6tions de I'ohjectif
1 en Fspagne- study financed by the European Commirrion.
Table 9: Communlty Support Fromeworls, MECU, l9t9 prlccc
1989 1990 l99t t992 1993
Objective I
ERDF
ESF
EAGGF
Objective 2
ERDF
ESF
Objectives 3+4
ESF
Objective 5 f
ERDF
ESF
EAGGF
1603.0
1102.0
3E6.0
115.0
212.4tD
1E3.4(1)
1:0"'
16.5
L6
9.0
4.9
1719.0
1090.0
394.0
235.O
2{t.3
188.8
58.5
203.0
n3.0
n.7
6.7
0.9
n.t
1914.0
1213.0
431.0
no.o
263.7
t92.2
51.5
168..2
t68.2
55.4
11.0
6.0
38.4
2147.0
1361.0
486.0
300.0
..
191.8
191.8
88.1
rt.5
10.5
59.1
2196.0
1433.0
651.0
3lz0
--
97.4
aL3
tL6
6L5
' Ongoing measures (191.8 MECU) have been included in 1989
2 Objective 5 a is not translated into a separate CSF
Source: EC Commission (1991) Annual ReDprt on ihe implcmentelion of thc reform of thc Stnrcturel Fundr.
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Thble 10: Communlty grants ln the obJcctlvc I CSF, by axls
(2)(l)
1. knprovedcommunications
1.1 Motorways ard other roads
1.2. Railways
1.3. Pqts
1.4. Ai{ports
1.5. Lrlandwaterways
1.5. Other means of transput
1.7. Telecommunication of which approx.ECU 1 12 million STAR/ERDF
2. Industry, crafts secior and business services
2.1. Support for industy and crafts sector
2.2. Support for business s€rvices
2.3.Looil developrnent
2.4. Lrdustsialfhardicraft estates
3. Tourism
3.1. Support for investment in tourism
3.2. Development of cultrnal resources of interest fc tourism
4. Agriculture and rural developnent
4.1. Inrprovenrent of the corditions of production
4.1 Protection of the environment and cons€r.rr. of neL resources
4.3. Horizontal measures (Objective 5a)
4.4. Reorientation of production and improvements in quality
5. Infrastructure to support 
€conomic activity
5.1. Waler
5.2. Errrgy (of which approL ECLI 63 million Valoren/ERDF)
5.3. Protection and improvenrant of theenvironment
5.4. Re.search, development and innovation
5.5. Training facilities
5.6. Healttr facilities
6. Developnrcnt of humanresources
6.1. Meaures directly linked to developnent pricities
6. 2. Multi-priority measure.s
6.3. Measures rcferred to in fut 1 (5) ard (6) of Reg.4255188
(training outside the finn)
6.4. Measures referred to in Art 1(2) of Reg.425588
(studies, innovative measures...)
7. Technicalassistarce
8. Objectives 3 and 4
Total
3218
2051
635
101
103
0
18
308
699
373
7L
132
123
t82
68
l13
t4/.t
793
100
477
70
1652
652
LL7
575
123
104
81
891
302
151
239
7
4
1265
9393
y.2
21.8
6.7
1.0
1.1
0.0
0.1
3.2
7.4
3.9
0.7
1.4
1.3
1.9
0.7
1.2
15.3
8.4
1.0
5.0
0.7
17.5
6.9
1.2
6.1
1.3
1.1
0.8
9.4
3.2
1.6
2.5
0.0
0.4
t3.4
1m.0
(l)= in MECU at 19E9 prices
(2)= in % of total
Source: Community Support Framework
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Country Studlcr
Sec elrc Bconomio Pepcru No.79 (ItG Uribd Kinjdm), No.tl (Thc Ncthcrludr) end No.t2 @e[ium).
No. I Thc Fcdcnl Republic of Gcrnmy (Scptcnbc 1990)
No. 2 Portugrl ( Feb,rurry l99l)
No. 3 Unitcd Kingdom (lulrch l99l)
No. 4 Dcnmark (April 191)
No.5 Frrncc (ro0t 1991)
No. 6 kelrnd (Scptembcr l99l)
No. ? Spein (March 1992)
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